| /* |
| * CDDL HEADER START |
| * |
| * This file and its contents are supplied under the terms of the |
| * Common Development and Distribution License ("CDDL"), version 1.0. |
| * You may only use this file in accordance with the terms of version |
| * 1.0 of the CDDL. |
| * |
| * A full copy of the text of the CDDL should have accompanied this |
| * source. A copy of the CDDL is also available via the Internet at |
| * http://www.illumos.org/license/CDDL. |
| * |
| * CDDL HEADER END |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2017, Datto, Inc. All rights reserved. |
| * Copyright (c) 2018 by Delphix. All rights reserved. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <sys/dsl_crypt.h> |
| #include <sys/dsl_pool.h> |
| #include <sys/zap.h> |
| #include <sys/zil.h> |
| #include <sys/dsl_dir.h> |
| #include <sys/dsl_prop.h> |
| #include <sys/spa_impl.h> |
| #include <sys/dmu_objset.h> |
| #include <sys/zvol.h> |
| |
| /* |
| * This file's primary purpose is for managing master encryption keys in |
| * memory and on disk. For more info on how these keys are used, see the |
| * block comment in zio_crypt.c. |
| * |
| * All master keys are stored encrypted on disk in the form of the DSL |
| * Crypto Key ZAP object. The binary key data in this object is always |
| * randomly generated and is encrypted with the user's wrapping key. This |
| * layer of indirection allows the user to change their key without |
| * needing to re-encrypt the entire dataset. The ZAP also holds on to the |
| * (non-encrypted) encryption algorithm identifier, IV, and MAC needed to |
| * safely decrypt the master key. For more info on the user's key see the |
| * block comment in libzfs_crypto.c |
| * |
| * In-memory encryption keys are managed through the spa_keystore. The |
| * keystore consists of 3 AVL trees, which are as follows: |
| * |
| * The Wrapping Key Tree: |
| * The wrapping key (wkey) tree stores the user's keys that are fed into the |
| * kernel through 'zfs load-key' and related commands. Datasets inherit their |
| * parent's wkey by default, so these structures are refcounted. The wrapping |
| * keys remain in memory until they are explicitly unloaded (with |
| * "zfs unload-key"). Unloading is only possible when no datasets are using |
| * them (refcount=0). |
| * |
| * The DSL Crypto Key Tree: |
| * The DSL Crypto Keys (DCK) are the in-memory representation of decrypted |
| * master keys. They are used by the functions in zio_crypt.c to perform |
| * encryption, decryption, and authentication. Snapshots and clones of a given |
| * dataset will share a DSL Crypto Key, so they are also refcounted. Once the |
| * refcount on a key hits zero, it is immediately zeroed out and freed. |
| * |
| * The Crypto Key Mapping Tree: |
| * The zio layer needs to lookup master keys by their dataset object id. Since |
| * the DSL Crypto Keys can belong to multiple datasets, we maintain a tree of |
| * dsl_key_mapping_t's which essentially just map the dataset object id to its |
| * appropriate DSL Crypto Key. The management for creating and destroying these |
| * mappings hooks into the code for owning and disowning datasets. Usually, |
| * there will only be one active dataset owner, but there are times |
| * (particularly during dataset creation and destruction) when this may not be |
| * true or the dataset may not be initialized enough to own. As a result, this |
| * object is also refcounted. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * This tunable allows datasets to be raw received even if the stream does |
| * not include IVset guids or if the guids don't match. This is used as part |
| * of the resolution for ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_8308_ENCRYPTION. |
| */ |
| int zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check = 0; |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_wrapping_key_hold(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag) |
| { |
| (void) zfs_refcount_add(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, void *tag) |
| { |
| (void) zfs_refcount_remove(&wkey->wk_refcnt, tag); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_wrapping_key_free(dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey) |
| { |
| ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&wkey->wk_refcnt)); |
| |
| if (wkey->wk_key.ck_data) { |
| bzero(wkey->wk_key.ck_data, |
| CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); |
| kmem_free(wkey->wk_key.ck_data, |
| CRYPTO_BITS2BYTES(wkey->wk_key.ck_length)); |
| } |
| |
| zfs_refcount_destroy(&wkey->wk_refcnt); |
| kmem_free(wkey, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t)); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_wrapping_key_create(uint8_t *wkeydata, zfs_keyformat_t keyformat, |
| uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out) |
| { |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey; |
| |
| /* allocate the wrapping key */ |
| wkey = kmem_alloc(sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| |
| /* allocate and initialize the underlying crypto key */ |
| wkey->wk_key.ck_data = kmem_alloc(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN, KM_SLEEP); |
| |
| wkey->wk_key.ck_format = CRYPTO_KEY_RAW; |
| wkey->wk_key.ck_length = CRYPTO_BYTES2BITS(WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); |
| bcopy(wkeydata, wkey->wk_key.ck_data, WRAPPING_KEY_LEN); |
| |
| /* initialize the rest of the struct */ |
| zfs_refcount_create(&wkey->wk_refcnt); |
| wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat; |
| wkey->wk_salt = salt; |
| wkey->wk_iters = iters; |
| |
| *wkey_out = wkey; |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dsl_crypto_params_create_nvlist(dcp_cmd_t cmd, nvlist_t *props, |
| nvlist_t *crypto_args, dsl_crypto_params_t **dcp_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT; |
| uint64_t keyformat = ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE; |
| uint64_t salt = 0, iters = 0; |
| dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = NULL; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL; |
| uint8_t *wkeydata = NULL; |
| uint_t wkeydata_len = 0; |
| char *keylocation = NULL; |
| |
| dcp = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| dcp->cp_cmd = cmd; |
| |
| /* get relevant arguments from the nvlists */ |
| if (props != NULL) { |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION), &crypt); |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), &keyformat); |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_string(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), &keylocation); |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), &salt); |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), &iters); |
| |
| dcp->cp_crypt = crypt; |
| } |
| |
| if (crypto_args != NULL) { |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(crypto_args, "wkeydata", |
| &wkeydata, &wkeydata_len); |
| } |
| |
| /* check for valid command */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd >= DCP_CMD_MAX) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } else { |
| dcp->cp_cmd = cmd; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for valid crypt */ |
| if (dcp->cp_crypt >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } else { |
| dcp->cp_crypt = crypt; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for valid keyformat */ |
| if (keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for a valid keylocation (of any kind) and copy it in */ |
| if (keylocation != NULL) { |
| if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_FALSE)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| dcp->cp_keylocation = spa_strdup(keylocation); |
| } |
| |
| /* check wrapping key length, if given */ |
| if (wkeydata != NULL && wkeydata_len != WRAPPING_KEY_LEN) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* if the user asked for the default crypt, determine that now */ |
| if (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_ON) |
| dcp->cp_crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_ON_VALUE; |
| |
| /* create the wrapping key from the raw data */ |
| if (wkeydata != NULL) { |
| /* create the wrapping key with the verified parameters */ |
| dsl_wrapping_key_create(wkeydata, keyformat, salt, |
| iters, &wkey); |
| dcp->cp_wkey = wkey; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Remove the encryption properties from the nvlist since they are not |
| * maintained through the DSL. |
| */ |
| (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION)); |
| (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT)); |
| (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT)); |
| (void) nvlist_remove_all(props, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS)); |
| |
| *dcp_out = dcp; |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t)); |
| *dcp_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_crypto_params_free(dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, boolean_t unload) |
| { |
| if (dcp == NULL) |
| return; |
| |
| if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL) |
| spa_strfree(dcp->cp_keylocation); |
| if (unload && dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) |
| dsl_wrapping_key_free(dcp->cp_wkey); |
| |
| kmem_free(dcp, sizeof (dsl_crypto_params_t)); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_crypto_key_compare(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| const dsl_crypto_key_t *dcka = a; |
| const dsl_crypto_key_t *dckb = b; |
| |
| if (dcka->dck_obj < dckb->dck_obj) |
| return (-1); |
| if (dcka->dck_obj > dckb->dck_obj) |
| return (1); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_key_mapping_compare(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| const dsl_key_mapping_t *kma = a; |
| const dsl_key_mapping_t *kmb = b; |
| |
| if (kma->km_dsobj < kmb->km_dsobj) |
| return (-1); |
| if (kma->km_dsobj > kmb->km_dsobj) |
| return (1); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_wkey_compare(const void *a, const void *b) |
| { |
| const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wka = a; |
| const dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkb = b; |
| |
| if (wka->wk_ddobj < wkb->wk_ddobj) |
| return (-1); |
| if (wka->wk_ddobj > wkb->wk_ddobj) |
| return (1); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| spa_keystore_init(spa_keystore_t *sk) |
| { |
| rw_init(&sk->sk_dk_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL); |
| rw_init(&sk->sk_km_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL); |
| rw_init(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock, NULL, RW_DEFAULT, NULL); |
| avl_create(&sk->sk_dsl_keys, spa_crypto_key_compare, |
| sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), |
| offsetof(dsl_crypto_key_t, dck_avl_link)); |
| avl_create(&sk->sk_key_mappings, spa_key_mapping_compare, |
| sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), |
| offsetof(dsl_key_mapping_t, km_avl_link)); |
| avl_create(&sk->sk_wkeys, spa_wkey_compare, sizeof (dsl_wrapping_key_t), |
| offsetof(dsl_wrapping_key_t, wk_avl_link)); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| spa_keystore_fini(spa_keystore_t *sk) |
| { |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey; |
| void *cookie = NULL; |
| |
| ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_dsl_keys)); |
| ASSERT(avl_is_empty(&sk->sk_key_mappings)); |
| |
| while ((wkey = avl_destroy_nodes(&sk->sk_wkeys, &cookie)) != NULL) |
| dsl_wrapping_key_free(wkey); |
| |
| avl_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys); |
| avl_destroy(&sk->sk_key_mappings); |
| avl_destroy(&sk->sk_dsl_keys); |
| rw_destroy(&sk->sk_wkeys_lock); |
| rw_destroy(&sk->sk_km_lock); |
| rw_destroy(&sk->sk_dk_lock); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *rddobj) |
| { |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT)); |
| |
| return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, rddobj)); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *version) |
| { |
| *version = 0; |
| |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOENT)); |
| |
| /* version 0 is implied by ENOENT */ |
| (void) zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, version); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| boolean_t |
| dsl_dir_incompatible_encryption_version(dsl_dir_t *dd) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t version = 0; |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_version(dd, &version); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (B_FALSE); |
| |
| return (version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj, |
| void *tag, dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey; |
| |
| ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)); |
| |
| /* init the search wrapping key */ |
| search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj; |
| |
| /* lookup the wrapping key */ |
| found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &search_wkey, NULL); |
| if (!found_wkey) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* increment the refcount */ |
| dsl_wrapping_key_hold(found_wkey, tag); |
| |
| *wkey_out = found_wkey; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| *wkey_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag, |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t **wkey_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey; |
| uint64_t rddobj; |
| boolean_t locked = B_FALSE; |
| |
| if (!RW_WRITE_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)) { |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_READER); |
| locked = B_TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| /* get the ddobj that the keylocation property was inherited from */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* lookup the wkey in the avl tree */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_ddobj_impl(spa, rddobj, tag, &wkey); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* unlock the wkey tree if we locked it */ |
| if (locked) |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| *wkey_out = wkey; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (locked) |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| *wkey_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dsl_crypto_can_set_keylocation(const char *dsname, const char *keylocation) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL; |
| uint64_t rddobj; |
| |
| /* hold the dsl dir */ |
| ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| dd = NULL; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* if dd is not encrypted, the value may only be "none" */ |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) { |
| if (strcmp(keylocation, "none") != 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for a valid keylocation for encrypted datasets */ |
| if (!zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(keylocation, B_TRUE)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that this is an encryption root */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (rddobj != dd->dd_object) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| out: |
| if (dd != NULL) |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| if (dp != NULL) |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_key_free(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck) |
| { |
| ASSERT(zfs_refcount_count(&dck->dck_holds) == 0); |
| |
| /* destroy the zio_crypt_key_t */ |
| zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck->dck_key); |
| |
| /* free the refcount, wrapping key, and lock */ |
| zfs_refcount_destroy(&dck->dck_holds); |
| if (dck->dck_wkey) |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck); |
| |
| /* free the key */ |
| kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t)); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_key_rele(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag) |
| { |
| if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) |
| dsl_crypto_key_free(dck); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_crypto_key_open(objset_t *mos, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, |
| uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t crypt = 0, guid = 0, version = 0; |
| uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN]; |
| uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN]; |
| uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN]; |
| uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN]; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck; |
| |
| /* allocate and initialize the key */ |
| dck = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| |
| /* fetch all of the values we need from the ZAP */ |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, |
| &crypt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &guid); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1, |
| MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1, |
| SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN, |
| iv); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN, |
| mac); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* the initial on-disk format for encryption did not have a version */ |
| (void) zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version); |
| |
| /* |
| * Unwrap the keys. If there is an error return EACCES to indicate |
| * an authentication failure. |
| */ |
| ret = zio_crypt_key_unwrap(&wkey->wk_key, crypt, version, guid, |
| raw_keydata, raw_hmac_keydata, iv, mac, &dck->dck_key); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* finish initializing the dsl_crypto_key_t */ |
| zfs_refcount_create(&dck->dck_holds); |
| dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck); |
| dck->dck_wkey = wkey; |
| dck->dck_obj = dckobj; |
| zfs_refcount_add(&dck->dck_holds, tag); |
| |
| *dck_out = dck; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dck != NULL) { |
| bzero(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t)); |
| kmem_free(dck, sizeof (dsl_crypto_key_t)); |
| } |
| |
| *dck_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dckobj, void *tag, |
| dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t search_dck; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *found_dck; |
| |
| ASSERT(RW_LOCK_HELD(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock)); |
| |
| /* init the search key */ |
| search_dck.dck_obj = dckobj; |
| |
| /* find the matching key in the keystore */ |
| found_dck = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, &search_dck, NULL); |
| if (!found_dck) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* increment the refcount */ |
| zfs_refcount_add(&found_dck->dck_holds, tag); |
| |
| *dck_out = found_dck; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| *dck_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa_t *spa, dsl_dir_t *dd, void *tag, |
| dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| avl_index_t where; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck_io = NULL, *dck_ks = NULL; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL; |
| uint64_t dckobj = dd->dd_crypto_obj; |
| |
| /* Lookup the key in the tree of currently loaded keys */ |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_READER); |
| ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks); |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock); |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| *dck_out = dck_ks; |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| /* Lookup the wrapping key from the keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, dd, FTAG, &wkey); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| *dck_out = NULL; |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| } |
| |
| /* Read the key from disk */ |
| ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(spa->spa_meta_objset, wkey, dckobj, |
| tag, &dck_io); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); |
| *dck_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Add the key to the keystore. It may already exist if it was |
| * added while performing the read from disk. In this case discard |
| * it and return the key from the keystore. |
| */ |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_impl(spa, dckobj, tag, &dck_ks); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, &where); |
| avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck_io, where); |
| *dck_out = dck_io; |
| } else { |
| dsl_crypto_key_free(dck_io); |
| *dck_out = dck_ks; |
| } |
| |
| /* Release the wrapping key (the dsl key now has a reference to it) */ |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, void *tag) |
| { |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| |
| if (zfs_refcount_remove(&dck->dck_holds, tag) == 0) { |
| avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dsl_keys, dck); |
| dsl_crypto_key_free(dck); |
| } |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_dk_lock); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| avl_index_t where; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey; |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| |
| /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */ |
| found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where); |
| if (found_wkey != NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EEXIST); |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } |
| avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where); |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error_unlock: |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_load_wkey(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, |
| boolean_t noop) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dcp->cp_wkey; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL; |
| uint64_t rddobj, keyformat, salt, iters; |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't validate the wrapping key's keyformat, salt, or iters |
| * since they will never be needed after the DCK has been wrapped. |
| */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL || |
| dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE || |
| dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT || |
| dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* hold the dsl dir */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| dd = NULL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* confirm that dd is the encryption root */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0 || rddobj != dd->dd_object) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* initialize the wkey's ddobj */ |
| wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object; |
| |
| /* verify that the wkey is correct by opening its dsl key */ |
| ret = dsl_crypto_key_open(dp->dp_meta_objset, wkey, |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj, FTAG, &dck); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* initialize the wkey encryption parameters from the DSL Crypto Key */ |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &keyformat); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ASSERT3U(keyformat, <, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS); |
| ASSERT3U(keyformat, !=, ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE); |
| IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters != 0); |
| IMPLY(keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt != 0); |
| IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, iters == 0); |
| IMPLY(keyformat != ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE, salt == 0); |
| |
| wkey->wk_keyformat = keyformat; |
| wkey->wk_salt = salt; |
| wkey->wk_iters = iters; |
| |
| /* |
| * At this point we have verified the wkey and confirmed that it can |
| * be used to decrypt a DSL Crypto Key. We can simply cleanup and |
| * return if this is all the user wanted to do. |
| */ |
| if (noop) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* insert the wrapping key into the keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG); |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| /* create any zvols under this ds */ |
| zvol_create_minors_recursive(dsname); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dck != NULL) |
| dsl_crypto_key_rele(dck, FTAG); |
| if (dd != NULL) |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| if (dp != NULL) |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(spa_t *spa, uint64_t ddobj) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t search_wkey; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *found_wkey; |
| |
| /* init the search wrapping key */ |
| search_wkey.wk_ddobj = ddobj; |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| |
| /* remove the wrapping key from the keystore */ |
| found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, |
| &search_wkey, NULL); |
| if (!found_wkey) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } else if (zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt) != 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EBUSY); |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } |
| avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey); |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| /* free the wrapping key */ |
| dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error_unlock: |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_unload_wkey(const char *dsname) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = NULL; |
| spa_t *spa = NULL; |
| |
| ret = spa_open(dsname, &spa, FTAG); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| /* |
| * Wait for any outstanding txg IO to complete, releasing any |
| * remaining references on the wkey. |
| */ |
| if (spa_mode(spa) != SPA_MODE_READ) |
| txg_wait_synced(spa->spa_dsl_pool, 0); |
| |
| spa_close(spa, FTAG); |
| |
| /* hold the dsl dir */ |
| ret = dsl_pool_hold(dsname, FTAG, &dp); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) { |
| ret = (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP)); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| dd = NULL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* unload the wkey */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_unload_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, dd->dd_object); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| /* remove any zvols under this ds */ |
| zvol_remove_minors(dp->dp_spa, dsname, B_TRUE); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dd != NULL) |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| if (dp != NULL) |
| dsl_pool_rele(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| key_mapping_add_ref(dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag) |
| { |
| ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1); |
| zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * The locking here is a little tricky to ensure we don't cause unnecessary |
| * performance problems. We want to release a key mapping whenever someone |
| * decrements the refcount to 0, but freeing the mapping requires removing |
| * it from the spa_keystore, which requires holding sk_km_lock as a writer. |
| * Most of the time we don't want to hold this lock as a writer, since the |
| * same lock is held as a reader for each IO that needs to encrypt / decrypt |
| * data for any dataset and in practice we will only actually free the |
| * mapping after unmounting a dataset. |
| */ |
| void |
| key_mapping_rele(spa_t *spa, dsl_key_mapping_t *km, void *tag) |
| { |
| ASSERT3U(zfs_refcount_count(&km->km_refcnt), >=, 1); |
| |
| if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, tag) != 0) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * We think we are going to need to free the mapping. Add a |
| * reference to prevent most other releasers from thinking |
| * this might be their responsibility. This is inherently |
| * racy, so we will confirm that we are legitimately the |
| * last holder once we have the sk_km_lock as a writer. |
| */ |
| zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG); |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| if (zfs_refcount_remove(&km->km_refcnt, FTAG) != 0) { |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km); |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km); |
| zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt); |
| kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t)); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_create_mapping(spa_t *spa, dsl_dataset_t *ds, void *tag, |
| dsl_key_mapping_t **km_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| avl_index_t where; |
| dsl_key_mapping_t *km, *found_km; |
| boolean_t should_free = B_FALSE; |
| |
| /* Allocate and initialize the mapping */ |
| km = kmem_zalloc(sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| zfs_refcount_create(&km->km_refcnt); |
| |
| ret = spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(spa, ds->ds_dir, km, &km->km_key); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt); |
| kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t)); |
| |
| if (km_out != NULL) |
| *km_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| km->km_dsobj = ds->ds_object; |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| |
| /* |
| * If a mapping already exists, simply increment its refcount and |
| * cleanup the one we made. We want to allocate / free outside of |
| * the lock because this lock is also used by the zio layer to lookup |
| * key mappings. Otherwise, use the one we created. Normally, there will |
| * only be one active reference at a time (the objset owner), but there |
| * are times when there could be multiple async users. |
| */ |
| found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, &where); |
| if (found_km != NULL) { |
| should_free = B_TRUE; |
| zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_refcnt, tag); |
| if (km_out != NULL) |
| *km_out = found_km; |
| } else { |
| zfs_refcount_add(&km->km_refcnt, tag); |
| avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, km, where); |
| if (km_out != NULL) |
| *km_out = km; |
| } |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| |
| if (should_free) { |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, km->km_key, km); |
| zfs_refcount_destroy(&km->km_refcnt); |
| kmem_free(km, sizeof (dsl_key_mapping_t)); |
| } |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_remove_mapping(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_key_mapping_t search_km; |
| dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km; |
| |
| /* init the search key mapping */ |
| search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj; |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER); |
| |
| /* find the matching mapping */ |
| found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, |
| &search_km, NULL); |
| if (found_km == NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT); |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| |
| key_mapping_rele(spa, found_km, tag); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error_unlock: |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is primarily used by the zio and arc layer to lookup |
| * DSL Crypto Keys for encryption. Callers must release the key with |
| * spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(). The function may also be called with |
| * dck_out == NULL and tag == NULL to simply check that a key exists |
| * without getting a reference to it. |
| */ |
| int |
| spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, void *tag, |
| dsl_crypto_key_t **dck_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_key_mapping_t search_km; |
| dsl_key_mapping_t *found_km; |
| |
| ASSERT((tag != NULL && dck_out != NULL) || |
| (tag == NULL && dck_out == NULL)); |
| |
| /* init the search key mapping */ |
| search_km.km_dsobj = dsobj; |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock, RW_READER); |
| |
| /* remove the mapping from the tree */ |
| found_km = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_key_mappings, &search_km, |
| NULL); |
| if (found_km == NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOENT); |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } |
| |
| if (found_km && tag) |
| zfs_refcount_add(&found_km->km_key->dck_holds, tag); |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| |
| if (dck_out != NULL) |
| *dck_out = found_km->km_key; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error_unlock: |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_km_lock); |
| |
| if (dck_out != NULL) |
| *dck_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dsl_dir_t *dd) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL; |
| |
| ret = spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dd->dd_pool->dp_spa, dd, FTAG, |
| &wkey); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| static zfs_keystatus_t |
| dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dsl_dir_t *dd) |
| { |
| /* check if this dd has a has a dsl key */ |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return (ZFS_KEYSTATUS_NONE); |
| |
| return (dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd) == 0 ? |
| ZFS_KEYSTATUS_AVAILABLE : ZFS_KEYSTATUS_UNAVAILABLE); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_dir_get_crypt(dsl_dir_t *dd, uint64_t *crypt) |
| { |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) { |
| *crypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF; |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| return (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, crypt)); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(objset_t *mos, uint64_t dckobj, uint64_t crypt, |
| uint64_t root_ddobj, uint64_t guid, uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, |
| uint8_t *keydata, uint8_t *hmac_keydata, uint64_t keyformat, |
| uint64_t salt, uint64_t iters, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, |
| &crypt, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, |
| &root_ddobj, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, |
| &guid, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN, |
| iv, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN, |
| mac, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1, |
| MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, keydata, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1, |
| SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, hmac_keydata, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), |
| 8, 1, &keyformat, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), |
| 8, 1, &salt, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(mos, dckobj, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), |
| 8, 1, &iters, tx)); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync(dsl_crypto_key_t *dck, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| zio_crypt_key_t *key = &dck->dck_key; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = dck->dck_wkey; |
| uint8_t keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN]; |
| uint8_t hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN]; |
| uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN]; |
| uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx)); |
| ASSERT3U(key->zk_crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS); |
| |
| /* encrypt and store the keys along with the IV and MAC */ |
| VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_wrap(&dck->dck_wkey->wk_key, key, iv, mac, |
| keydata, hmac_keydata)); |
| |
| /* update the ZAP with the obtained values */ |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck->dck_obj, |
| key->zk_crypt, wkey->wk_ddobj, key->zk_guid, iv, mac, keydata, |
| hmac_keydata, wkey->wk_keyformat, wkey->wk_salt, wkey->wk_iters, |
| tx); |
| } |
| |
| typedef struct spa_keystore_change_key_args { |
| const char *skcka_dsname; |
| dsl_crypto_params_t *skcka_cp; |
| } spa_keystore_change_key_args_t; |
| |
| static int |
| spa_keystore_change_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx); |
| spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg; |
| dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp; |
| uint64_t rddobj; |
| |
| /* check for the encryption feature */ |
| if (!spa_feature_is_enabled(dp->dp_spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for valid key change command */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY && |
| dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_INHERIT && |
| dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY && |
| dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* hold the dd */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &dd, NULL); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| dd = NULL; |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* verify that the dataset is encrypted */ |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* clones must always use their origin's key */ |
| if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* lookup the ddobj we are inheriting the keylocation from */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* Handle inheritance */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT || |
| dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT) { |
| /* no other encryption params should be given */ |
| if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT || |
| dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL || |
| dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that this is an encryption root */ |
| if (dd->dd_object != rddobj) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that the parent is encrypted */ |
| if (dd->dd_parent->dd_crypto_obj == 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* if we are rewrapping check that both keys are loaded */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) { |
| ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd->dd_parent); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| /* handle forcing an encryption root without rewrapping */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) { |
| /* no other encryption params should be given */ |
| if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT || |
| dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL || |
| dcp->cp_wkey != NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that this is not an encryption root */ |
| if (dd->dd_object == rddobj) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| /* crypt cannot be changed after creation */ |
| if (dcp->cp_crypt != ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* we are not inheritting our parent's wkey so we need one ourselves */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check for a valid keyformat for the new wrapping key */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS || |
| dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If this dataset is not currently an encryption root we need a new |
| * keylocation for this dataset's new wrapping key. Otherwise we can |
| * just keep the one we already had. |
| */ |
| if (dd->dd_object != rddobj && dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* check that the keylocation is valid if it is not NULL */ |
| if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL && |
| !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* passphrases require pbkdf2 salt and iters */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) { |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 || |
| dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EINVAL); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* make sure the dd's wkey is loaded */ |
| ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(dd); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dd != NULL) |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function deals with the intricacies of updating wrapping |
| * key references and encryption roots recursively in the event |
| * of a call to 'zfs change-key' or 'zfs promote'. The 'skip' |
| * parameter should always be set to B_FALSE when called |
| * externally. |
| */ |
| static void |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(uint64_t rddobj, uint64_t ddobj, |
| uint64_t new_rddobj, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, boolean_t skip, |
| dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| zap_cursor_t *zc; |
| zap_attribute_t *za; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx); |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = NULL; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| uint64_t curr_rddobj; |
| |
| ASSERT(RW_WRITE_HELD(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock)); |
| |
| /* hold the dd */ |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, ddobj, NULL, FTAG, &dd)); |
| |
| /* ignore special dsl dirs */ |
| if (dd->dd_myname[0] == '$' || dd->dd_myname[0] == '%') { |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj); |
| VERIFY(ret == 0 || ret == ENOENT); |
| |
| /* |
| * Stop recursing if this dsl dir didn't inherit from the root |
| * or if this dd is a clone. |
| */ |
| if (ret == ENOENT || |
| (!skip && (curr_rddobj != rddobj || dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)))) { |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we don't have a wrapping key just update the dck to reflect the |
| * new encryption root. Otherwise rewrap the entire dck and re-sync it |
| * to disk. If skip is set, we don't do any of this work. |
| */ |
| if (!skip) { |
| if (wkey == NULL) { |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(dp->dp_meta_objset, |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_ROOT_DDOBJ, 8, 1, |
| &new_rddobj, tx)); |
| } else { |
| VERIFY0(spa_keystore_dsl_key_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, dd, |
| FTAG, &dck)); |
| dsl_wrapping_key_hold(wkey, dck); |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(dck->dck_wkey, dck); |
| dck->dck_wkey = wkey; |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync(dck, tx); |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(dp->dp_spa, dck, FTAG); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| zc = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_cursor_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| za = kmem_alloc(sizeof (zap_attribute_t), KM_SLEEP); |
| |
| /* Recurse into all child dsl dirs. */ |
| for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset, |
| dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_child_dir_zapobj); |
| zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0; |
| zap_cursor_advance(zc)) { |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, |
| za->za_first_integer, new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx); |
| } |
| zap_cursor_fini(zc); |
| |
| /* |
| * Recurse into all dsl dirs of clones. We utilize the skip parameter |
| * here so that we don't attempt to process the clones directly. This |
| * is because the clone and its origin share the same dck, which has |
| * already been updated. |
| */ |
| for (zap_cursor_init(zc, dp->dp_meta_objset, |
| dsl_dir_phys(dd)->dd_clones); |
| zap_cursor_retrieve(zc, za) == 0; |
| zap_cursor_advance(zc)) { |
| dsl_dataset_t *clone; |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, za->za_first_integer, |
| FTAG, &clone)); |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, |
| clone->ds_dir->dd_object, new_rddobj, wkey, B_TRUE, tx); |
| dsl_dataset_rele(clone, FTAG); |
| } |
| zap_cursor_fini(zc); |
| |
| kmem_free(za, sizeof (zap_attribute_t)); |
| kmem_free(zc, sizeof (zap_cursor_t)); |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(dd, FTAG); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_dataset_t *ds; |
| avl_index_t where; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = dmu_tx_pool(tx); |
| spa_t *spa = dp->dp_spa; |
| spa_keystore_change_key_args_t *skcka = arg; |
| dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp = skcka->skcka_cp; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey = NULL, *found_wkey; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t wkey_search; |
| char *keylocation = dcp->cp_keylocation; |
| uint64_t rddobj, new_rddobj; |
| |
| /* create and initialize the wrapping key */ |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold(dp, skcka->skcka_dsname, FTAG, &ds)); |
| ASSERT(!ds->ds_is_snapshot); |
| |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY || |
| dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY) { |
| /* |
| * We are changing to a new wkey. Set additional properties |
| * which can be sent along with this ioctl. Note that this |
| * command can set keylocation even if it can't normally be |
| * set via 'zfs set' due to a non-local keylocation. |
| */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) { |
| wkey = dcp->cp_wkey; |
| wkey->wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object; |
| } else { |
| keylocation = "prompt"; |
| } |
| |
| if (keylocation != NULL) { |
| dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), |
| ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, |
| keylocation, tx); |
| } |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj)); |
| new_rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * We are inheritting the parent's wkey. Unset any local |
| * keylocation and grab a reference to the wkey. |
| */ |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_INHERIT) { |
| VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(spa, |
| ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey)); |
| } |
| |
| dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), ZPROP_SRC_NONE, |
| 0, 0, NULL, tx); |
| |
| rddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object; |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir->dd_parent, |
| &new_rddobj)); |
| } |
| |
| if (wkey == NULL) { |
| ASSERT(dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_INHERIT || |
| dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_FORCE_NEW_KEY); |
| } |
| |
| rw_enter(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| |
| /* recurse through all children and rewrap their keys */ |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, ds->ds_dir->dd_object, |
| new_rddobj, wkey, B_FALSE, tx); |
| |
| /* |
| * All references to the old wkey should be released now (if it |
| * existed). Replace the wrapping key. |
| */ |
| wkey_search.wk_ddobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_object; |
| found_wkey = avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, &wkey_search, NULL); |
| if (found_wkey != NULL) { |
| ASSERT0(zfs_refcount_count(&found_wkey->wk_refcnt)); |
| avl_remove(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, found_wkey); |
| dsl_wrapping_key_free(found_wkey); |
| } |
| |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_NEW_KEY) { |
| avl_find(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, &where); |
| avl_insert(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys, wkey, where); |
| } else if (wkey != NULL) { |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); |
| } |
| |
| rw_exit(&spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_keystore_change_key(const char *dsname, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp) |
| { |
| spa_keystore_change_key_args_t skcka; |
| |
| /* initialize the args struct */ |
| skcka.skcka_dsname = dsname; |
| skcka.skcka_cp = dcp; |
| |
| /* |
| * Perform the actual work in syncing context. The blocks modified |
| * here could be calculated but it would require holding the pool |
| * lock and traversing all of the datasets that will have their keys |
| * changed. |
| */ |
| return (dsl_sync_task(dsname, spa_keystore_change_key_check, |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync, &skcka, 15, |
| ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_RESERVED)); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dsl_dir_rename_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *dd, dsl_dir_t *newparent) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t curr_rddobj, parent_rddobj; |
| |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return (0); |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &curr_rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* |
| * if this is not an encryption root, we must make sure we are not |
| * moving dd to a new encryption root |
| */ |
| if (dd->dd_object != curr_rddobj) { |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(newparent, |
| &parent_rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| if (parent_rddobj != curr_rddobj) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check to make sure that a promote from targetdd to origindd will not require |
| * any key rewraps. |
| */ |
| int |
| dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t rddobj, op_rddobj, tp_rddobj; |
| |
| /* If the dataset is not encrypted we don't need to check anything */ |
| if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we are not changing the first origin snapshot in a chain |
| * the encryption root won't change either. |
| */ |
| if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin)) |
| return (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * If the origin is the encryption root we will update |
| * the DSL Crypto Key to point to the target instead. |
| */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| if (rddobj == origin->dd_object) |
| return (0); |
| |
| /* |
| * The origin is inheriting its encryption root from its parent. |
| * Check that the parent of the target has the same encryption root. |
| */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin->dd_parent, &op_rddobj); |
| if (ret == ENOENT) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| else if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(target->dd_parent, &tp_rddobj); |
| if (ret == ENOENT) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| else if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| if (op_rddobj != tp_rddobj) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_dataset_promote_crypt_sync(dsl_dir_t *target, dsl_dir_t *origin, |
| dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| uint64_t rddobj; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = target->dd_pool; |
| dsl_dataset_t *targetds; |
| dsl_dataset_t *originds; |
| char *keylocation; |
| |
| if (origin->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return; |
| if (dsl_dir_is_clone(origin)) |
| return; |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(origin, &rddobj)); |
| |
| if (rddobj != origin->dd_object) |
| return; |
| |
| /* |
| * If the target is being promoted to the encryption root update the |
| * DSL Crypto Key and keylocation to reflect that. We also need to |
| * update the DSL Crypto Keys of all children inheritting their |
| * encryption root to point to the new target. Otherwise, the check |
| * function ensured that the encryption root will not change. |
| */ |
| keylocation = kmem_alloc(ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, KM_SLEEP); |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, |
| dsl_dir_phys(target)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &targetds)); |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(dp, |
| dsl_dir_phys(origin)->dd_head_dataset_obj, FTAG, &originds)); |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_prop_get_dd(origin, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), |
| 1, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN, keylocation, NULL, B_FALSE)); |
| dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(targetds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), |
| ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, keylocation, tx); |
| dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(originds, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), |
| ZPROP_SRC_NONE, 0, 0, NULL, tx); |
| |
| rw_enter(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock, RW_WRITER); |
| spa_keystore_change_key_sync_impl(rddobj, origin->dd_object, |
| target->dd_object, NULL, B_FALSE, tx); |
| rw_exit(&dp->dp_spa->spa_keystore.sk_wkeys_lock); |
| |
| dsl_dataset_rele(targetds, FTAG); |
| dsl_dataset_rele(originds, FTAG); |
| kmem_free(keylocation, ZAP_MAXVALUELEN); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dmu_objset_create_crypt_check(dsl_dir_t *parentdd, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, |
| boolean_t *will_encrypt) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| uint64_t pcrypt, crypt; |
| dsl_crypto_params_t dummy_dcp = { 0 }; |
| |
| if (will_encrypt != NULL) |
| *will_encrypt = B_FALSE; |
| |
| if (dcp == NULL) |
| dcp = &dummy_dcp; |
| |
| if (dcp->cp_cmd != DCP_CMD_NONE) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| if (parentdd != NULL) { |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_crypt(parentdd, &pcrypt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| } else { |
| pcrypt = ZIO_CRYPT_OFF; |
| } |
| |
| crypt = (dcp->cp_crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) ? pcrypt : dcp->cp_crypt; |
| |
| ASSERT3U(pcrypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT); |
| ASSERT3U(crypt, !=, ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT); |
| |
| /* check for valid dcp with no encryption (inherited or local) */ |
| if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) { |
| /* Must not specify encryption params */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey != NULL || |
| (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL && |
| strcmp(dcp->cp_keylocation, "none") != 0)) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| if (will_encrypt != NULL) |
| *will_encrypt = B_TRUE; |
| |
| /* |
| * We will now definitely be encrypting. Check the feature flag. When |
| * creating the pool the caller will check this for us since we won't |
| * technically have the feature activated yet. |
| */ |
| if (parentdd != NULL && |
| !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa, |
| SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)) { |
| return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP)); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check for errata #4 (encryption enabled, bookmark_v2 disabled) */ |
| if (parentdd != NULL && |
| !spa_feature_is_enabled(parentdd->dd_pool->dp_spa, |
| SPA_FEATURE_BOOKMARK_V2)) { |
| return (SET_ERROR(EOPNOTSUPP)); |
| } |
| |
| /* handle inheritance */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) { |
| ASSERT3P(parentdd, !=, NULL); |
| |
| /* key must be fully unspecified */ |
| if (dcp->cp_keylocation != NULL) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* parent must have a key to inherit */ |
| if (pcrypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* check for parent key */ |
| ret = dmu_objset_check_wkey_loaded(parentdd); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| /* At this point we should have a fully specified key. Check location */ |
| if (dcp->cp_keylocation == NULL || |
| !zfs_prop_valid_keylocation(dcp->cp_keylocation, B_TRUE)) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* Must have fully specified keyformat */ |
| switch (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_keyformat) { |
| case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_HEX: |
| case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_RAW: |
| /* requires no pbkdf2 iters and salt */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt != 0 || dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters != 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| break; |
| case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE: |
| /* requires pbkdf2 iters and salt */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey->wk_salt == 0 || |
| dcp->cp_wkey->wk_iters < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| break; |
| case ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE: |
| default: |
| /* keyformat must be specified and valid */ |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| } |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_dataset_create_crypt_sync(uint64_t dsobj, dsl_dir_t *dd, |
| dsl_dataset_t *origin, dsl_crypto_params_t *dcp, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = dd->dd_pool; |
| uint64_t crypt; |
| dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey; |
| |
| /* clones always use their origin's wrapping key */ |
| if (dsl_dir_is_clone(dd)) { |
| ASSERT3P(dcp, ==, NULL); |
| |
| /* |
| * If this is an encrypted clone we just need to clone the |
| * dck into dd. Zapify the dd so we can do that. |
| */ |
| if (origin->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) { |
| dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx); |
| dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx); |
| |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj = |
| dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(origin->ds_dir, tx); |
| VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object, |
| DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, |
| &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx)); |
| } |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * A NULL dcp at this point indicates this is the origin dataset |
| * which does not have an objset to encrypt. Raw receives will handle |
| * encryption separately later. In both cases we can simply return. |
| */ |
| if (dcp == NULL || dcp->cp_cmd == DCP_CMD_RAW_RECV) |
| return; |
| |
| crypt = dcp->cp_crypt; |
| wkey = dcp->cp_wkey; |
| |
| /* figure out the effective crypt */ |
| if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT && dd->dd_parent != NULL) |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd->dd_parent, &crypt)); |
| |
| /* if we aren't doing encryption just return */ |
| if (crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_OFF || crypt == ZIO_CRYPT_INHERIT) |
| return; |
| |
| /* zapify the dd so that we can add the crypto key obj to it */ |
| dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx); |
| dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx); |
| |
| /* use the new key if given or inherit from the parent */ |
| if (wkey == NULL) { |
| VERIFY0(spa_keystore_wkey_hold_dd(dp->dp_spa, |
| dd->dd_parent, FTAG, &wkey)); |
| } else { |
| wkey->wk_ddobj = dd->dd_object; |
| } |
| |
| ASSERT3P(wkey, !=, NULL); |
| |
| /* Create or clone the DSL crypto key and activate the feature */ |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj = dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(crypt, wkey, tx); |
| VERIFY0(zap_add(dp->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_object, |
| DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| tx)); |
| dsl_dataset_activate_feature(dsobj, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, |
| (void *)B_TRUE, tx); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we inherited the wrapping key we release our reference now. |
| * Otherwise, this is a new key and we need to load it into the |
| * keystore. |
| */ |
| if (dcp->cp_wkey == NULL) { |
| dsl_wrapping_key_rele(wkey, FTAG); |
| } else { |
| VERIFY0(spa_keystore_load_wkey_impl(dp->dp_spa, wkey)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| typedef struct dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg { |
| uint64_t dcrka_dsobj; |
| uint64_t dcrka_fromobj; |
| dmu_objset_type_t dcrka_ostype; |
| nvlist_t *dcrka_nvl; |
| boolean_t dcrka_do_key; |
| } dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t; |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dsl_dataset_t *fromds, |
| dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| objset_t *os; |
| dnode_t *mdn; |
| uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| uint_t len; |
| uint64_t intval, nlevels, blksz, ibs; |
| uint64_t nblkptr, maxblkid; |
| |
| if (ostype != DMU_OST_ZFS && ostype != DMU_OST_ZVOL) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* raw receives also need info about the structure of the metadnode */ |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_COMPRESS_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CHECKSUM_LEGACY_FUNCTIONS) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", &nlevels); |
| if (ret != 0 || nlevels > DN_MAX_LEVELS) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", &blksz); |
| if (ret != 0 || blksz < SPA_MINBLOCKSIZE) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| else if (blksz > spa_maxblocksize(tx->tx_pool->dp_spa)) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", &ibs); |
| if (ret != 0 || ibs < DN_MIN_INDBLKSHIFT || ibs > DN_MAX_INDBLKSHIFT) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", &nblkptr); |
| if (ret != 0 || nblkptr != DN_MAX_NBLKPTR) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", &maxblkid); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &buf, &len); |
| if (ret != 0 || len != ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| |
| mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os); |
| |
| /* |
| * If we already created the objset, make sure its unchangeable |
| * properties match the ones received in the nvlist. |
| */ |
| rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG); |
| if (!BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds)) && |
| (mdn->dn_nlevels != nlevels || mdn->dn_datablksz != blksz || |
| mdn->dn_indblkshift != ibs || mdn->dn_nblkptr != nblkptr)) { |
| rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| } |
| rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check that the ivset guid of the fromds matches the one from the |
| * send stream. Older versions of the encryption code did not have |
| * an ivset guid on the from dataset and did not send one in the |
| * stream. For these streams we provide the |
| * zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable to allow these datasets to |
| * be received with a generated ivset guid. |
| */ |
| if (fromds != NULL && !zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check) { |
| uint64_t from_ivset_guid = 0; |
| intval = 0; |
| |
| (void) nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", &intval); |
| (void) zap_lookup(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, |
| fromds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, |
| sizeof (from_ivset_guid), 1, &from_ivset_guid); |
| |
| if (intval == 0 || from_ivset_guid == 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISSING)); |
| |
| if (intval != from_ivset_guid) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ZFS_ERR_FROM_IVSET_GUID_MISMATCH)); |
| } |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, dmu_objset_type_t ostype, |
| nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool; |
| objset_t *os; |
| dnode_t *mdn; |
| zio_t *zio; |
| uint8_t *portable_mac; |
| uint_t len; |
| uint64_t compress, checksum, nlevels, blksz, ibs, maxblkid; |
| boolean_t newds = B_FALSE; |
| |
| VERIFY0(dmu_objset_from_ds(ds, &os)); |
| mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os); |
| |
| /* |
| * Fetch the values we need from the nvlist. "to_ivset_guid" must |
| * be set on the snapshot, which doesn't exist yet. The receive |
| * code will take care of this for us later. |
| */ |
| compress = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress"); |
| checksum = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum"); |
| nlevels = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels"); |
| blksz = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz"); |
| ibs = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift"); |
| maxblkid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid"); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", &portable_mac, |
| &len)); |
| |
| /* if we haven't created an objset for the ds yet, do that now */ |
| rrw_enter(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, RW_READER, FTAG); |
| if (BP_IS_HOLE(dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds))) { |
| (void) dmu_objset_create_impl_dnstats(dp->dp_spa, ds, |
| dsl_dataset_get_blkptr(ds), ostype, nlevels, blksz, |
| ibs, tx); |
| newds = B_TRUE; |
| } |
| rrw_exit(&ds->ds_bp_rwlock, FTAG); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set the portable MAC. The local MAC will always be zero since the |
| * incoming data will all be portable and user accounting will be |
| * deferred until the next mount. Afterwards, flag the os to be |
| * written out raw next time. |
| */ |
| arc_release(os->os_phys_buf, &os->os_phys_buf); |
| bcopy(portable_mac, os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN); |
| bzero(os->os_phys->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN); |
| os->os_flags &= ~OBJSET_FLAG_USERACCOUNTING_COMPLETE; |
| os->os_next_write_raw[tx->tx_txg & TXG_MASK] = B_TRUE; |
| |
| /* set metadnode compression and checksum */ |
| mdn->dn_compress = compress; |
| mdn->dn_checksum = checksum; |
| |
| rw_enter(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock, RW_WRITER); |
| dnode_new_blkid(mdn, maxblkid, tx, B_FALSE, B_TRUE); |
| rw_exit(&mdn->dn_struct_rwlock); |
| |
| /* |
| * We can't normally dirty the dataset in syncing context unless |
| * we are creating a new dataset. In this case, we perform a |
| * pseudo txg sync here instead. |
| */ |
| if (newds) { |
| dsl_dataset_dirty(ds, tx); |
| } else { |
| zio = zio_root(dp->dp_spa, NULL, NULL, ZIO_FLAG_MUSTSUCCEED); |
| dsl_dataset_sync(ds, zio, tx); |
| VERIFY0(zio_wait(zio)); |
| dsl_dataset_sync_done(ds, tx); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset; |
| uint8_t *buf = NULL; |
| uint_t len; |
| uint64_t intval, key_guid, version; |
| boolean_t is_passphrase = B_FALSE; |
| |
| ASSERT(dsl_dataset_phys(ds)->ds_flags & DS_FLAG_INCONSISTENT); |
| |
| /* |
| * Read and check all the encryption values from the nvlist. We need |
| * all of the fields of a DSL Crypto Key, as well as a fully specified |
| * wrapping key. |
| */ |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS || |
| intval <= ZIO_CRYPT_OFF) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, &intval); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* |
| * If this is an incremental receive make sure the given key guid |
| * matches the one we already have. |
| */ |
| if (ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj != 0) { |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| return (ret); |
| if (intval != key_guid) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EACCES)); |
| } |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, |
| &buf, &len); |
| if (ret != 0 || len != MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, |
| &buf, &len); |
| if (ret != 0 || len != SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &buf, &len); |
| if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_IV_LEN) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &buf, &len); |
| if (ret != 0 || len != WRAPPING_MAC_LEN) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't support receiving old on-disk formats. The version 0 |
| * implementation protected several fields in an objset that were |
| * not always portable during a raw receive. As a result, we call |
| * the old version an on-disk errata #3. |
| */ |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, &version); |
| if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), |
| &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || intval >= ZFS_KEYFORMAT_FORMATS || |
| intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_NONE) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| is_passphrase = (intval == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE); |
| |
| /* |
| * for raw receives we allow any number of pbkdf2iters since there |
| * won't be a chance for the user to change it. |
| */ |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), |
| &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0))) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| ret = nvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), |
| &intval); |
| if (ret != 0 || (is_passphrase == (intval == 0))) |
| return (SET_ERROR(EINVAL)); |
| |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nvl, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = tx->tx_pool; |
| objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir; |
| uint_t len; |
| uint64_t rddobj, one = 1; |
| uint8_t *keydata, *hmac_keydata, *iv, *mac; |
| uint64_t crypt, key_guid, keyformat, iters, salt; |
| uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION; |
| char *keylocation = "prompt"; |
| |
| /* lookup the values we need to create the DSL Crypto Key */ |
| crypt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE); |
| key_guid = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID); |
| keyformat = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT)); |
| iters = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS)); |
| salt = fnvlist_lookup_uint64(nvl, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, |
| &keydata, &len)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, |
| &hmac_keydata, &len)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, &iv, &len)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_lookup_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, &mac, &len)); |
| |
| /* if this is a new dataset setup the DSL Crypto Key. */ |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) { |
| /* zapify the dsl dir so we can add the key object to it */ |
| dmu_buf_will_dirty(dd->dd_dbuf, tx); |
| dsl_dir_zapify(dd, tx); |
| |
| /* create the DSL Crypto Key on disk and activate the feature */ |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj = zap_create(mos, |
| DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, |
| sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, |
| dd->dd_crypto_obj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, |
| sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx)); |
| |
| dsl_dataset_activate_feature(ds->ds_object, |
| SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION, (void *)B_TRUE, tx); |
| ds->ds_feature[SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION] = (void *)B_TRUE; |
| |
| /* save the dd_crypto_obj on disk */ |
| VERIFY0(zap_add(mos, dd->dd_object, DD_FIELD_CRYPTO_KEY_OBJ, |
| sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &dd->dd_crypto_obj, tx)); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set the keylocation to prompt by default. If keylocation |
| * has been provided via the properties, this will be overridden |
| * later. |
| */ |
| dsl_prop_set_sync_impl(ds, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYLOCATION), |
| ZPROP_SRC_LOCAL, 1, strlen(keylocation) + 1, |
| keylocation, tx); |
| |
| rddobj = dd->dd_object; |
| } else { |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &rddobj)); |
| } |
| |
| /* sync the key data to the ZAP object on disk */ |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync_impl(mos, dd->dd_crypto_obj, crypt, |
| rddobj, key_guid, iv, mac, keydata, hmac_keydata, keyformat, salt, |
| iters, tx); |
| } |
| |
| static int |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_check(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg; |
| dsl_dataset_t *ds = NULL, *fromds = NULL; |
| |
| ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj, |
| FTAG, &ds); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| if (dcrka->dcrka_fromobj != 0) { |
| ret = dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_fromobj, |
| FTAG, &fromds); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_check(ds, fromds, |
| dcrka->dcrka_ostype, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| /* |
| * We run this check even if we won't be doing this part of |
| * the receive now so that we don't make the user wait until |
| * the receive finishes to fail. |
| */ |
| ret = dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_check(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto out; |
| |
| out: |
| if (ds != NULL) |
| dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG); |
| if (fromds != NULL) |
| dsl_dataset_rele(fromds, FTAG); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| static void |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync(void *arg, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t *dcrka = arg; |
| dsl_dataset_t *ds; |
| |
| VERIFY0(dsl_dataset_hold_obj(tx->tx_pool, dcrka->dcrka_dsobj, |
| FTAG, &ds)); |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_objset_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_ostype, |
| dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx); |
| if (dcrka->dcrka_do_key) |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw_key_sync(ds, dcrka->dcrka_nvl, tx); |
| dsl_dataset_rele(ds, FTAG); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function is used to sync an nvlist representing a DSL Crypto Key and |
| * the associated encryption parameters. The key will be written exactly as is |
| * without wrapping it. |
| */ |
| int |
| dsl_crypto_recv_raw(const char *poolname, uint64_t dsobj, uint64_t fromobj, |
| dmu_objset_type_t ostype, nvlist_t *nvl, boolean_t do_key) |
| { |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_arg_t dcrka; |
| |
| dcrka.dcrka_dsobj = dsobj; |
| dcrka.dcrka_fromobj = fromobj; |
| dcrka.dcrka_ostype = ostype; |
| dcrka.dcrka_nvl = nvl; |
| dcrka.dcrka_do_key = do_key; |
| |
| return (dsl_sync_task(poolname, dsl_crypto_recv_key_check, |
| dsl_crypto_recv_key_sync, &dcrka, 1, ZFS_SPACE_CHECK_NORMAL)); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| dsl_crypto_populate_key_nvlist(objset_t *os, uint64_t from_ivset_guid, |
| nvlist_t **nvl_out) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_dataset_t *ds = os->os_dsl_dataset; |
| dnode_t *mdn; |
| uint64_t rddobj; |
| nvlist_t *nvl = NULL; |
| uint64_t dckobj = ds->ds_dir->dd_crypto_obj; |
| dsl_dir_t *rdd = NULL; |
| dsl_pool_t *dp = ds->ds_dir->dd_pool; |
| objset_t *mos = dp->dp_meta_objset; |
| uint64_t crypt = 0, key_guid = 0, format = 0; |
| uint64_t iters = 0, salt = 0, version = 0; |
| uint64_t to_ivset_guid = 0; |
| uint8_t raw_keydata[MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN]; |
| uint8_t raw_hmac_keydata[SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN]; |
| uint8_t iv[WRAPPING_IV_LEN]; |
| uint8_t mac[WRAPPING_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| ASSERT(dckobj != 0); |
| |
| mdn = DMU_META_DNODE(os); |
| |
| nvl = fnvlist_alloc(); |
| |
| /* lookup values from the DSL Crypto Key */ |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, 8, 1, |
| &crypt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &key_guid); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, 1, |
| MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN, raw_keydata); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, 1, |
| SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN, raw_hmac_keydata); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, 1, WRAPPING_IV_LEN, |
| iv); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, 1, WRAPPING_MAC_LEN, |
| mac); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* see zfs_disable_ivset_guid_check tunable for errata info */ |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, ds->ds_object, DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, |
| &to_ivset_guid); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| ASSERT3U(dp->dp_spa->spa_errata, !=, 0); |
| |
| /* |
| * We don't support raw sends of legacy on-disk formats. See the |
| * comment in dsl_crypto_recv_key_check() for details. |
| */ |
| ret = zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, 8, 1, &version); |
| if (ret != 0 || version != ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION) { |
| dp->dp_spa->spa_errata = ZPOOL_ERRATA_ZOL_6845_ENCRYPTION; |
| ret = SET_ERROR(ENOTSUP); |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Lookup wrapping key properties. An early version of the code did |
| * not correctly add these values to the wrapping key or the DSL |
| * Crypto Key on disk for non encryption roots, so to be safe we |
| * always take the slightly circuitous route of looking it up from |
| * the encryption root's key. |
| */ |
| ret = dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(ds->ds_dir, &rddobj); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| dsl_pool_config_enter(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| ret = dsl_dir_hold_obj(dp, rddobj, NULL, FTAG, &rdd); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error_unlock; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &format); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error_unlock; |
| |
| if (format == ZFS_KEYFORMAT_PASSPHRASE) { |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &iters); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error_unlock; |
| |
| ret = zap_lookup(dp->dp_meta_objset, rdd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &salt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error_unlock; |
| } |
| |
| dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG); |
| dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG); |
| |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_CRYPTO_SUITE, crypt); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, key_guid); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, version); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MASTER_KEY, |
| raw_keydata, MASTER_KEY_MAX_LEN)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_HMAC_KEY, |
| raw_hmac_keydata, SHA512_HMAC_KEYLEN)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_IV, iv, |
| WRAPPING_IV_LEN)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_MAC, mac, |
| WRAPPING_MAC_LEN)); |
| VERIFY0(nvlist_add_uint8_array(nvl, "portable_mac", |
| os->os_phys->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN)); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), format); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), iters); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), salt); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_checksum", mdn->dn_checksum); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_compress", mdn->dn_compress); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nlevels", mdn->dn_nlevels); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_blksz", mdn->dn_datablksz); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_indblkshift", mdn->dn_indblkshift); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_nblkptr", mdn->dn_nblkptr); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "mdn_maxblkid", mdn->dn_maxblkid); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "to_ivset_guid", to_ivset_guid); |
| fnvlist_add_uint64(nvl, "from_ivset_guid", from_ivset_guid); |
| |
| *nvl_out = nvl; |
| return (0); |
| |
| error_unlock: |
| dsl_pool_config_exit(dp, FTAG); |
| error: |
| if (rdd != NULL) |
| dsl_dir_rele(rdd, FTAG); |
| nvlist_free(nvl); |
| |
| *nvl_out = NULL; |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t |
| dsl_crypto_key_create_sync(uint64_t crypt, dsl_wrapping_key_t *wkey, |
| dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| dsl_crypto_key_t dck; |
| uint64_t version = ZIO_CRYPT_KEY_CURRENT_VERSION; |
| uint64_t one = 1ULL; |
| |
| ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx)); |
| ASSERT3U(crypt, <, ZIO_CRYPT_FUNCTIONS); |
| ASSERT3U(crypt, >, ZIO_CRYPT_OFF); |
| |
| /* create the DSL Crypto Key ZAP object */ |
| dck.dck_obj = zap_create(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, |
| DMU_OTN_ZAP_METADATA, DMU_OT_NONE, 0, tx); |
| |
| /* fill in the key (on the stack) and sync it to disk */ |
| dck.dck_wkey = wkey; |
| VERIFY0(zio_crypt_key_init(crypt, &dck.dck_key)); |
| |
| dsl_crypto_key_sync(&dck, tx); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &one, tx)); |
| VERIFY0(zap_update(tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset, dck.dck_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_VERSION, sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &version, tx)); |
| |
| zio_crypt_key_destroy(&dck.dck_key); |
| bzero(&dck.dck_key, sizeof (zio_crypt_key_t)); |
| |
| return (dck.dck_obj); |
| } |
| |
| uint64_t |
| dsl_crypto_key_clone_sync(dsl_dir_t *origindd, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset; |
| |
| ASSERT(dmu_tx_is_syncing(tx)); |
| |
| VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, origindd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, 1, tx)); |
| |
| return (origindd->dd_crypto_obj); |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_crypto_key_destroy_sync(uint64_t dckobj, dmu_tx_t *tx) |
| { |
| objset_t *mos = tx->tx_pool->dp_meta_objset; |
| uint64_t refcnt; |
| |
| /* Decrement the refcount, destroy if this is the last reference */ |
| VERIFY0(zap_lookup(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, |
| sizeof (uint64_t), 1, &refcnt)); |
| |
| if (refcnt != 1) { |
| VERIFY0(zap_increment(mos, dckobj, DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_REFCOUNT, |
| -1, tx)); |
| } else { |
| VERIFY0(zap_destroy(mos, dckobj, tx)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| dsl_dataset_crypt_stats(dsl_dataset_t *ds, nvlist_t *nv) |
| { |
| uint64_t intval; |
| dsl_dir_t *dd = ds->ds_dir; |
| dsl_dir_t *enc_root; |
| char buf[ZFS_MAX_DATASET_NAME_LEN]; |
| |
| if (dd->dd_crypto_obj == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| intval = dsl_dataset_get_keystatus(dd); |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYSTATUS, intval); |
| |
| if (dsl_dir_get_crypt(dd, &intval) == 0) |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION, intval); |
| if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| DSL_CRYPTO_KEY_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) { |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEY_GUID, intval); |
| } |
| if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) { |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_KEYFORMAT, intval); |
| } |
| if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) { |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_SALT, intval); |
| } |
| if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, dd->dd_crypto_obj, |
| zfs_prop_to_name(ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS), 8, 1, &intval) == 0) { |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_PBKDF2_ITERS, intval); |
| } |
| if (zap_lookup(dd->dd_pool->dp_meta_objset, ds->ds_object, |
| DS_FIELD_IVSET_GUID, 8, 1, &intval) == 0) { |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_uint64(nv, ZFS_PROP_IVSET_GUID, intval); |
| } |
| |
| if (dsl_dir_get_encryption_root_ddobj(dd, &intval) == 0) { |
| if (dsl_dir_hold_obj(dd->dd_pool, intval, NULL, FTAG, |
| &enc_root) == 0) { |
| dsl_dir_name(enc_root, buf); |
| dsl_dir_rele(enc_root, FTAG); |
| dsl_prop_nvlist_add_string(nv, |
| ZFS_PROP_ENCRYPTION_ROOT, buf); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_crypt_get_salt(spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, uint8_t *salt) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| |
| /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dck != NULL) |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Objset blocks are a special case for MAC generation. These blocks have 2 |
| * 256-bit MACs which are embedded within the block itself, rather than a |
| * single 128 bit MAC. As a result, this function handles encoding and decoding |
| * the MACs on its own, unlike other functions in this file. |
| */ |
| int |
| spa_do_crypt_objset_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, |
| abd_t *abd, uint_t datalen, boolean_t byteswap) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| void *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen); |
| objset_phys_t *osp = buf; |
| uint8_t portable_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN]; |
| uint8_t local_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN]; |
| const uint8_t zeroed_mac[ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN] = {0}; |
| |
| /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* calculate both HMACs */ |
| ret = zio_crypt_do_objset_hmacs(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen, |
| byteswap, portable_mac, local_mac); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| |
| /* if we are generating encode the HMACs in the objset_phys_t */ |
| if (generate) { |
| bcopy(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN); |
| bcopy(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN); |
| abd_return_buf_copy(abd, buf, datalen); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| if (memcmp(portable_mac, osp->os_portable_mac, |
| ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0 || |
| memcmp(local_mac, osp->os_local_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) { |
| /* |
| * If the MAC is zeroed out, we failed to decrypt it. |
| * This should only arise, at least on Linux, |
| * if we hit edge case handling for useraccounting, since we |
| * shouldn't get here without bailing out on error earlier |
| * otherwise. |
| * |
| * So if we're in that case, we can just fall through and |
| * special-casing noticing that it's zero will handle it |
| * elsewhere, since we can just regenerate it. |
| */ |
| if (memcmp(local_mac, zeroed_mac, ZIO_OBJSET_MAC_LEN) != 0) { |
| abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen); |
| return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dck != NULL) |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| spa_do_crypt_mac_abd(boolean_t generate, spa_t *spa, uint64_t dsobj, abd_t *abd, |
| uint_t datalen, uint8_t *mac) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| uint8_t *buf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(abd, datalen); |
| uint8_t digestbuf[ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN]; |
| |
| /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, dsobj, FTAG, &dck); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* perform the hmac */ |
| ret = zio_crypt_do_hmac(&dck->dck_key, buf, datalen, |
| digestbuf, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen); |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| |
| /* |
| * Truncate and fill in mac buffer if we were asked to generate a MAC. |
| * Otherwise verify that the MAC matched what we expected. |
| */ |
| if (generate) { |
| bcopy(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| if (bcmp(digestbuf, mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN) != 0) |
| return (SET_ERROR(ECKSUM)); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (dck != NULL) |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| abd_return_buf(abd, buf, datalen); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This function serves as a multiplexer for encryption and decryption of |
| * all blocks (except the L2ARC). For encryption, it will populate the IV, |
| * salt, MAC, and cabd (the ciphertext). On decryption it will simply use |
| * these fields to populate pabd (the plaintext). |
| */ |
| int |
| spa_do_crypt_abd(boolean_t encrypt, spa_t *spa, const zbookmark_phys_t *zb, |
| dmu_object_type_t ot, boolean_t dedup, boolean_t bswap, uint8_t *salt, |
| uint8_t *iv, uint8_t *mac, uint_t datalen, abd_t *pabd, abd_t *cabd, |
| boolean_t *no_crypt) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| dsl_crypto_key_t *dck = NULL; |
| uint8_t *plainbuf = NULL, *cipherbuf = NULL; |
| |
| ASSERT(spa_feature_is_active(spa, SPA_FEATURE_ENCRYPTION)); |
| |
| /* look up the key from the spa's keystore */ |
| ret = spa_keystore_lookup_key(spa, zb->zb_objset, FTAG, &dck); |
| if (ret != 0) { |
| ret = SET_ERROR(EACCES); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (encrypt) { |
| plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(pabd, datalen); |
| cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf(cabd, datalen); |
| } else { |
| plainbuf = abd_borrow_buf(pabd, datalen); |
| cipherbuf = abd_borrow_buf_copy(cabd, datalen); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Both encryption and decryption functions need a salt for key |
| * generation and an IV. When encrypting a non-dedup block, we |
| * generate the salt and IV randomly to be stored by the caller. Dedup |
| * blocks perform a (more expensive) HMAC of the plaintext to obtain |
| * the salt and the IV. ZIL blocks have their salt and IV generated |
| * at allocation time in zio_alloc_zil(). On decryption, we simply use |
| * the provided values. |
| */ |
| if (encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_INTENT_LOG && !dedup) { |
| ret = zio_crypt_key_get_salt(&dck->dck_key, salt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv(iv); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| } else if (encrypt && dedup) { |
| ret = zio_crypt_generate_iv_salt_dedup(&dck->dck_key, |
| plainbuf, datalen, iv, salt); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| } |
| |
| /* call lower level function to perform encryption / decryption */ |
| ret = zio_do_crypt_data(encrypt, &dck->dck_key, ot, bswap, salt, iv, |
| mac, datalen, plainbuf, cipherbuf, no_crypt); |
| |
| /* |
| * Handle injected decryption faults. Unfortunately, we cannot inject |
| * faults for dnode blocks because we might trigger the panic in |
| * dbuf_prepare_encrypted_dnode_leaf(), which exists because syncing |
| * context is not prepared to handle malicious decryption failures. |
| */ |
| if (zio_injection_enabled && !encrypt && ot != DMU_OT_DNODE && ret == 0) |
| ret = zio_handle_decrypt_injection(spa, zb, ot, ECKSUM); |
| if (ret != 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| if (encrypt) { |
| abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen); |
| abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen); |
| } else { |
| abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen); |
| abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen); |
| } |
| |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| |
| return (0); |
| |
| error: |
| if (encrypt) { |
| /* zero out any state we might have changed while encrypting */ |
| bzero(salt, ZIO_DATA_SALT_LEN); |
| bzero(iv, ZIO_DATA_IV_LEN); |
| bzero(mac, ZIO_DATA_MAC_LEN); |
| abd_return_buf(pabd, plainbuf, datalen); |
| abd_return_buf_copy(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen); |
| } else { |
| abd_return_buf_copy(pabd, plainbuf, datalen); |
| abd_return_buf(cabd, cipherbuf, datalen); |
| } |
| |
| spa_keystore_dsl_key_rele(spa, dck, FTAG); |
| |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| ZFS_MODULE_PARAM(zfs, zfs_, disable_ivset_guid_check, INT, ZMOD_RW, |
| "Set to allow raw receives without IVset guids"); |