| /* |
| * CDDL HEADER START |
| * |
| * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the |
| * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License"). |
| * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * |
| * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE |
| * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions |
| * and limitations under the License. |
| * |
| * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each |
| * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE. |
| * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the |
| * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying |
| * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner] |
| * |
| * CDDL HEADER END |
| */ |
| /* |
| * Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems, Inc. All rights reserved. |
| * Use is subject to license terms. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <sys/zfs_context.h> |
| #include <sys/crypto/common.h> |
| #include <sys/crypto/impl.h> |
| #include <sys/crypto/api.h> |
| #include <sys/crypto/spi.h> |
| #include <sys/crypto/sched_impl.h> |
| |
| #define CRYPTO_OPS_OFFSET(f) offsetof(crypto_ops_t, co_##f) |
| #define CRYPTO_MAC_OFFSET(f) offsetof(crypto_mac_ops_t, f) |
| |
| /* |
| * Message authentication codes routines. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * The following are the possible returned values common to all the routines |
| * below. The applicability of some of these return values depends on the |
| * presence of the arguments. |
| * |
| * CRYPTO_SUCCESS: The operation completed successfully. |
| * CRYPTO_QUEUED: A request was submitted successfully. The callback |
| * routine will be called when the operation is done. |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_NUMBER, CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH_PARAM, or |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_MECH for problems with the 'mech'. |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_DATA for bogus 'data' |
| * CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY for failure to allocate memory to handle this work. |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT: Not a valid context. |
| * CRYPTO_BUSY: Cannot process the request now. Schedule a |
| * crypto_bufcall(), or try later. |
| * CRYPTO_NOT_SUPPORTED and CRYPTO_MECH_NOT_SUPPORTED: No provider is |
| * capable of a function or a mechanism. |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_KEY: bogus 'key' argument. |
| * CRYPTO_INVALID_MAC: bogus 'mac' argument. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * crypto_mac_prov() |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. |
| * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by |
| * crypto_mech2id(); |
| * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends |
| * on the standard definition of the mechanism. |
| * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. |
| * data: The message to compute the MAC for. |
| * mac: Storage for the MAC. The length needed depends on the mechanism. |
| * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a |
| * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by |
| * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). |
| * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. |
| * |
| * Description: |
| * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a |
| * single-part message authentication of 'data' with the mechanism |
| * 'mech', using * the key 'key', on the specified provider with |
| * the specified session id. |
| * When complete and successful, 'mac' will contain the message |
| * authentication code. |
| * |
| * Context: |
| * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'crq'. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * See comment in the beginning of the file. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, |
| crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, |
| crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; |
| int rv; |
| |
| ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); |
| |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { |
| rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, |
| CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, |
| &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC); |
| |
| if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, sid, mech, key, |
| data, mac, tmpl); |
| rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE); |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); |
| |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Same as crypto_mac_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose |
| * a provider. See crypto_mac() comments for more information. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, |
| crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, |
| crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| int error; |
| kcf_mech_entry_t *me; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; |
| crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; |
| kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; |
| |
| retry: |
| /* The pd is returned held */ |
| if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, |
| list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), |
| data->cd_length)) == NULL) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template |
| * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so |
| * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by |
| * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW |
| * provider |
| */ |
| if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && |
| ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { |
| if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); |
| } else { |
| spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { |
| crypto_mechanism_t lmech; |
| |
| lmech = *mech; |
| KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); |
| |
| error = KCF_PROV_MAC_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, data, |
| mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); |
| } else { |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && |
| (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE) && |
| (data->cd_length > pd->pd_hash_limit)) { |
| /* |
| * XXX - We need a check to see if this is indeed |
| * a HMAC. So far, all kernel clients use |
| * this interface only for HMAC. So, this is fine |
| * for now. |
| */ |
| error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_ATOMIC, |
| pd->pd_sid, mech, key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); |
| |
| error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, |
| KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && |
| IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { |
| /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ |
| if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Single part operation to compute the MAC corresponding to the specified |
| * 'data' and to verify that it matches the MAC specified by 'mac'. |
| * The other arguments are the same as the function crypto_mac_prov(). |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_verify_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, |
| crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, crypto_key_t *key, |
| crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; |
| int rv; |
| |
| ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); |
| |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { |
| rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, |
| CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, |
| &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC); |
| |
| if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, sid, mech, |
| key, data, mac, tmpl); |
| rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, NULL, crq, ¶ms, B_FALSE); |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); |
| |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Same as crypto_mac_verify_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to choose |
| * a provider. See crypto_mac_verify_prov() comments for more information. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_verify(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_data_t *data, |
| crypto_key_t *key, crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_data_t *mac, |
| crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| int error; |
| kcf_mech_entry_t *me; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; |
| crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; |
| kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; |
| |
| retry: |
| /* The pd is returned held */ |
| if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, |
| list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC_ATOMIC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), |
| data->cd_length)) == NULL) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template |
| * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so |
| * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by |
| * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW |
| * provider |
| */ |
| if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && |
| ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { |
| if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); |
| } else { |
| spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { |
| crypto_mechanism_t lmech; |
| |
| lmech = *mech; |
| KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, pd, &lmech); |
| |
| error = KCF_PROV_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC(pd, pd->pd_sid, &lmech, key, |
| data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl, KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); |
| } else { |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && |
| (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE) && |
| (data->cd_length > pd->pd_hash_limit)) { |
| /* see comments in crypto_mac() */ |
| error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, |
| KCF_OP_MAC_VERIFY_ATOMIC, pd->pd_sid, mech, |
| key, data, mac, spi_ctx_tmpl); |
| |
| error = kcf_submit_request(pd, NULL, crq, ¶ms, |
| KCF_ISDUALREQ(crq)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && |
| IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { |
| /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ |
| if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * crypto_mac_init_prov() |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * pd: pointer to the descriptor of the provider to use for this |
| * operation. |
| * sid: provider session id. |
| * mech: crypto_mechanism_t pointer. |
| * mech_type is a valid value previously returned by |
| * crypto_mech2id(); |
| * When the mech's parameter is not NULL, its definition depends |
| * on the standard definition of the mechanism. |
| * key: pointer to a crypto_key_t structure. |
| * tmpl: a crypto_ctx_template_t, opaque template of a context of a |
| * MAC with the 'mech' using 'key'. 'tmpl' is created by |
| * a previous call to crypto_create_ctx_template(). |
| * ctxp: Pointer to a crypto_context_t. |
| * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. |
| * |
| * Description: |
| * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs the |
| * initialization of a MAC operation on the specified provider with |
| * the specified session. |
| * When possible and applicable, will internally use the pre-computed MAC |
| * context from the context template, tmpl. |
| * When complete and successful, 'ctxp' will contain a crypto_context_t |
| * valid for later calls to mac_update() and mac_final(). |
| * The caller should hold a reference on the specified provider |
| * descriptor before calling this function. |
| * |
| * Context: |
| * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * See comment in the beginning of the file. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_init_prov(crypto_provider_t provider, crypto_session_id_t sid, |
| crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, crypto_spi_ctx_template_t tmpl, |
| crypto_context_t *ctxp, crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| int rv; |
| crypto_ctx_t *ctx; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd = provider; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *real_provider = pd; |
| |
| ASSERT(KCF_PROV_REFHELD(pd)); |
| |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) { |
| rv = kcf_get_hardware_provider(mech->cm_type, |
| CRYPTO_MECH_INVALID, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), pd, |
| &real_provider, CRYPTO_FG_MAC); |
| |
| if (rv != CRYPTO_SUCCESS) |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* Allocate and initialize the canonical context */ |
| if ((ctx = kcf_new_ctx(crq, real_provider, sid)) == NULL) { |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); |
| return (CRYPTO_HOST_MEMORY); |
| } |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(crq, pd)) { |
| crypto_mechanism_t lmech; |
| |
| lmech = *mech; |
| KCF_SET_PROVIDER_MECHNUM(mech->cm_type, real_provider, &lmech); |
| rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_INIT(real_provider, ctx, &lmech, key, tmpl, |
| KCF_SWFP_RHNDL(crq)); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_INIT, sid, mech, key, |
| NULL, NULL, tmpl); |
| rv = kcf_submit_request(real_provider, ctx, crq, ¶ms, |
| B_FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER) |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(real_provider); |
| |
| if ((rv == CRYPTO_SUCCESS) || (rv == CRYPTO_QUEUED)) |
| *ctxp = (crypto_context_t)ctx; |
| else { |
| /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx(). */ |
| KCF_CONTEXT_REFRELE((kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private); |
| } |
| |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Same as crypto_mac_init_prov(), but relies on the KCF scheduler to |
| * choose a provider. See crypto_mac_init_prov() comments for more |
| * information. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_init(crypto_mechanism_t *mech, crypto_key_t *key, |
| crypto_ctx_template_t tmpl, crypto_context_t *ctxp, |
| crypto_call_req_t *crq) |
| { |
| int error; |
| kcf_mech_entry_t *me; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| kcf_ctx_template_t *ctx_tmpl; |
| crypto_spi_ctx_template_t spi_ctx_tmpl = NULL; |
| kcf_prov_tried_t *list = NULL; |
| |
| retry: |
| /* The pd is returned held */ |
| if ((pd = kcf_get_mech_provider(mech->cm_type, &me, &error, |
| list, CRYPTO_FG_MAC, CHECK_RESTRICT(crq), 0)) == NULL) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For SW providers, check the validity of the context template |
| * It is very rare that the generation number mis-matches, so |
| * is acceptable to fail here, and let the consumer recover by |
| * freeing this tmpl and create a new one for the key and new SW |
| * provider |
| */ |
| |
| if ((pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_SW_PROVIDER) && |
| ((ctx_tmpl = (kcf_ctx_template_t *)tmpl) != NULL)) { |
| if (ctx_tmpl->ct_generation != me->me_gen_swprov) { |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (CRYPTO_OLD_CTX_TEMPLATE); |
| } else { |
| spi_ctx_tmpl = ctx_tmpl->ct_prov_tmpl; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (pd->pd_prov_type == CRYPTO_HW_PROVIDER && |
| (pd->pd_flags & CRYPTO_HASH_NO_UPDATE)) { |
| /* |
| * The hardware provider has limited HMAC support. |
| * So, we fallback early here to using a software provider. |
| * |
| * XXX - need to enhance to do the fallback later in |
| * crypto_mac_update() if the size of accumulated input data |
| * exceeds the maximum size digestable by hardware provider. |
| */ |
| error = CRYPTO_BUFFER_TOO_BIG; |
| } else { |
| error = crypto_mac_init_prov(pd, pd->pd_sid, mech, key, |
| spi_ctx_tmpl, ctxp, crq); |
| } |
| if (error != CRYPTO_SUCCESS && error != CRYPTO_QUEUED && |
| IS_RECOVERABLE(error)) { |
| /* Add pd to the linked list of providers tried. */ |
| if (kcf_insert_triedlist(&list, pd, KCF_KMFLAG(crq)) != NULL) |
| goto retry; |
| } |
| |
| if (list != NULL) |
| kcf_free_triedlist(list); |
| |
| KCF_PROV_REFRELE(pd); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * crypto_mac_update() |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). |
| * data: The message part to be MAC'ed |
| * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. |
| * |
| * Description: |
| * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a |
| * part of a MAC operation. |
| * |
| * Context: |
| * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * See comment in the beginning of the file. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_update(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, |
| crypto_call_req_t *cr) |
| { |
| crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; |
| kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| int rv; |
| |
| if ((ctx == NULL) || |
| ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || |
| ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { |
| return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); |
| } |
| |
| ASSERT(pd->pd_prov_type != CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER); |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { |
| rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_UPDATE(pd, ctx, data, NULL); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_UPDATE, |
| ctx->cc_session, NULL, NULL, data, NULL, NULL); |
| rv = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * crypto_mac_final() |
| * |
| * Arguments: |
| * context: A crypto_context_t initialized by mac_init(). |
| * mac: Storage for the message authentication code. |
| * cr: crypto_call_req_t calling conditions and call back info. |
| * |
| * Description: |
| * Asynchronously submits a request for, or synchronously performs a |
| * part of a message authentication operation. |
| * |
| * Context: |
| * Process or interrupt, according to the semantics dictated by the 'cr'. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * See comment in the beginning of the file. |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_final(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *mac, |
| crypto_call_req_t *cr) |
| { |
| crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; |
| kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| int rv; |
| |
| if ((ctx == NULL) || |
| ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || |
| ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { |
| return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); |
| } |
| |
| ASSERT(pd->pd_prov_type != CRYPTO_LOGICAL_PROVIDER); |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { |
| rv = KCF_PROV_MAC_FINAL(pd, ctx, mac, NULL); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, rv); |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_FINAL, |
| ctx->cc_session, NULL, NULL, NULL, mac, NULL); |
| rv = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ |
| KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(rv, kcf_ctx); |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * See comments for crypto_mac_update() and crypto_mac_final(). |
| */ |
| int |
| crypto_mac_single(crypto_context_t context, crypto_data_t *data, |
| crypto_data_t *mac, crypto_call_req_t *cr) |
| { |
| crypto_ctx_t *ctx = (crypto_ctx_t *)context; |
| kcf_context_t *kcf_ctx; |
| kcf_provider_desc_t *pd; |
| int error; |
| kcf_req_params_t params; |
| |
| |
| if ((ctx == NULL) || |
| ((kcf_ctx = (kcf_context_t *)ctx->cc_framework_private) == NULL) || |
| ((pd = kcf_ctx->kc_prov_desc) == NULL)) { |
| return (CRYPTO_INVALID_CONTEXT); |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* The fast path for SW providers. */ |
| if (CHECK_FASTPATH(cr, pd)) { |
| error = KCF_PROV_MAC(pd, ctx, data, mac, NULL); |
| KCF_PROV_INCRSTATS(pd, error); |
| } else { |
| KCF_WRAP_MAC_OPS_PARAMS(¶ms, KCF_OP_SINGLE, pd->pd_sid, |
| NULL, NULL, data, mac, NULL); |
| error = kcf_submit_request(pd, ctx, cr, ¶ms, B_FALSE); |
| } |
| |
| /* Release the hold done in kcf_new_ctx() during init step. */ |
| KCF_CONTEXT_COND_RELEASE(error, kcf_ctx); |
| return (error); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(_KERNEL) |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_prov); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_verify_prov); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_verify); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_init_prov); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_init); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_update); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_final); |
| EXPORT_SYMBOL(crypto_mac_single); |
| #endif |