| /* |
| * OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks |
| * over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based |
| * session authentication and key exchange, |
| * packet encryption, packet authentication, and |
| * packet compression. |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2002-2018 OpenVPN Inc <sales@openvpn.net> |
| * Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Fox Crypto B.V. <openvpn@fox-it.com> |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 |
| * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| * |
| * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| * GNU General Public License for more details. |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along |
| * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., |
| * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
| */ |
| |
| /** |
| * @file Control Channel Verification Module |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H |
| #include "config.h" |
| #elif defined(_MSC_VER) |
| #include "config-msvc.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "syshead.h" |
| |
| #include "base64.h" |
| #include "manage.h" |
| #include "otime.h" |
| #include "run_command.h" |
| #include "ssl_verify.h" |
| #include "ssl_verify_backend.h" |
| |
| #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL |
| #include "ssl_verify_openssl.h" |
| #endif |
| #include "auth_token.h" |
| #include "push.h" |
| |
| /** Maximum length of common name */ |
| #define TLS_USERNAME_LEN 64 |
| |
| static void |
| string_mod_remap_name(char *str) |
| { |
| string_mod(str, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Export the untrusted IP address and port to the environment |
| */ |
| static void |
| setenv_untrusted(struct tls_session *session) |
| { |
| setenv_link_socket_actual(session->opt->es, "untrusted", &session->untrusted_addr, SA_IP_PORT); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Remove authenticated state from all sessions in the given tunnel |
| */ |
| static void |
| tls_deauthenticate(struct tls_multi *multi) |
| { |
| if (multi) |
| { |
| wipe_auth_token(multi); |
| for (int i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i) |
| { |
| for (int j = 0; j < KS_SIZE; ++j) |
| { |
| multi->session[i].key[j].authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set the given session's common_name |
| */ |
| static void |
| set_common_name(struct tls_session *session, const char *common_name) |
| { |
| if (session->common_name) |
| { |
| free(session->common_name); |
| session->common_name = NULL; |
| #ifdef ENABLE_PF |
| session->common_name_hashval = 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| if (common_name) |
| { |
| /* FIXME: Last alloc will never be freed */ |
| session->common_name = string_alloc(common_name, NULL); |
| #ifdef ENABLE_PF |
| { |
| const uint32_t len = (uint32_t) strlen(common_name); |
| if (len) |
| { |
| session->common_name_hashval = hash_func((const uint8_t *)common_name, len+1, 0); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| session->common_name_hashval = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Retrieve the common name for the given tunnel's active session. If the |
| * common name is NULL or empty, return NULL if null is true, or "UNDEF" if |
| * null is false. |
| */ |
| const char * |
| tls_common_name(const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) |
| { |
| const char *ret = NULL; |
| if (multi) |
| { |
| ret = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; |
| } |
| if (ret && strlen(ret)) |
| { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| else if (null) |
| { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return "UNDEF"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Lock the common name for the given tunnel. |
| */ |
| void |
| tls_lock_common_name(struct tls_multi *multi) |
| { |
| const char *cn = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].common_name; |
| if (cn && !multi->locked_cn) |
| { |
| multi->locked_cn = string_alloc(cn, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Lock the username for the given tunnel |
| */ |
| static bool |
| tls_lock_username(struct tls_multi *multi, const char *username) |
| { |
| if (multi->locked_username) |
| { |
| if (!username || strcmp(username, multi->locked_username)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: username attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", |
| multi->locked_username, |
| np(username)); |
| |
| /* disable the tunnel */ |
| tls_deauthenticate(multi); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (username) |
| { |
| multi->locked_username = string_alloc(username, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| const char * |
| tls_username(const struct tls_multi *multi, const bool null) |
| { |
| const char *ret = NULL; |
| if (multi) |
| { |
| ret = multi->locked_username; |
| } |
| if (ret && strlen(ret)) |
| { |
| return ret; |
| } |
| else if (null) |
| { |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return "UNDEF"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| cert_hash_remember(struct tls_session *session, const int error_depth, |
| const struct buffer *cert_hash) |
| { |
| if (error_depth >= 0 && error_depth < MAX_CERT_DEPTH) |
| { |
| if (!session->cert_hash_set) |
| { |
| ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(session->cert_hash_set, struct cert_hash_set); |
| } |
| if (!session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]) |
| { |
| ALLOC_OBJ(session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth], struct cert_hash); |
| } |
| |
| struct cert_hash *ch = session->cert_hash_set->ch[error_depth]; |
| ASSERT(sizeof(ch->sha256_hash) == BLEN(cert_hash)); |
| memcpy(ch->sha256_hash, BPTR(cert_hash), sizeof(ch->sha256_hash)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| cert_hash_free(struct cert_hash_set *chs) |
| { |
| if (chs) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) |
| { |
| free(chs->ch[i]); |
| } |
| free(chs); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool |
| cert_hash_compare(const struct cert_hash_set *chs1, const struct cert_hash_set *chs2) |
| { |
| if (chs1 && chs2) |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) |
| { |
| const struct cert_hash *ch1 = chs1->ch[i]; |
| const struct cert_hash *ch2 = chs2->ch[i]; |
| |
| if (!ch1 && !ch2) |
| { |
| continue; |
| } |
| else if (ch1 && ch2 && !memcmp(ch1->sha256_hash, ch2->sha256_hash, |
| sizeof(ch1->sha256_hash))) |
| { |
| continue; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| else if (!chs1 && !chs2) |
| { |
| return true; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static struct cert_hash_set * |
| cert_hash_copy(const struct cert_hash_set *chs) |
| { |
| struct cert_hash_set *dest = NULL; |
| if (chs) |
| { |
| int i; |
| ALLOC_OBJ_CLEAR(dest, struct cert_hash_set); |
| for (i = 0; i < MAX_CERT_DEPTH; ++i) |
| { |
| const struct cert_hash *ch = chs->ch[i]; |
| if (ch) |
| { |
| ALLOC_OBJ(dest->ch[i], struct cert_hash); |
| memcpy(dest->ch[i]->sha256_hash, ch->sha256_hash, |
| sizeof(dest->ch[i]->sha256_hash)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return dest; |
| } |
| void |
| tls_lock_cert_hash_set(struct tls_multi *multi) |
| { |
| const struct cert_hash_set *chs = multi->session[TM_ACTIVE].cert_hash_set; |
| if (chs && !multi->locked_cert_hash_set) |
| { |
| multi->locked_cert_hash_set = cert_hash_copy(chs); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Returns the string associated with the given certificate type. |
| */ |
| static const char * |
| print_nsCertType(int type) |
| { |
| switch (type) |
| { |
| case NS_CERT_CHECK_SERVER: |
| return "SERVER"; |
| |
| case NS_CERT_CHECK_CLIENT: |
| return "CLIENT"; |
| |
| default: |
| return "?"; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the peer's certificate fields. |
| * |
| * @param opt the tls options to verify against |
| * @param peer_cert the peer's certificate |
| * @param subject the peer's extracted subject name |
| * @param subject the peer's extracted common name |
| */ |
| static result_t |
| verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, |
| const char *subject, const char *common_name) |
| { |
| /* verify certificate nsCertType */ |
| if (opt->ns_cert_type != NS_CERT_CHECK_NONE) |
| { |
| if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_ns_cert_type(peer_cert, opt->ns_cert_type)) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: nsCertType=%s", |
| print_nsCertType(opt->ns_cert_type)); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY nsCertType ERROR: %s, require nsCertType=%s", |
| subject, print_nsCertType(opt->ns_cert_type)); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* verify certificate ku */ |
| if (opt->remote_cert_ku[0] != 0) |
| { |
| if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_ku(peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_ku, MAX_PARMS)) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU OK"); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY KU ERROR"); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* verify certificate eku */ |
| if (opt->remote_cert_eku != NULL) |
| { |
| if (SUCCESS == x509_verify_cert_eku(peer_cert, opt->remote_cert_eku)) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU OK"); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY EKU ERROR"); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */ |
| if (opt->verify_x509_type != VERIFY_X509_NONE) |
| { |
| if ( (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN |
| && strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, subject) == 0) |
| || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN |
| && strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0) |
| || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX |
| && strncmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name, |
| strlen(opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0) ) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", subject); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME ERROR: %s, must be %s", |
| subject, opt->verify_x509_name); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Export the subject, common_name, and raw certificate fields to the |
| * environment for later verification by scripts and plugins. |
| */ |
| static void |
| verify_cert_set_env(struct env_set *es, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert, int cert_depth, |
| const char *subject, const char *common_name, |
| const struct x509_track *x509_track) |
| { |
| char envname[64]; |
| char *serial = NULL; |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| |
| /* Save X509 fields in environment */ |
| if (x509_track) |
| { |
| x509_setenv_track(x509_track, es, cert_depth, peer_cert); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| x509_setenv(es, cert_depth, peer_cert); |
| } |
| |
| /* export subject name string as environmental variable */ |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_id_%d", cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, subject); |
| |
| #if 0 |
| /* export common name string as environmental variable */ |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_common_name_%d", cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, common_name); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* export X509 cert fingerprints */ |
| { |
| struct buffer sha1 = x509_get_sha1_fingerprint(peer_cert, &gc); |
| struct buffer sha256 = x509_get_sha256_fingerprint(peer_cert, &gc); |
| |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_digest_%d", cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, |
| format_hex_ex(BPTR(&sha1), BLEN(&sha1), 0, 1, ":", &gc)); |
| |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_digest_sha256_%d", |
| cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, |
| format_hex_ex(BPTR(&sha256), BLEN(&sha256), 0, 1, ":", &gc)); |
| } |
| |
| /* export serial number as environmental variable */ |
| serial = backend_x509_get_serial(peer_cert, &gc); |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_%d", cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, serial); |
| |
| /* export serial number in hex as environmental variable */ |
| serial = backend_x509_get_serial_hex(peer_cert, &gc); |
| openvpn_snprintf(envname, sizeof(envname), "tls_serial_hex_%d", cert_depth); |
| setenv_str(es, envname, serial); |
| |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * call --tls-verify plug-in(s) |
| */ |
| static result_t |
| verify_cert_call_plugin(const struct plugin_list *plugins, struct env_set *es, |
| int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject) |
| { |
| if (plugin_defined(plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY)) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| struct argv argv = argv_new(); |
| |
| argv_printf(&argv, "%d %s", cert_depth, subject); |
| |
| ret = plugin_call_ssl(plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_VERIFY, &argv, NULL, es, cert_depth, cert); |
| |
| argv_free(&argv); |
| |
| if (ret == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN OK: depth=%d, %s", |
| cert_depth, subject); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY PLUGIN ERROR: depth=%d, %s", |
| cert_depth, subject); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| } |
| return SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| static const char * |
| verify_cert_export_cert(openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert, const char *tmp_dir, struct gc_arena *gc) |
| { |
| FILE *peercert_file; |
| const char *peercert_filename = ""; |
| |
| /* create tmp file to store peer cert */ |
| if (!tmp_dir |
| || !(peercert_filename = platform_create_temp_file(tmp_dir, "pcf", gc))) |
| { |
| msg(M_NONFATAL, "Failed to create peer cert file"); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* write peer-cert in tmp-file */ |
| peercert_file = fopen(peercert_filename, "w+"); |
| if (!peercert_file) |
| { |
| msg(M_NONFATAL|M_ERRNO, "Failed to open temporary file: %s", |
| peercert_filename); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (SUCCESS != x509_write_pem(peercert_file, peercert)) |
| { |
| msg(M_NONFATAL, "Error writing PEM file containing certificate"); |
| (void) platform_unlink(peercert_filename); |
| peercert_filename = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| fclose(peercert_file); |
| return peercert_filename; |
| } |
| |
| |
| /* |
| * run --tls-verify script |
| */ |
| static result_t |
| verify_cert_call_command(const char *verify_command, struct env_set *es, |
| int cert_depth, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, char *subject, const char *verify_export_cert) |
| { |
| const char *tmp_file = NULL; |
| int ret; |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| struct argv argv = argv_new(); |
| |
| setenv_str(es, "script_type", "tls-verify"); |
| |
| if (verify_export_cert) |
| { |
| tmp_file = verify_cert_export_cert(cert, verify_export_cert, &gc); |
| if (!tmp_file) |
| { |
| ret = false; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| setenv_str(es, "peer_cert", tmp_file); |
| } |
| |
| argv_parse_cmd(&argv, verify_command); |
| argv_printf_cat(&argv, "%d %s", cert_depth, subject); |
| |
| argv_msg_prefix(D_TLS_DEBUG, &argv, "TLS: executing verify command"); |
| ret = openvpn_run_script(&argv, es, 0, "--tls-verify script"); |
| |
| if (verify_export_cert) |
| { |
| if (tmp_file) |
| { |
| platform_unlink(tmp_file); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| cleanup: |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| argv_free(&argv); |
| |
| if (ret) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT OK: depth=%d, %s", |
| cert_depth, subject); |
| return SUCCESS; |
| } |
| |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY SCRIPT ERROR: depth=%d, %s", |
| cert_depth, subject); |
| return FAILURE; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * check peer cert against CRL directory |
| */ |
| static result_t |
| verify_check_crl_dir(const char *crl_dir, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, |
| const char *subject, int cert_depth) |
| { |
| result_t ret = FAILURE; |
| char fn[256]; |
| int fd = -1; |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| |
| char *serial = backend_x509_get_serial(cert, &gc); |
| if (!serial) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: depth=%d, %s, serial number is not available", |
| cert_depth, subject); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| if (!openvpn_snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "%s%c%s", crl_dir, OS_SPECIFIC_DIRSEP, serial)) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: filename overflow"); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| fd = platform_open(fn, O_RDONLY, 0); |
| if (fd >= 0) |
| { |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY CRL: depth=%d, %s, serial=%s is revoked", |
| cert_depth, subject, serial); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| ret = SUCCESS; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| if (fd != -1) |
| { |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| result_t |
| verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_depth) |
| { |
| result_t ret = FAILURE; |
| char *subject = NULL; |
| char common_name[TLS_USERNAME_LEN+1] = {0}; /* null-terminated */ |
| const struct tls_options *opt; |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| |
| opt = session->opt; |
| ASSERT(opt); |
| |
| session->verified = false; |
| |
| /* get the X509 name */ |
| subject = x509_get_subject(cert, &gc); |
| if (!subject) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: depth=%d, could not extract X509 " |
| "subject string from certificate", cert_depth); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* enforce character class restrictions in X509 name */ |
| string_mod_remap_name(subject); |
| string_replace_leading(subject, '-', '_'); |
| |
| /* extract the username (default is CN) */ |
| if (SUCCESS != backend_x509_get_username(common_name, sizeof(common_name), |
| opt->x509_username_field, cert)) |
| { |
| if (!cert_depth) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: could not extract %s from X509 " |
| "subject string ('%s') -- note that the username length is " |
| "limited to %d characters", |
| opt->x509_username_field, |
| subject, |
| TLS_USERNAME_LEN); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* enforce character class restrictions in common name */ |
| string_mod_remap_name(common_name); |
| |
| /* warn if cert chain is too deep */ |
| if (cert_depth >= MAX_CERT_DEPTH) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Convoluted certificate chain detected with depth [%d] greater than %d", cert_depth, MAX_CERT_DEPTH); |
| goto cleanup; /* Reject connection */ |
| } |
| |
| /* verify level 1 cert, i.e. the CA that signed our leaf cert */ |
| if (cert_depth == 1 && opt->verify_hash) |
| { |
| struct buffer ca_hash = {0}; |
| |
| switch (opt->verify_hash_algo) |
| { |
| case MD_SHA1: |
| ca_hash = x509_get_sha1_fingerprint(cert, &gc); |
| break; |
| |
| case MD_SHA256: |
| ca_hash = x509_get_sha256_fingerprint(cert, &gc); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| /* This should normally not happen at all; the algorithm used |
| * is parsed by add_option() [options.c] and set to a predefined |
| * value in an enumerated type. So if this unlikely scenario |
| * happens, consider this a failure |
| */ |
| msg(M_WARN, "Unexpected invalid algorithm used with " |
| "--verify-hash (%i)", opt->verify_hash_algo); |
| ret = FAILURE; |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| if (memcmp(BPTR(&ca_hash), opt->verify_hash, BLEN(&ca_hash))) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: level-1 certificate hash verification failed"); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* save common name in session object */ |
| if (cert_depth == 0) |
| { |
| set_common_name(session, common_name); |
| } |
| |
| session->verify_maxlevel = max_int(session->verify_maxlevel, cert_depth); |
| |
| /* export certificate values to the environment */ |
| verify_cert_set_env(opt->es, cert, cert_depth, subject, common_name, |
| opt->x509_track); |
| |
| /* export current untrusted IP */ |
| setenv_untrusted(session); |
| |
| /* If this is the peer's own certificate, verify it */ |
| if (cert_depth == 0 && SUCCESS != verify_peer_cert(opt, cert, subject, common_name)) |
| { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* call --tls-verify plug-in(s), if registered */ |
| if (SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_plugin(opt->plugins, opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject)) |
| { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* run --tls-verify script */ |
| if (opt->verify_command && SUCCESS != verify_cert_call_command(opt->verify_command, |
| opt->es, cert_depth, cert, subject, opt->verify_export_cert)) |
| { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| |
| /* check peer cert against CRL */ |
| if (opt->crl_file) |
| { |
| if (opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR) |
| { |
| if (SUCCESS != verify_check_crl_dir(opt->crl_file, cert, subject, cert_depth)) |
| { |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (tls_verify_crl_missing(opt)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "VERIFY ERROR: CRL not loaded"); |
| goto cleanup; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY OK: depth=%d, %s", cert_depth, subject); |
| session->verified = true; |
| ret = SUCCESS; |
| |
| cleanup: |
| |
| if (ret != SUCCESS) |
| { |
| tls_clear_error(); /* always? */ |
| session->verified = false; /* double sure? */ |
| } |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* *************************************************************************** |
| * Functions for the management of deferred authentication when using |
| * user/password authentication. |
| *************************************************************************** */ |
| |
| #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH |
| /* key_state_test_auth_control_file return values, |
| * NOTE: acf_merge indexing depends on these values */ |
| #define ACF_UNDEFINED 0 |
| #define ACF_SUCCEEDED 1 |
| #define ACF_DISABLED 2 |
| #define ACF_FAILED 3 |
| #endif |
| |
| void |
| auth_set_client_reason(struct tls_multi *multi, const char *client_reason) |
| { |
| if (multi->client_reason) |
| { |
| free(multi->client_reason); |
| multi->client_reason = NULL; |
| } |
| if (client_reason && strlen(client_reason)) |
| { |
| multi->client_reason = string_alloc(client_reason, NULL); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| |
| static inline unsigned int |
| man_def_auth_test(const struct key_state *ks) |
| { |
| if (management_enable_def_auth(management)) |
| { |
| return ks->mda_status; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return ACF_DISABLED; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| |
| /* |
| * auth_control_file functions |
| */ |
| |
| void |
| key_state_rm_auth_control_file(struct key_state *ks) |
| { |
| if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) |
| { |
| platform_unlink(ks->auth_control_file); |
| free(ks->auth_control_file); |
| ks->auth_control_file = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool |
| key_state_gen_auth_control_file(struct key_state *ks, const struct tls_options *opt) |
| { |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| |
| key_state_rm_auth_control_file(ks); |
| const char *acf = platform_create_temp_file(opt->tmp_dir, "acf", &gc); |
| if (acf) |
| { |
| ks->auth_control_file = string_alloc(acf, NULL); |
| setenv_str(opt->es, "auth_control_file", ks->auth_control_file); |
| } |
| |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| return acf; |
| } |
| |
| static unsigned int |
| key_state_test_auth_control_file(struct key_state *ks) |
| { |
| if (ks && ks->auth_control_file) |
| { |
| unsigned int ret = ks->auth_control_status; |
| if (ret == ACF_UNDEFINED) |
| { |
| FILE *fp = fopen(ks->auth_control_file, "r"); |
| if (fp) |
| { |
| const int c = fgetc(fp); |
| if (c == '1') |
| { |
| ret = ACF_SUCCEEDED; |
| } |
| else if (c == '0') |
| { |
| ret = ACF_FAILED; |
| } |
| fclose(fp); |
| ks->auth_control_status = ret; |
| } |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| return ACF_DISABLED; |
| } |
| |
| #endif /* ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| /* This function is called when a session's primary key state first becomes KS_TRUE */ |
| void ssl_session_fully_authenticated(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session* session) |
| { |
| struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; |
| if (ks->key_id == 0) |
| { |
| /* A key id of 0 indicates a new session and the client will |
| * get the auth-token as part of the initial push reply */ |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Auth token already sent to client, update auth-token on client. |
| * The initial auth-token is sent as part of the push message, for this |
| * update we need to schedule an extra push message. |
| * |
| * Otherwise the auth-token get pushed out as part of the "normal" |
| * push-reply |
| */ |
| if (multi->auth_token_initial) |
| { |
| /* |
| * We do not explicitly schedule the sending of the |
| * control message here but control message are only |
| * postponed when the control channel is not yet fully |
| * established and furthermore since this is called in |
| * the middle of authentication, there are other messages |
| * (new data channel keys) that are sent anyway and will |
| * trigger scheduling |
| */ |
| send_push_reply_auth_token(multi); |
| } |
| } |
| /* |
| * Return current session authentication state. Return |
| * value is TLS_AUTHENTICATION_x. |
| */ |
| |
| int |
| tls_authentication_status(struct tls_multi *multi, const int latency) |
| { |
| bool deferred = false; |
| bool success = false; |
| bool active = false; |
| |
| #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH |
| static const unsigned char acf_merge[] = |
| { |
| ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ |
| ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ |
| ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_UNDEFINED s2=ACF_FAILED */ |
| ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ |
| ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ |
| ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_SUCCEEDED s2=ACF_FAILED */ |
| ACF_UNDEFINED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ |
| ACF_SUCCEEDED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ |
| ACF_DISABLED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_DISABLED s2=ACF_FAILED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_UNDEFINED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_SUCCEEDED */ |
| ACF_FAILED, /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_DISABLED */ |
| ACF_FAILED /* s1=ACF_FAILED s2=ACF_FAILED */ |
| }; |
| #endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| if (multi) |
| { |
| int i; |
| |
| #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH |
| if (latency && multi->tas_last && multi->tas_last + latency >= now) |
| { |
| return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_UNDEFINED; |
| } |
| multi->tas_last = now; |
| #endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) |
| { |
| struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; |
| if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks)) |
| { |
| active = true; |
| if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE) |
| { |
| #ifdef ENABLE_DEF_AUTH |
| unsigned int s1 = ACF_DISABLED; |
| unsigned int s2 = ACF_DISABLED; |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| s1 = key_state_test_auth_control_file(ks); |
| #endif /* PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH */ |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| s2 = man_def_auth_test(ks); |
| #endif /* MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ |
| ASSERT(s1 < 4 && s2 < 4); |
| switch (acf_merge[(s1<<2) + s2]) |
| { |
| case ACF_SUCCEEDED: |
| case ACF_DISABLED: |
| success = true; |
| /* i=0 is the TM_ACTIVE/KS_PRIMARY session */ |
| if (i == 0 && ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_DEFERRED) |
| { |
| ssl_session_fully_authenticated(multi, |
| &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE]); |
| } |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_TRUE; |
| break; |
| |
| case ACF_UNDEFINED: |
| if (now < ks->auth_deferred_expire) |
| { |
| deferred = true; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case ACF_FAILED: |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE; |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| ASSERT(0); |
| } |
| #else /* !ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ |
| success = true; |
| #endif /* ENABLE_DEF_AUTH */ |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if 0 |
| dmsg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TAS: a=%d s=%d d=%d", active, success, deferred); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (success) |
| { |
| return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED; |
| } |
| else if (!active || deferred) |
| { |
| return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_DEFERRED; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| /* |
| * For deferred auth, this is where the management interface calls (on server) |
| * to indicate auth failure/success. |
| */ |
| bool |
| tls_authenticate_key(struct tls_multi *multi, const unsigned int mda_key_id, const bool auth, const char *client_reason) |
| { |
| bool ret = false; |
| if (multi) |
| { |
| int i; |
| auth_set_client_reason(multi, client_reason); |
| for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i) |
| { |
| struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i]; |
| if (ks->mda_key_id == mda_key_id) |
| { |
| ks->mda_status = auth ? ACF_SUCCEEDED : ACF_FAILED; |
| ret = true; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif /* ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| |
| /* **************************************************************************** |
| * Functions to verify username and password |
| * |
| * Authenticate a client using username/password. |
| * Runs on server. |
| * |
| * If you want to add new authentication methods, |
| * this is the place to start. |
| *************************************************************************** */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the user name and password using a script |
| */ |
| static bool |
| verify_user_pass_script(struct tls_session *session, struct tls_multi *multi, |
| const struct user_pass *up) |
| { |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| struct argv argv = argv_new(); |
| const char *tmp_file = ""; |
| bool ret = false; |
| |
| /* Set environmental variables prior to calling script */ |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "script_type", "user-pass-verify"); |
| |
| /* format command line */ |
| argv_parse_cmd(&argv, session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script); |
| |
| if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) |
| { |
| struct status_output *so; |
| |
| tmp_file = platform_create_temp_file(session->opt->tmp_dir, "up", |
| &gc); |
| if (tmp_file) |
| { |
| so = status_open(tmp_file, 0, -1, NULL, STATUS_OUTPUT_WRITE); |
| status_printf(so, "%s", up->username); |
| status_printf(so, "%s", up->password); |
| if (!status_close(so)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not write username/password to file: %s", |
| tmp_file); |
| goto done; |
| } |
| /* pass temp file name to script */ |
| argv_printf_cat(&argv, "%s", tmp_file); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: could not create write " |
| "username/password to temp file"); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "password", up->password); |
| } |
| |
| /* call command */ |
| ret = openvpn_run_script(&argv, session->opt->es, 0, |
| "--auth-user-pass-verify"); |
| |
| if (!session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script_via_file) |
| { |
| setenv_del(session->opt->es, "password"); |
| } |
| done: |
| if (tmp_file && strlen(tmp_file) > 0) |
| { |
| platform_unlink(tmp_file); |
| } |
| |
| argv_free(&argv); |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the username and password using a plugin |
| */ |
| static int |
| verify_user_pass_plugin(struct tls_session *session, struct tls_multi *multi, |
| const struct user_pass *up) |
| { |
| int retval = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ |
| #endif |
| |
| /* set password in private env space */ |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "password", up->password); |
| |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| /* generate filename for deferred auth control file */ |
| if (!key_state_gen_auth_control_file(ks, session->opt)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error (%s): " |
| "could not create deferred auth control file", __func__); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* call command */ |
| retval = plugin_call(session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY, NULL, NULL, session->opt->es); |
| |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| /* purge auth control filename (and file itself) for non-deferred returns */ |
| if (retval != OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) |
| { |
| key_state_rm_auth_control_file(ks); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| setenv_del(session->opt->es, "password"); |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| /* |
| * MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH internal ssl_verify.c status codes |
| */ |
| #define KMDA_ERROR 0 |
| #define KMDA_SUCCESS 1 |
| #define KMDA_UNDEF 2 |
| #define KMDA_DEF 3 |
| |
| static int |
| verify_user_pass_management(struct tls_session *session, |
| struct tls_multi *multi, |
| const struct user_pass *up) |
| { |
| int retval = KMDA_ERROR; |
| struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ |
| |
| /* set username/password in private env space */ |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "password", up->password); |
| |
| if (management) |
| { |
| management_notify_client_needing_auth(management, ks->mda_key_id, session->opt->mda_context, session->opt->es); |
| } |
| |
| setenv_del(session->opt->es, "password"); |
| |
| retval = KMDA_SUCCESS; |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |
| #endif /* ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH */ |
| |
| static bool |
| set_verify_user_pass_env(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, |
| struct tls_session *session) |
| { |
| /* Is username defined? */ |
| if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_AUTH_USER_PASS_OPTIONAL) || strlen(up->username)) |
| { |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "username", up->username); |
| |
| /* setenv incoming cert common name for script */ |
| setenv_str(session->opt->es, "common_name", session->common_name); |
| |
| /* setenv client real IP address */ |
| setenv_untrusted(session); |
| |
| /* |
| * if we are using auth-gen-token, send also the session id of auth gen token to |
| * allow the management to figure out if it is a new session or a continued one |
| */ |
| add_session_token_env(session, multi, up); |
| return true; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: peer provided a blank username"); |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Main username/password verification entry point |
| * |
| * Will set session->ks[KS_PRIMARY].authenticated according to |
| * result of the username/password verification |
| */ |
| void |
| verify_user_pass(struct user_pass *up, struct tls_multi *multi, |
| struct tls_session *session) |
| { |
| int s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS; |
| bool s2 = true; |
| struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ |
| |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| int man_def_auth = KMDA_UNDEF; |
| |
| if (management_enable_def_auth(management)) |
| { |
| man_def_auth = KMDA_DEF; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* enforce character class restrictions in username/password */ |
| string_mod_remap_name(up->username); |
| string_mod(up->password, CC_PRINT, CC_CRLF, '_'); |
| |
| /* |
| * If auth token succeeds we skip the auth |
| * methods unless otherwise specified |
| */ |
| bool skip_auth = false; |
| |
| /* |
| * If server is configured with --auth-gen-token and the client sends |
| * something that looks like an authentication token, this |
| * round will be done internally using the token instead of |
| * calling any external authentication modules. |
| */ |
| if (session->opt->auth_token_generate && is_auth_token(up->password)) |
| { |
| ks->auth_token_state_flags = verify_auth_token(up, multi, session); |
| if (session->opt->auth_token_call_auth) |
| { |
| /* |
| * we do not care about the result here because it is |
| * the responsibility of the external authentication to |
| * decide what to do with the result |
| */ |
| } |
| else if (ks->auth_token_state_flags == AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK) |
| { |
| /* |
| * We do not want the EXPIRED or EMPTY USER flags here so check |
| * for equality with AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK |
| */ |
| msg(M_WARN, "TLS: Username/auth-token authentication " |
| "succeeded for username '%s'", |
| up->username); |
| skip_auth = true; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| wipe_auth_token(multi); |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE; |
| msg(M_WARN, "TLS: Username/auth-token authentication " |
| "failed for username '%s'", up->username); |
| return; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Set the environment variables used by all auth variants */ |
| if (!set_verify_user_pass_env(up, multi, session)) |
| { |
| skip_auth = true; |
| s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; |
| } |
| |
| /* call plugin(s) and/or script */ |
| if (!skip_auth) |
| { |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| if (man_def_auth==KMDA_DEF) |
| { |
| man_def_auth = verify_user_pass_management(session, multi, up); |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (plugin_defined(session->opt->plugins, OPENVPN_PLUGIN_AUTH_USER_PASS_VERIFY)) |
| { |
| s1 = verify_user_pass_plugin(session, multi, up); |
| } |
| |
| if (session->opt->auth_user_pass_verify_script) |
| { |
| s2 = verify_user_pass_script(session, multi, up); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* check sizing of username if it will become our common name */ |
| if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) |
| && strlen(up->username)>TLS_USERNAME_LEN) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, |
| "TLS Auth Error: --username-as-common name specified and username is longer than the maximum permitted Common Name length of %d characters", |
| TLS_USERNAME_LEN); |
| s1 = OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_ERROR; |
| } |
| /* auth succeeded? */ |
| if ((s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| || s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED |
| #endif |
| ) && s2 |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| && man_def_auth != KMDA_ERROR |
| #endif |
| && tls_lock_username(multi, up->username)) |
| { |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_TRUE; |
| #ifdef PLUGIN_DEF_AUTH |
| if (s1 == OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_DEFERRED) |
| { |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #ifdef MANAGEMENT_DEF_AUTH |
| if (man_def_auth != KMDA_UNDEF) |
| { |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_DEFERRED; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if ((session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME)) |
| { |
| set_common_name(session, up->username); |
| } |
| |
| if ((session->opt->auth_token_generate)) |
| { |
| /* |
| * If we accepted a (not expired) token, i.e. |
| * initial auth via token on new connection, we need |
| * to store the auth-token in multi->auth_token, so |
| * the initial timestamp and session id can be extracted from it |
| */ |
| if (!multi->auth_token |
| && (ks->auth_token_state_flags & AUTH_TOKEN_HMAC_OK) |
| && !(ks->auth_token_state_flags & AUTH_TOKEN_EXPIRED)) |
| { |
| multi->auth_token = strdup(up->password); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Server is configured with --auth-gen-token. Generate or renew |
| * the token. |
| */ |
| generate_auth_token(up, multi); |
| } |
| msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "TLS: Username/Password authentication %s for username '%s' %s", |
| (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_DEFERRED) ? "deferred" : "succeeded", |
| up->username, |
| (session->opt->ssl_flags & SSLF_USERNAME_AS_COMMON_NAME) ? "[CN SET]" : ""); |
| if (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_TRUE) |
| { |
| ssl_session_fully_authenticated(multi, session); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE; |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: Auth Username/Password verification failed for peer"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| verify_final_auth_checks(struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_session *session) |
| { |
| struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY]; /* primary key */ |
| |
| /* While it shouldn't really happen, don't allow the common name to be NULL */ |
| if (!session->common_name) |
| { |
| set_common_name(session, ""); |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow the CN to change once it's been locked */ |
| if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE && multi->locked_cn) |
| { |
| const char *cn = session->common_name; |
| if (cn && strcmp(cn, multi->locked_cn)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN attempted to change from '%s' to '%s' -- tunnel disabled", |
| multi->locked_cn, |
| cn); |
| |
| /* change the common name back to its original value and disable the tunnel */ |
| set_common_name(session, multi->locked_cn); |
| tls_deauthenticate(multi); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow the cert hashes to change once they have been locked */ |
| if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE && multi->locked_cert_hash_set) |
| { |
| const struct cert_hash_set *chs = session->cert_hash_set; |
| if (chs && !cert_hash_compare(chs, multi->locked_cert_hash_set)) |
| { |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: TLS object CN=%s client-provided SSL certs unexpectedly changed during mid-session reauth", |
| session->common_name); |
| |
| /* disable the tunnel */ |
| tls_deauthenticate(multi); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* verify --client-config-dir based authentication */ |
| if (ks->authenticated > KS_AUTH_FALSE && session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive) |
| { |
| struct gc_arena gc = gc_new(); |
| |
| const char *cn = session->common_name; |
| const char *path = platform_gen_path(session->opt->client_config_dir_exclusive, |
| cn, &gc); |
| if (!cn || !strcmp(cn, CCD_DEFAULT) || !platform_test_file(path)) |
| { |
| ks->authenticated = KS_AUTH_FALSE; |
| wipe_auth_token(multi); |
| msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Auth Error: --client-config-dir authentication failed for common name '%s' file='%s'", |
| session->common_name, |
| path ? path : "UNDEF"); |
| } |
| |
| gc_free(&gc); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| void |
| tls_x509_clear_env(struct env_set *es) |
| { |
| struct env_item *item = es->list; |
| while (item) |
| { |
| struct env_item *next = item->next; |
| if (item->string |
| && 0 == strncmp("X509_", item->string, strlen("X509_"))) |
| { |
| env_set_del(es, item->string); |
| } |
| item = next; |
| } |
| } |
