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da5c24cd5ce3a3ab1675a9ddf3bbcf54b7dcb420
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Ben Collins <benmcollins13@gmail.com>
Thu Jun 18 07:50:43 2026 -0400
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GitHub <noreply@github.com>
Thu Jun 18 07:50:43 2026 -0400
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83e5456d0cc0bd7e5dfc50008d3ab3f91467e04d
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825b0a2fe3899e4658d08e00f8faea5f6ece13f8 [diff]
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eca511ece30bd7e49c865d07d14f4f772c11a599 [diff]
Merge pull request #329 from benmcollins/315-rfc7797-b64

jwt: RFC 7797 unencoded (b64=false) + detached payloads
tree: 83e5456d0cc0bd7e5dfc50008d3ab3f91467e04d
  1. .github/
  2. cmake/
  3. doxygen/
  4. images/
  5. include/
  6. libjwt/
  7. tests/
  8. tools/
  9. .gitignore
  10. CLAUDE.md
  11. CMakeLists.txt
  12. codecov.yml
  13. LICENSE
  14. README.md
  15. SECURITY.md
README.md

LibJWT - The C JWT Library

codecov

maClara

:bulb: Supported Standards

StandardRFCDescription
JWS:page_facing_up: RFC-7515JSON Web Signature
JWE:page_facing_up: RFC-7516JSON Web Encryption
JWK:page_facing_up: RFC-7517JSON Web Keys and Sets
JWA:page_facing_up: RFC-7518JSON Web Algorithms
JWT:page_facing_up: RFC-7519JSON Web Token
JWK Thumbprint:page_facing_up: RFC-7638 / RFC-9278JWK Thumbprint and Thumbprint URI
cnf:page_facing_up: RFC-7800Proof-of-Possession (confirmation) claim helpers

[!NOTE] Throughout this documentation you will see links such as the ones above to RFC documents. These are relevant to that particular part of the library and are helpful to understand some of the specific standards that shaped the development of LibJWT.

:construction: Build Prerequisites

Required

  • A JSON library: either Jansson (>= 2.0, the default) or json-c (>= 0.16, selected with -DWITH_JSON_C=ON). The two are interchangeable.
  • CMake (>= 3.7)

Crypto support

  • OpenSSL (>= 3.0.0)
  • GnuTLS (>= 3.8.8)
  • MbedTLS (>= 3.6.0)

[!NOTE] At least one crypto backend is required, but any non-empty combination works. OpenSSL is enabled by default and can be disabled with -DWITH_OPENSSL=OFF. Each backend parses and converts JWK(S) natively.

Algorithm support matrix

JWS Algorithm algOpenSSLGnuTLSMbedTLS
HS256 HS384 HS512:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
ES256 ES384 ES512:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
RS256 RS384 RS512:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
EdDSA using ED25519 [^okp3813]:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::x:
EdDSA using ED448 [^okp3813]:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::x:
PS256 PS384 PS512:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
ES256K:white_check_mark::x::white_check_mark:
ML-DSA-44/65/87 [^mldsa]:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::x:

[^mldsa]: ML-DSA (FIPS 204, registered for JOSE by RFC 9964) is experimental and off by default. Build with -DWITH_ML_DSA=ON; it is only enabled when a backend with ML-DSA support is present: OpenSSL >= 3.5, or GnuTLS >= 3.8.10 built against a PQC provider (e.g. --with-leancrypto). When built in, the public header defines LIBJWT_HAVE_ML_DSA. ML-DSA keys use the "AKP" key type with a "pub" member and a "priv" member holding the 32-byte FIPS-204 seed. MbedTLS has no ML-DSA and rejects AKP keys.

[^okp3813]: On the GnuTLS backend these specific cases need GnuTLS >= 3.8.13: (a) loading an OKP private JWK supplied without its public coordinate x, a “seed-only” Ed25519/Ed448 key (older GnuTLS crashes deriving the public key); and (b) ECDH-ES with the X25519 and X448 curves. Anything that carries x (including every public key and every PEM/DER key) is unaffected, as are the OpenSSL and MbedTLS backends. The version is checked at runtime, so upgrading the shared libgnutls to >= 3.8.13 lifts the restriction without rebuilding LibJWT.

JWS serialization

LibJWT produces and verifies JWS (RFC 7515) in the Compact Serialization (the default) and the JSON Serialization — both the Flattened form and the General form with one or more signatures.

JWS serializationSignaturesSupported
Compact (RFC 7515 §7.1)one:white_check_mark:
JSON Flattened (RFC 7515 §7.2.2)one:white_check_mark:
JSON General (RFC 7515 §7.2.1)one or more:white_check_mark:

Select the form with jwt_builder_set_format(); add extra signers (each with its own algorithm and per-signature protected/unprotected header) with jwt_builder_add_signature(). The same payload is signed independently by each signer, so signatures may use different algorithms (e.g. RS256 + ES256).

To verify a multi-signature token, supply a set of candidate keys (a JWKS) with jwt_checker_setkeyring() and a policy: JWT_VERIFY_POLICY_ANY (the default — accept if at least one signature verifies, e.g. multi-issuer or key rotation) or JWT_VERIFY_POLICY_ALL (every signature must verify, e.g. co-signing). A signature naming a kid is matched to that key; a keyless one is tried against every compatible key, always under the usual algorithm/key-type binding. jwt_checker_verify() auto-detects Compact vs JSON input.

Unencoded and detached payloads (RFC 7797)

For a generic JWS over an opaque (non-claims) payload — e.g. HTTP message signatures or JAdES/eIDAS detached signatures — set the payload bytes with jwt_builder_setpayload(). jwt_builder_setb64(b, 0) selects the RFC 7797 unencoded form ("b64":false, with "b64" marked critical and the signature computed over the raw payload), and jwt_builder_set_detached() omits the payload from the output. A detached token is verified with jwt_checker_verify_detached(), supplying the payload out-of-band. As mandated by RFC 7797 §6, the checker rejects a "b64":false token unless "b64" appears in "crit".

JWE

LibJWT supports JWE (RFC 7516) in both the Compact Serialization and the JSON Serialization (the Flattened form and the General form with one or more recipients). A JWE uses two algorithms: a key management algorithm (alg) and a content encryption algorithm (enc).

JWE serializationRecipientsSupported
Compact (RFC 7516 §7.1)one:white_check_mark:
JSON Flattened (RFC 7516 §7.2.2)one:white_check_mark:
JSON General (RFC 7516 §7.2.1)one or more:white_check_mark:

With the JSON serializations the plaintext is encrypted once with a single CEK; each recipient wraps that CEK independently, so any recipient's key can decrypt the token. They also carry an optional shared unprotected header, per-recipient headers, and an application AAD member.

Legend: :white_check_mark: native implementation  ·  :x: not supported

JWE key management algOpenSSLGnuTLSMbedTLS
dir (Direct Encryption):white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
A128KW A192KW A256KW:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
RSA-OAEP (SHA-1):white_check_mark::x::white_check_mark:
RSA-OAEP-256:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
ECDH-ES (+ +A128KW/+A192KW/+A256KW) [^okp3813]:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
JWE content encryption encOpenSSLGnuTLSMbedTLS
A128GCM A192GCM A256GCM:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:
A128CBC-HS256 A192CBC-HS384 A256CBC-HS512:white_check_mark::white_check_mark::white_check_mark:

[!NOTE] ECDH-ES supports both Direct Key Agreement and the +A*KW key wrapping modes, on the EC curves P-256/384/521 and the OKP curves X25519/X448, with optional apu/apv PartyInfo. RSA1_5 and zip (compression) are intentionally not supported. Each backend implements JWE natively. GnuTLS/Nettle cannot perform RSA-OAEP with SHA-1, so the GnuTLS backend does not support plain RSA-OAEP (RSA-OAEP-256 is native).

Optional

:books: Docs and Source

:link: Current Docs

:link: Legacy Docs v2.1.1

:link: GitHub Repo

:package: Pre-built Packages

LibJWT is available in most Linux distributions as well as through Homebrew for Linux, macOS, and Windows.

:hammer: Build Instructions

With CMake:

$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ cmake ..
$ make