blob: c777d7b0eb6f3761116e41fab4ca39afa0c96a12 [file] [log] [blame]
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include "dns-domain.h"
#include "home-util.h"
#include "libcrypt-util.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
#include "user-util.h"
bool suitable_user_name(const char *name) {
/* Checks whether the specified name is suitable for management via homed. Note that client-side
* we usually validate with the simple valid_user_group_name(), while server-side we are a bit more
* restrictive, so that we can change the rules server-side without having to update things
* client-side too. */
if (!valid_user_group_name(name, 0))
return false;
/* We generally rely on NSS to tell us which users not to care for, but let's filter out some
* particularly well-known users. */
if (STR_IN_SET(name,
"root",
"nobody",
NOBODY_USER_NAME, NOBODY_GROUP_NAME))
return false;
/* Let's also defend our own namespace, as well as Debian's (unwritten?) logic of prefixing system
* users with underscores. */
if (STARTSWITH_SET(name, "systemd-", "_"))
return false;
return true;
}
int suitable_realm(const char *realm) {
_cleanup_free_ char *normalized = NULL;
int r;
/* Similar to the above: let's validate the realm a bit stricter server-side than client side */
r = dns_name_normalize(realm, 0, &normalized); /* this also checks general validity */
if (r == -EINVAL)
return 0;
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (!streq(realm, normalized)) /* is this normalized? */
return false;
if (dns_name_is_root(realm)) /* Don't allow top level domain */
return false;
return true;
}
int suitable_image_path(const char *path) {
return !empty_or_root(path) &&
path_is_valid(path) &&
path_is_absolute(path);
}
bool supported_fstype(const char *fstype) {
/* Limit the set of supported file systems a bit, as protection against little tested kernel file
* systems. Also, we only support the resize ioctls for these file systems. */
return STR_IN_SET(fstype, "ext4", "btrfs", "xfs");
}
int split_user_name_realm(const char *t, char **ret_user_name, char **ret_realm) {
_cleanup_free_ char *user_name = NULL, *realm = NULL;
const char *c;
int r;
assert(t);
assert(ret_user_name);
assert(ret_realm);
c = strchr(t, '@');
if (!c) {
user_name = strdup(t);
if (!user_name)
return -ENOMEM;
} else {
user_name = strndup(t, c - t);
if (!user_name)
return -ENOMEM;
realm = strdup(c + 1);
if (!realm)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!suitable_user_name(user_name))
return -EINVAL;
if (realm) {
r = suitable_realm(realm);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (r == 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
*ret_user_name = TAKE_PTR(user_name);
*ret_realm = TAKE_PTR(realm);
return 0;
}
int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *formatted = NULL;
JsonVariant *v;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(secret);
if (!FLAGS_SET(secret->mask, USER_RECORD_SECRET))
return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", "{}");
v = json_variant_by_key(secret->json, "secret");
if (!v)
return -EINVAL;
r = json_variant_format(v, 0, &formatted);
if (r < 0)
return r;
(void) sd_bus_message_sensitive(m);
return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", formatted);
}
const char *home_record_dir(void) {
return secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_HOME_RECORD_DIR") ?: "/var/lib/systemd/home/";
}