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third-party-mirror / openvpn / e5a70b7b87c37fd414cec9693bf6b6dfcbe742a9 / . / src / openvpn / crypto.c
blob: 7e7dead0ccc59f62110d62c8c78f315a5ead345e [file] [log] [blame]
/*
* OpenVPN -- An application to securely tunnel IP networks
* over a single TCP/UDP port, with support for SSL/TLS-based
* session authentication and key exchange,
* packet encryption, packet authentication, and
* packet compression.
*
* Copyright (C) 2002-2018 OpenVPN Inc <sales@openvpn.net>
* Copyright (C) 2010-2018 Fox Crypto B.V. <openvpn@fox-it.com>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2
* as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
* with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
* 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "config.h"
#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
#include "config-msvc.h"
#endif
#include "syshead.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTO
#include "crypto.h"
#include "error.h"
#include "integer.h"
#include "platform.h"
#include "memdbg.h"
/*
* Encryption and Compression Routines.
*
* On entry, buf contains the input data and length.
* On exit, it should be set to the output data and length.
*
* If buf->len is <= 0 we should return
* If buf->len is set to 0 on exit it tells the caller to ignore the packet.
*
* work is a workspace buffer we are given of size BUF_SIZE.
* work may be used to return output data, or the input buffer
* may be modified and returned as output. If output data is
* returned in work, the data should start after FRAME_HEADROOM bytes
* of padding to leave room for downstream routines to prepend.
*
* Up to a total of FRAME_HEADROOM bytes may be prepended to the input buf
* by all routines (encryption, decryption, compression, and decompression).
*
* Note that the buf_prepend return will assert if we try to
* make a header bigger than FRAME_HEADROOM. This should not
* happen unless the frame parameters are wrong.
*/
static void
openvpn_encrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt)
{
#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES
struct gc_arena gc;
int outlen = 0;
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt;
uint8_t *mac_out = NULL;
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt = cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(ctx->cipher);
const int mac_len = cipher_kt_tag_size(cipher_kt);
/* IV, packet-ID and implicit IV required for this mode. */
ASSERT(ctx->cipher);
ASSERT(cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher_kt));
ASSERT(opt->flags & CO_USE_IV);
ASSERT(packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id));
gc_init(&gc);
/* Prepare IV */
{
struct buffer iv_buffer;
uint8_t iv[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = {0};
const int iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
ASSERT(iv_len >= OPENVPN_AEAD_MIN_IV_LEN && iv_len <= OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
buf_set_write(&iv_buffer, iv, iv_len);
/* IV starts with packet id to make the IV unique for packet */
if (!packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &iv_buffer, false, false))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
/* Remainder of IV consists of implicit part (unique per session) */
ASSERT(buf_write(&iv_buffer, ctx->implicit_iv, ctx->implicit_iv_len));
ASSERT(iv_buffer.len == iv_len);
/* Write explicit part of IV to work buffer */
ASSERT(buf_write(&work, iv, iv_len - ctx->implicit_iv_len));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT IV: %s", format_hex(iv, iv_len, 0, &gc));
/* Init cipher_ctx with IV. key & keylen are already initialized */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv));
}
/* Reserve space for authentication tag */
mac_out = buf_write_alloc(&work, mac_len);
ASSERT(mac_out);
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
/* Buffer overflow check */
if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS,
"ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d",
buf->capacity, buf->offset, buf->len, work.capacity, work.offset,
work.len);
goto err;
}
/* For AEAD ciphers, authenticate Additional Data, including opcode */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update_ad(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work) - mac_len));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT AD: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work) - mac_len, 0, &gc));
/* Encrypt packet ID, payload */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update(ctx->cipher, BEND(&work), &outlen, BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf)));
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
/* Flush the encryption buffer */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_final(ctx->cipher, BEND(&work), &outlen));
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
/* Write authentication tag */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_get_tag(ctx->cipher, mac_out, mac_len));
*buf = work;
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
gc_free(&gc);
return;
err:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free(&gc);
return;
#else /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */
ASSERT(0);
#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */
}
static void
openvpn_encrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt)
{
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init(&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt)
{
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt;
uint8_t *mac_out = NULL;
const uint8_t *hmac_start = NULL;
/* Do Encrypt from buf -> work */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = {0};
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt = cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(ctx->cipher);
int outlen;
/* Reserve space for HMAC */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
mac_out = buf_write_alloc(&work, hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac));
ASSERT(mac_out);
hmac_start = BEND(&work);
}
if (cipher_kt_mode_cbc(cipher_kt))
{
/* generate pseudo-random IV */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
prng_bytes(iv_buf, iv_size);
}
/* Put packet ID in plaintext buffer */
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
&& !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM,
true))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
}
else if (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher_kt))
{
struct buffer b;
/* IV and packet-ID required for this mode. */
ASSERT(opt->flags & CO_USE_IV);
ASSERT(packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id));
buf_set_write(&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
ASSERT(packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, &b, true, false));
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT(0);
}
/* set the IV pseudo-randomly */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
ASSERT(buf_write(&work, iv_buf, iv_size));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT IV: %s", format_hex(iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
}
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT FROM: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
/* cipher_ctx was already initialized with key & keylen */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf));
/* Buffer overflow check */
if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT: buffer size error, bc=%d bo=%d bl=%d wc=%d wo=%d wl=%d cbs=%d",
buf->capacity,
buf->offset,
buf->len,
work.capacity,
work.offset,
work.len,
cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher));
goto err;
}
/* Encrypt packet ID, payload */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update(ctx->cipher, BEND(&work), &outlen, BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf)));
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
/* Flush the encryption buffer */
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_final(ctx->cipher, BEND(&work), &outlen));
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
/* For all CBC mode ciphers, check the last block is complete */
ASSERT(cipher_kt_mode(cipher_kt) != OPENVPN_MODE_CBC
|| outlen == iv_size);
}
else /* No Encryption */
{
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id)
&& !packet_id_write(&opt->packet_id.send, buf,
opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM, true))
{
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "ENCRYPT ERROR: packet ID roll over");
goto err;
}
if (ctx->hmac)
{
hmac_start = BPTR(buf);
ASSERT(mac_out = buf_prepend(buf, hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac)));
}
if (BLEN(&work))
{
buf_write_prepend(buf, BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work));
}
work = *buf;
}
/* HMAC the ciphertext (or plaintext if !cipher) */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac);
hmac_ctx_update(ctx->hmac, hmac_start, BEND(&work) - hmac_start);
hmac_ctx_final(ctx->hmac, mac_out);
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT HMAC: %s",
format_hex(mac_out, hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac), 80, &gc));
}
*buf = work;
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "ENCRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc));
}
gc_free(&gc);
return;
err:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free(&gc);
return;
}
void
openvpn_encrypt(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt)
{
if (buf->len > 0 && opt)
{
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt =
cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(opt->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.cipher);
if (cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher_kt))
{
openvpn_encrypt_aead(buf, work, opt);
}
else
{
openvpn_encrypt_v1(buf, work, opt);
}
}
}
bool
crypto_check_replay(struct crypto_options *opt,
const struct packet_id_net *pin, const char *error_prefix,
struct gc_arena *gc)
{
bool ret = false;
packet_id_reap_test(&opt->packet_id.rec);
if (packet_id_test(&opt->packet_id.rec, pin))
{
packet_id_add(&opt->packet_id.rec, pin);
if (opt->pid_persist && (opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM))
{
packet_id_persist_save_obj(opt->pid_persist, &opt->packet_id);
}
ret = true;
}
else
{
if (!(opt->flags & CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS))
{
msg(D_REPLAY_ERRORS, "%s: bad packet ID (may be a replay): %s -- "
"see the man page entry for --no-replay and --replay-window for "
"more info or silence this warning with --mute-replay-warnings",
error_prefix, packet_id_net_print(pin, true, gc));
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* If (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) is not NULL, we will read an IV from the packet.
*
* Set buf->len to 0 and return false on decrypt error.
*
* On success, buf is set to point to plaintext, true
* is returned.
*/
static bool
openvpn_decrypt_aead(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt, const struct frame *frame,
const uint8_t *ad_start)
{
#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES
static const char error_prefix[] = "AEAD Decrypt error";
struct packet_id_net pin = { 0 };
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt = cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(ctx->cipher);
uint8_t *tag_ptr = NULL;
int tag_size = 0;
int outlen;
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init(&gc);
ASSERT(opt);
ASSERT(frame);
ASSERT(buf->len > 0);
ASSERT(ctx->cipher);
ASSERT(cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher_kt));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
ASSERT(ad_start >= buf->data && ad_start <= BPTR(buf));
ASSERT(buf_init(&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ(frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
/* IV and Packet ID required for this mode */
ASSERT(packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id));
ASSERT(opt->flags & CO_USE_IV);
/* Combine IV from explicit part from packet and implicit part from context */
{
uint8_t iv[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
const int iv_len = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
const size_t packet_iv_len = iv_len - ctx->implicit_iv_len;
ASSERT(ctx->implicit_iv_len <= iv_len);
if (buf->len + ctx->implicit_iv_len < iv_len)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing IV info");
}
memcpy(iv, BPTR(buf), packet_iv_len);
memcpy(iv + packet_iv_len, ctx->implicit_iv, ctx->implicit_iv_len);
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex(iv, iv_len, 0, &gc));
/* Load IV, ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */
if (!cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher init failed");
}
}
/* Read packet ID from packet */
if (!packet_id_read(&pin, buf, false))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("error reading packet-id");
}
/* keep the tag value to feed in later */
tag_size = cipher_kt_tag_size(cipher_kt);
if (buf->len < tag_size)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing tag");
}
tag_ptr = BPTR(buf);
ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, tag_size));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT MAC: %s", format_hex(tag_ptr, tag_size, 0, &gc));
#if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001040L
/* OpenSSL <= 1.0.1c bug requires set tag before processing ciphertext */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->cipher, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, tag_size, tag_ptr))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("setting tag failed");
}
#endif
if (buf->len < 1)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing payload");
}
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s", format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 0, &gc));
/* Buffer overflow check (should never fail) */
if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("potential buffer overflow");
}
{
/* feed in tag and the authenticated data */
const int ad_size = BPTR(buf) - ad_start - tag_size;
ASSERT(cipher_ctx_update_ad(ctx->cipher, ad_start, ad_size));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT AD: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(buf) - ad_size - tag_size, ad_size, 0, &gc));
}
/* Decrypt and authenticate packet */
if (!cipher_ctx_update(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work), &outlen, BPTR(buf),
BLEN(buf)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher update failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
if (!cipher_ctx_final_check_tag(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen,
&outlen, tag_ptr, tag_size))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher final failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc));
if (!crypto_check_replay(opt, &pin, error_prefix, &gc))
{
goto error_exit;
}
*buf = work;
gc_free(&gc);
return true;
error_exit:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free(&gc);
return false;
#else /* HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */
ASSERT(0);
return false;
#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */
}
/*
* If (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV) is not NULL, we will read an IV from the packet.
*
* Set buf->len to 0 and return false on decrypt error.
*
* On success, buf is set to point to plaintext, true
* is returned.
*/
static bool
openvpn_decrypt_v1(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt, const struct frame *frame)
{
static const char error_prefix[] = "Authenticate/Decrypt packet error";
struct gc_arena gc;
gc_init(&gc);
if (buf->len > 0 && opt)
{
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
struct packet_id_net pin;
bool have_pin = false;
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT FROM: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf), 80, &gc));
/* Verify the HMAC */
if (ctx->hmac)
{
int hmac_len;
uint8_t local_hmac[MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH]; /* HMAC of ciphertext computed locally */
hmac_ctx_reset(ctx->hmac);
/* Assume the length of the input HMAC */
hmac_len = hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac);
/* Authentication fails if insufficient data in packet for HMAC */
if (buf->len < hmac_len)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing authentication info");
}
hmac_ctx_update(ctx->hmac, BPTR(buf) + hmac_len, BLEN(buf) - hmac_len);
hmac_ctx_final(ctx->hmac, local_hmac);
/* Compare locally computed HMAC with packet HMAC */
if (memcmp_constant_time(local_hmac, BPTR(buf), hmac_len))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("packet HMAC authentication failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, hmac_len));
}
/* Decrypt packet ID + payload */
if (ctx->cipher)
{
const int iv_size = cipher_ctx_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
const cipher_kt_t *cipher_kt = cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(ctx->cipher);
uint8_t iv_buf[OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
int outlen;
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT(buf_init(&work, FRAME_HEADROOM_ADJ(frame, FRAME_HEADROOM_MARKER_DECRYPT)));
/* use IV if user requested it */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
if (buf->len < iv_size)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing IV info");
}
memcpy(iv_buf, BPTR(buf), iv_size);
ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, iv_size));
}
/* show the IV's initial state */
if (opt->flags & CO_USE_IV)
{
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT IV: %s", format_hex(iv_buf, iv_size, 0, &gc));
}
if (buf->len < 1)
{
CRYPT_ERROR("missing payload");
}
/* ctx->cipher was already initialized with key & keylen */
if (!cipher_ctx_reset(ctx->cipher, iv_buf))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher init failed");
}
/* Buffer overflow check (should never happen) */
if (!buf_safe(&work, buf->len + cipher_ctx_block_size(ctx->cipher)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("potential buffer overflow");
}
/* Decrypt packet ID, payload */
if (!cipher_ctx_update(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work), &outlen, BPTR(buf), BLEN(buf)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher update failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
/* Flush the decryption buffer */
if (!cipher_ctx_final(ctx->cipher, BPTR(&work) + outlen, &outlen))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("cipher final failed");
}
ASSERT(buf_inc_len(&work, outlen));
dmsg(D_PACKET_CONTENT, "DECRYPT TO: %s",
format_hex(BPTR(&work), BLEN(&work), 80, &gc));
/* Get packet ID from plaintext buffer or IV, depending on cipher mode */
{
if (cipher_kt_mode_cbc(cipher_kt))
{
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
{
if (!packet_id_read(&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST(opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("error reading CBC packet-id");
}
have_pin = true;
}
}
else if (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(cipher_kt))
{
struct buffer b;
/* IV and packet-ID required for this mode. */
ASSERT(opt->flags & CO_USE_IV);
ASSERT(packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id));
buf_set_read(&b, iv_buf, iv_size);
if (!packet_id_read(&pin, &b, true))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("error reading CFB/OFB packet-id");
}
have_pin = true;
}
else /* We only support CBC, CFB, or OFB modes right now */
{
ASSERT(0);
}
}
}
else
{
work = *buf;
if (packet_id_initialized(&opt->packet_id))
{
if (!packet_id_read(&pin, &work, BOOL_CAST(opt->flags & CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM)))
{
CRYPT_ERROR("error reading packet-id");
}
have_pin = !BOOL_CAST(opt->flags & CO_IGNORE_PACKET_ID);
}
}
if (have_pin && !crypto_check_replay(opt, &pin, error_prefix, &gc))
{
goto error_exit;
}
*buf = work;
}
gc_free(&gc);
return true;
error_exit:
crypto_clear_error();
buf->len = 0;
gc_free(&gc);
return false;
}
bool
openvpn_decrypt(struct buffer *buf, struct buffer work,
struct crypto_options *opt, const struct frame *frame,
const uint8_t *ad_start)
{
bool ret = false;
if (buf->len > 0 && opt)
{
const struct key_ctx *ctx = &opt->key_ctx_bi.decrypt;
if (cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(ctx->cipher)))
{
ret = openvpn_decrypt_aead(buf, work, opt, frame, ad_start);
}
else
{
ret = openvpn_decrypt_v1(buf, work, opt, frame);
}
}
else
{
ret = true;
}
return ret;
}
void
crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
const struct key_type *kt,
bool use_iv,
bool packet_id,
bool packet_id_long_form)
{
unsigned int crypto_overhead = 0;
if (packet_id)
{
crypto_overhead += packet_id_size(packet_id_long_form);
}
if (kt->cipher)
{
if (use_iv)
{
crypto_overhead += cipher_kt_iv_size(kt->cipher);
}
if (cipher_kt_mode_aead(kt->cipher))
{
crypto_overhead += cipher_kt_tag_size(kt->cipher);
}
/* extra block required by cipher_ctx_update() */
crypto_overhead += cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher);
}
crypto_overhead += kt->hmac_length;
frame_add_to_extra_frame(frame, crypto_overhead);
msg(D_MTU_DEBUG, "%s: Adjusting frame parameters for crypto by %u bytes",
__func__, crypto_overhead);
}
unsigned int
crypto_max_overhead(void)
{
return packet_id_size(true) + OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH
+OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE
+max_int(OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE, OPENVPN_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH);
}
/*
* Build a struct key_type.
*/
void
init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername,
const char *authname, int keysize, bool tls_mode, bool warn)
{
bool aead_cipher = false;
ASSERT(ciphername);
ASSERT(authname);
CLEAR(*kt);
if (strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0)
{
kt->cipher = cipher_kt_get(translate_cipher_name_from_openvpn(ciphername));
if (!kt->cipher)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Cipher %s not supported", ciphername);
}
kt->cipher_length = cipher_kt_key_size(kt->cipher);
if (keysize > 0 && keysize <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH)
{
kt->cipher_length = keysize;
}
/* check legal cipher mode */
aead_cipher = cipher_kt_mode_aead(kt->cipher);
if (!(cipher_kt_mode_cbc(kt->cipher)
|| (tls_mode && aead_cipher)
#ifdef ENABLE_OFB_CFB_MODE
|| (tls_mode && cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(kt->cipher))
#endif
))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' mode not supported", ciphername);
}
if (OPENVPN_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE < cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Cipher '%s' not allowed: block size too big.", ciphername);
}
}
else
{
if (warn)
{
msg(M_WARN, "******* WARNING *******: '--cipher none' was specified. "
"This means NO encryption will be performed and tunnelled "
"data WILL be transmitted in clear text over the network! "
"PLEASE DO RECONSIDER THIS SETTING!");
}
}
if (strcmp(authname, "none") != 0)
{
if (!aead_cipher) /* Ignore auth for AEAD ciphers */
{
kt->digest = md_kt_get(authname);
kt->hmac_length = md_kt_size(kt->digest);
if (OPENVPN_MAX_HMAC_SIZE < kt->hmac_length)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "HMAC '%s' not allowed: digest size too big.", authname);
}
}
}
else if (!aead_cipher)
{
if (warn)
{
msg(M_WARN, "******* WARNING *******: '--auth none' was specified. "
"This means no authentication will be performed on received "
"packets, meaning you CANNOT trust that the data received by "
"the remote side have NOT been manipulated. "
"PLEASE DO RECONSIDER THIS SETTING!");
}
}
}
/* given a key and key_type, build a key_ctx */
void
init_key_ctx(struct key_ctx *ctx, const struct key *key,
const struct key_type *kt, int enc,
const char *prefix)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
CLEAR(*ctx);
if (kt->cipher && kt->cipher_length > 0)
{
ctx->cipher = cipher_ctx_new();
cipher_ctx_init(ctx->cipher, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length,
kt->cipher, enc);
msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "%s: Cipher '%s' initialized with %d bit key",
prefix,
translate_cipher_name_to_openvpn(cipher_kt_name(kt->cipher)),
kt->cipher_length *8);
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEYS, "%s: CIPHER KEY: %s", prefix,
format_hex(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "%s: CIPHER block_size=%d iv_size=%d",
prefix, cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher),
cipher_kt_iv_size(kt->cipher));
if (cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher) < 128/8)
{
msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: INSECURE cipher with block size less than 128"
" bit (%d bit). This allows attacks like SWEET32. Mitigate by "
"using a --cipher with a larger block size (e.g. AES-256-CBC).",
cipher_kt_block_size(kt->cipher)*8);
}
}
if (kt->digest && kt->hmac_length > 0)
{
ctx->hmac = hmac_ctx_new();
hmac_ctx_init(ctx->hmac, key->hmac, kt->hmac_length, kt->digest);
msg(D_HANDSHAKE,
"%s: Using %d bit message hash '%s' for HMAC authentication",
prefix, md_kt_size(kt->digest) * 8, md_kt_name(kt->digest));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEYS, "%s: HMAC KEY: %s", prefix,
format_hex(key->hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "%s: HMAC size=%d block_size=%d",
prefix,
md_kt_size(kt->digest),
hmac_ctx_size(ctx->hmac));
}
gc_free(&gc);
}
void
init_key_ctx_bi(struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const struct key2 *key2,
int key_direction, const struct key_type *kt, const char *name)
{
char log_prefix[128] = { 0 };
struct key_direction_state kds;
key_direction_state_init(&kds, key_direction);
openvpn_snprintf(log_prefix, sizeof(log_prefix), "Outgoing %s", name);
init_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt, &key2->keys[kds.out_key], kt,
OPENVPN_OP_ENCRYPT, log_prefix);
openvpn_snprintf(log_prefix, sizeof(log_prefix), "Incoming %s", name);
init_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt, &key2->keys[kds.in_key], kt,
OPENVPN_OP_DECRYPT, log_prefix);
ctx->initialized = true;
}
void
free_key_ctx(struct key_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx->cipher)
{
cipher_ctx_free(ctx->cipher);
ctx->cipher = NULL;
}
if (ctx->hmac)
{
hmac_ctx_cleanup(ctx->hmac);
hmac_ctx_free(ctx->hmac);
ctx->hmac = NULL;
}
ctx->implicit_iv_len = 0;
}
void
free_key_ctx_bi(struct key_ctx_bi *ctx)
{
free_key_ctx(&ctx->encrypt);
free_key_ctx(&ctx->decrypt);
}
static bool
key_is_zero(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < kt->cipher_length; ++i)
if (key->cipher[i])
{
return false;
}
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: WARNING: zero key detected");
return true;
}
/*
* Make sure that cipher key is a valid key for current key_type.
*/
bool
check_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
{
if (kt->cipher)
{
/*
* Check for zero key
*/
if (key_is_zero(key, kt))
{
return false;
}
/*
* Check for weak or semi-weak DES keys.
*/
{
const int ndc = key_des_num_cblocks(kt->cipher);
if (ndc)
{
return key_des_check(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, ndc);
}
else
{
return true;
}
}
}
return true;
}
/*
* Make safe mutations to key to ensure it is valid,
* such as ensuring correct parity on DES keys.
*
* This routine cannot guarantee it will generate a good
* key. You must always call check_key after this routine
* to make sure.
*/
void
fixup_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
if (kt->cipher)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG
const struct key orig = *key;
#endif
const int ndc = key_des_num_cblocks(kt->cipher);
if (ndc)
{
key_des_fixup(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, ndc);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG
if (check_debug_level(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG))
{
if (memcmp(orig.cipher, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length))
{
dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key: before=%s after=%s",
format_hex(orig.cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc),
format_hex(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc));
}
}
#endif
}
gc_free(&gc);
}
void
check_replay_iv_consistency(const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id, bool use_iv)
{
ASSERT(kt);
if (!(packet_id && use_iv) && (cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(kt->cipher)
|| cipher_kt_mode_aead(kt->cipher)))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "--no-replay or --no-iv cannot be used with a CFB, OFB or "
"AEAD mode cipher");
}
}
/*
* Generate a random key. If key_type is provided, make
* sure generated key is valid for key_type.
*/
void
generate_key_random(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
{
int cipher_len = MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH;
int hmac_len = MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH;
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
do
{
CLEAR(*key);
if (kt)
{
if (kt->cipher && kt->cipher_length > 0 && kt->cipher_length <= cipher_len)
{
cipher_len = kt->cipher_length;
}
if (kt->digest && kt->hmac_length > 0 && kt->hmac_length <= hmac_len)
{
hmac_len = kt->hmac_length;
}
}
if (!rand_bytes(key->cipher, cipher_len)
|| !rand_bytes(key->hmac, hmac_len))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for key generation");
}
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "Cipher source entropy: %s", format_hex(key->cipher, cipher_len, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "HMAC source entropy: %s", format_hex(key->hmac, hmac_len, 0, &gc));
if (kt)
{
fixup_key(key, kt);
}
} while (kt && !check_key(key, kt));
gc_free(&gc);
}
/*
* Print key material
*/
void
key2_print(const struct key2 *k,
const struct key_type *kt,
const char *prefix0,
const char *prefix1)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
ASSERT(k->n == 2);
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (cipher): %s",
prefix0,
format_hex(k->keys[0].cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (hmac): %s",
prefix0,
format_hex(k->keys[0].hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (cipher): %s",
prefix1,
format_hex(k->keys[1].cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "%s (hmac): %s",
prefix1,
format_hex(k->keys[1].hmac, kt->hmac_length, 0, &gc));
gc_free(&gc);
}
void
test_crypto(struct crypto_options *co, struct frame *frame)
{
int i, j;
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
struct buffer src = alloc_buf_gc(TUN_MTU_SIZE(frame), &gc);
struct buffer work = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(frame), &gc);
struct buffer encrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(frame), &gc);
struct buffer decrypt_workspace = alloc_buf_gc(BUF_SIZE(frame), &gc);
struct buffer buf = clear_buf();
void *buf_p;
/* init work */
ASSERT(buf_init(&work, FRAME_HEADROOM(frame)));
#ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES
/* init implicit IV */
{
const cipher_kt_t *cipher =
cipher_ctx_get_cipher_kt(co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.cipher);
if (cipher_kt_mode_aead(cipher))
{
size_t impl_iv_len = cipher_kt_iv_size(cipher) - sizeof(packet_id_type);
ASSERT(cipher_kt_iv_size(cipher) <= OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
ASSERT(cipher_kt_iv_size(cipher) >= OPENVPN_AEAD_MIN_IV_LEN);
/* Generate dummy implicit IV */
ASSERT(rand_bytes(co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv,
OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH));
co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv_len = impl_iv_len;
memcpy(co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.implicit_iv,
co->key_ctx_bi.encrypt.implicit_iv, OPENVPN_MAX_IV_LENGTH);
co->key_ctx_bi.decrypt.implicit_iv_len = impl_iv_len;
}
}
#endif /* ifdef HAVE_AEAD_CIPHER_MODES */
msg(M_INFO, "Entering " PACKAGE_NAME " crypto self-test mode.");
for (i = 1; i <= TUN_MTU_SIZE(frame); ++i)
{
update_time();
msg(M_INFO, "TESTING ENCRYPT/DECRYPT of packet length=%d", i);
/*
* Load src with random data.
*/
ASSERT(buf_init(&src, 0));
ASSERT(i <= src.capacity);
src.len = i;
ASSERT(rand_bytes(BPTR(&src), BLEN(&src)));
/* copy source to input buf */
buf = work;
buf_p = buf_write_alloc(&buf, BLEN(&src));
ASSERT(buf_p);
memcpy(buf_p, BPTR(&src), BLEN(&src));
/* initialize work buffer with FRAME_HEADROOM bytes of prepend capacity */
ASSERT(buf_init(&encrypt_workspace, FRAME_HEADROOM(frame)));
/* encrypt */
openvpn_encrypt(&buf, encrypt_workspace, co);
/* decrypt */
openvpn_decrypt(&buf, decrypt_workspace, co, frame, BPTR(&buf));
/* compare */
if (buf.len != src.len)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "SELF TEST FAILED, src.len=%d buf.len=%d", src.len, buf.len);
}
for (j = 0; j < i; ++j)
{
const uint8_t in = *(BPTR(&src) + j);
const uint8_t out = *(BPTR(&buf) + j);
if (in != out)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "SELF TEST FAILED, pos=%d in=%d out=%d", j, in, out);
}
}
}
msg(M_INFO, PACKAGE_NAME " crypto self-test mode SUCCEEDED.");
gc_free(&gc);
}
void
crypto_read_openvpn_key(const struct key_type *key_type,
struct key_ctx_bi *ctx, const char *key_file, const char *key_inline,
const int key_direction, const char *key_name, const char *opt_name)
{
struct key2 key2;
struct key_direction_state kds;
if (key_inline)
{
read_key_file(&key2, key_inline, RKF_MUST_SUCCEED|RKF_INLINE);
}
else
{
read_key_file(&key2, key_file, RKF_MUST_SUCCEED);
}
if (key2.n != 2)
{
msg(M_ERR, "File '%s' does not have OpenVPN Static Key format. Using "
"free-form passphrase file is not supported anymore.", key_file);
}
/* check for and fix highly unlikely key problems */
verify_fix_key2(&key2, key_type, key_file);
/* handle key direction */
key_direction_state_init(&kds, key_direction);
must_have_n_keys(key_file, opt_name, &key2, kds.need_keys);
/* initialize key in both directions */
init_key_ctx_bi(ctx, &key2, key_direction, key_type, key_name);
secure_memzero(&key2, sizeof(key2));
}
/* header and footer for static key file */
static const char static_key_head[] = "-----BEGIN OpenVPN Static key V1-----";
static const char static_key_foot[] = "-----END OpenVPN Static key V1-----";
static const char printable_char_fmt[] =
"Non-Hex character ('%c') found at line %d in key file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)";
static const char unprintable_char_fmt[] =
"Non-Hex, unprintable character (0x%02x) found at line %d in key file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)";
/* read key from file */
void
read_key_file(struct key2 *key2, const char *file, const unsigned int flags)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
struct buffer in;
int fd, size;
uint8_t hex_byte[3] = {0, 0, 0};
const char *error_filename = file;
/* parse info */
const unsigned char *cp;
int hb_index = 0;
int line_num = 1;
int line_index = 0;
int match = 0;
/* output */
uint8_t *out = (uint8_t *) &key2->keys;
const int keylen = sizeof(key2->keys);
int count = 0;
/* parse states */
#define PARSE_INITIAL 0
#define PARSE_HEAD 1
#define PARSE_DATA 2
#define PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE 3
#define PARSE_FOOT 4
#define PARSE_FINISHED 5
int state = PARSE_INITIAL;
/* constants */
const int hlen = strlen(static_key_head);
const int flen = strlen(static_key_foot);
const int onekeylen = sizeof(key2->keys[0]);
CLEAR(*key2);
/*
* Key can be provided as a filename in 'file' or if RKF_INLINE
* is set, the actual key data itself in ascii form.
*/
if (flags & RKF_INLINE) /* 'file' is a string containing ascii representation of key */
{
size = strlen(file) + 1;
buf_set_read(&in, (const uint8_t *)file, size);
error_filename = INLINE_FILE_TAG;
}
else /* 'file' is a filename which refers to a file containing the ascii key */
{
in = alloc_buf_gc(2048, &gc);
fd = platform_open(file, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (fd == -1)
{
msg(M_ERR, "Cannot open key file '%s'", file);
}
size = read(fd, in.data, in.capacity);
if (size < 0)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Read error on key file ('%s')", file);
}
if (size == in.capacity)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Key file ('%s') can be a maximum of %d bytes", file, (int)in.capacity);
}
close(fd);
}
cp = (unsigned char *)in.data;
while (size > 0)
{
const unsigned char c = *cp;
#if 0
msg(M_INFO, "char='%c'[%d] s=%d ln=%d li=%d m=%d c=%d",
c, (int)c, state, line_num, line_index, match, count);
#endif
if (c == '\n')
{
line_index = match = 0;
++line_num;
}
else
{
/* first char of new line */
if (!line_index)
{
/* first char of line after header line? */
if (state == PARSE_HEAD)
{
state = PARSE_DATA;
}
/* first char of footer */
if ((state == PARSE_DATA || state == PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE) && c == '-')
{
state = PARSE_FOOT;
}
}
/* compare read chars with header line */
if (state == PARSE_INITIAL)
{
if (line_index < hlen && c == static_key_head[line_index])
{
if (++match == hlen)
{
state = PARSE_HEAD;
}
}
}
/* compare read chars with footer line */
if (state == PARSE_FOOT)
{
if (line_index < flen && c == static_key_foot[line_index])
{
if (++match == flen)
{
state = PARSE_FINISHED;
}
}
}
/* reading key */
if (state == PARSE_DATA)
{
if (isxdigit(c))
{
ASSERT(hb_index >= 0 && hb_index < 2);
hex_byte[hb_index++] = c;
if (hb_index == 2)
{
unsigned int u;
ASSERT(sscanf((const char *)hex_byte, "%x", &u) == 1);
*out++ = u;
hb_index = 0;
if (++count == keylen)
{
state = PARSE_DATA_COMPLETE;
}
}
}
else if (isspace(c))
{
}
else
{
msg(M_FATAL,
(isprint(c) ? printable_char_fmt : unprintable_char_fmt),
c, line_num, error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen);
}
}
++line_index;
}
++cp;
--size;
}
/*
* Normally we will read either 1 or 2 keys from file.
*/
key2->n = count / onekeylen;
ASSERT(key2->n >= 0 && key2->n <= (int) SIZE(key2->keys));
if (flags & RKF_MUST_SUCCEED)
{
if (!key2->n)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Insufficient key material or header text not found in file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)",
error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen);
}
if (state != PARSE_FINISHED)
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Footer text not found in file '%s' (%d/%d/%d bytes found/min/max)",
error_filename, count, onekeylen, keylen);
}
}
/* zero file read buffer if not an inline file */
if (!(flags & RKF_INLINE))
{
buf_clear(&in);
}
#if 0
/* DEBUGGING */
{
int i;
printf("KEY READ, n=%d\n", key2->n);
for (i = 0; i < (int) SIZE(key2->keys); ++i)
{
/* format key as ascii */
const char *fmt = format_hex_ex((const uint8_t *)&key2->keys[i],
sizeof(key2->keys[i]),
0,
16,
"\n",
&gc);
printf("[%d]\n%s\n\n", i, fmt);
}
}
#endif
/* pop our garbage collection level */
gc_free(&gc);
}
/*
* Write key to file, return number of random bits
* written.
*/
int
write_key_file(const int nkeys, const char *filename)
{
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
int fd, i;
int nbits = 0;
/* must be large enough to hold full key file */
struct buffer out = alloc_buf_gc(2048, &gc);
struct buffer nbits_head_text = alloc_buf_gc(128, &gc);
/* how to format the ascii file representation of key */
const int bytes_per_line = 16;
/* open key file */
fd = platform_open(filename, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (fd == -1)
{
msg(M_ERR, "Cannot open shared secret file '%s' for write", filename);
}
buf_printf(&out, "%s\n", static_key_head);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; ++i)
{
struct key key;
char *fmt;
/* generate random bits */
generate_key_random(&key, NULL);
/* format key as ascii */
fmt = format_hex_ex((const uint8_t *)&key,
sizeof(key),
0,
bytes_per_line,
"\n",
&gc);
/* increment random bits counter */
nbits += sizeof(key) * 8;
/* write to holding buffer */
buf_printf(&out, "%s\n", fmt);
/* zero memory which held key component (will be freed by GC) */
secure_memzero(fmt, strlen(fmt));
secure_memzero(&key, sizeof(key));
}
buf_printf(&out, "%s\n", static_key_foot);
/* write number of bits */
buf_printf(&nbits_head_text, "#\n# %d bit OpenVPN static key\n#\n", nbits);
buf_write_string_file(&nbits_head_text, filename, fd);
/* write key file, now formatted in out, to file */
buf_write_string_file(&out, filename, fd);
if (close(fd))
{
msg(M_ERR, "Close error on shared secret file %s", filename);
}
/* zero memory which held file content (memory will be freed by GC) */
buf_clear(&out);
/* pop our garbage collection level */
gc_free(&gc);
return nbits;
}
void
must_have_n_keys(const char *filename, const char *option, const struct key2 *key2, int n)
{
if (key2->n < n)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_SMALL
msg(M_FATAL, "Key file '%s' used in --%s contains insufficient key material [keys found=%d required=%d]", filename, option, key2->n, n);
#else
msg(M_FATAL, "Key file '%s' used in --%s contains insufficient key material [keys found=%d required=%d] -- try generating a new key file with '" PACKAGE " --genkey --secret [file]', or use the existing key file in bidirectional mode by specifying --%s without a key direction parameter", filename, option, key2->n, n, option);
#endif
}
}
int
ascii2keydirection(int msglevel, const char *str)
{
if (!str)
{
return KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL;
}
else if (!strcmp(str, "0"))
{
return KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL;
}
else if (!strcmp(str, "1"))
{
return KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE;
}
else
{
msg(msglevel, "Unknown key direction '%s' -- must be '0' or '1'", str);
return -1;
}
return KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL; /* NOTREACHED */
}
const char *
keydirection2ascii(int kd, bool remote, bool humanreadable)
{
if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL)
{
if (humanreadable)
{
return "not set";
}
else
{
return NULL;
}
}
else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL)
{
return remote ? "1" : "0";
}
else if (kd == KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE)
{
return remote ? "0" : "1";
}
else
{
ASSERT(0);
}
return NULL; /* NOTREACHED */
}
void
key_direction_state_init(struct key_direction_state *kds, int key_direction)
{
CLEAR(*kds);
switch (key_direction)
{
case KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL:
kds->out_key = 0;
kds->in_key = 1;
kds->need_keys = 2;
break;
case KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE:
kds->out_key = 1;
kds->in_key = 0;
kds->need_keys = 2;
break;
case KEY_DIRECTION_BIDIRECTIONAL:
kds->out_key = 0;
kds->in_key = 0;
kds->need_keys = 1;
break;
default:
ASSERT(0);
}
}
void
verify_fix_key2(struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared_secret_file)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < key2->n; ++i)
{
/* Fix parity for DES keys and make sure not a weak key */
fixup_key(&key2->keys[i], kt);
/* This should be a very improbable failure */
if (!check_key(&key2->keys[i], kt))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "Key #%d in '%s' is bad. Try making a new key with --genkey.",
i+1, shared_secret_file);
}
}
}
/* given a key and key_type, write key to buffer */
bool
write_key(const struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt,
struct buffer *buf)
{
ASSERT(kt->cipher_length <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH
&& kt->hmac_length <= MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH);
if (!buf_write(buf, &kt->cipher_length, 1))
{
return false;
}
if (!buf_write(buf, &kt->hmac_length, 1))
{
return false;
}
if (!buf_write(buf, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length))
{
return false;
}
if (!buf_write(buf, key->hmac, kt->hmac_length))
{
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Given a key_type and buffer, read key from buffer.
* Return: 1 on success
* -1 read failure
* 0 on key length mismatch
*/
int
read_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf)
{
uint8_t cipher_length;
uint8_t hmac_length;
CLEAR(*key);
if (!buf_read(buf, &cipher_length, 1))
{
goto read_err;
}
if (!buf_read(buf, &hmac_length, 1))
{
goto read_err;
}
if (cipher_length != kt->cipher_length || hmac_length != kt->hmac_length)
{
goto key_len_err;
}
if (!buf_read(buf, key->cipher, cipher_length))
{
goto read_err;
}
if (!buf_read(buf, key->hmac, hmac_length))
{
goto read_err;
}
return 1;
read_err:
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: error reading key from remote");
return -1;
key_len_err:
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
"TLS Error: key length mismatch, local cipher/hmac %d/%d, remote cipher/hmac %d/%d",
kt->cipher_length, kt->hmac_length, cipher_length, hmac_length);
return 0;
}
/*
* Random number functions, used in cases where we want
* reasonably strong cryptographic random number generation
* without depleting our entropy pool. Used for random
* IV values and a number of other miscellaneous tasks.
*/
static uint8_t *nonce_data = NULL; /* GLOBAL */
static const md_kt_t *nonce_md = NULL; /* GLOBAL */
static int nonce_secret_len = 0; /* GLOBAL */
/* Reset the nonce value, also done periodically to refresh entropy */
static void
prng_reset_nonce(void)
{
const int size = md_kt_size(nonce_md) + nonce_secret_len;
#if 1 /* Must be 1 for real usage */
if (!rand_bytes(nonce_data, size))
{
msg(M_FATAL, "ERROR: Random number generator cannot obtain entropy for PRNG");
}
#else
/* Only for testing -- will cause a predictable PRNG sequence */
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < size; ++i)
nonce_data[i] = (uint8_t) i;
}
#endif
}
void
prng_init(const char *md_name, const int nonce_secret_len_parm)
{
prng_uninit();
nonce_md = md_name ? md_kt_get(md_name) : NULL;
if (nonce_md)
{
ASSERT(nonce_secret_len_parm >= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MIN && nonce_secret_len_parm <= NONCE_SECRET_LEN_MAX);
nonce_secret_len = nonce_secret_len_parm;
{
const int size = md_kt_size(nonce_md) + nonce_secret_len;
dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "PRNG init md=%s size=%d", md_kt_name(nonce_md), size);
nonce_data = (uint8_t *) malloc(size);
check_malloc_return(nonce_data);
prng_reset_nonce();
}
}
}
void
prng_uninit(void)
{
free(nonce_data);
nonce_data = NULL;
nonce_md = NULL;
nonce_secret_len = 0;
}
void
prng_bytes(uint8_t *output, int len)
{
static size_t processed = 0;
if (nonce_md)
{
const int md_size = md_kt_size(nonce_md);
while (len > 0)
{
const int blen = min_int(len, md_size);
md_full(nonce_md, nonce_data, md_size + nonce_secret_len, nonce_data);
memcpy(output, nonce_data, blen);
output += blen;
len -= blen;
/* Ensure that random data is reset regularly */
processed += blen;
if (processed > PRNG_NONCE_RESET_BYTES)
{
prng_reset_nonce();
processed = 0;
}
}
}
else
{
ASSERT(rand_bytes(output, len));
}
}
/* an analogue to the random() function, but use prng_bytes */
long int
get_random(void)
{
long int l;
prng_bytes((unsigned char *)&l, sizeof(l));
if (l < 0)
{
l = -l;
}
return l;
}
static const cipher_name_pair *
get_cipher_name_pair(const char *cipher_name)
{
const cipher_name_pair *pair;
size_t i = 0;
/* Search for a cipher name translation */
for (; i < cipher_name_translation_table_count; i++)
{
pair = &cipher_name_translation_table[i];
if (0 == strcmp(cipher_name, pair->openvpn_name)
|| 0 == strcmp(cipher_name, pair->lib_name))
{
return pair;
}
}
/* Nothing found, return null */
return NULL;
}
const char *
translate_cipher_name_from_openvpn(const char *cipher_name)
{
const cipher_name_pair *pair = get_cipher_name_pair(cipher_name);
if (NULL == pair)
{
return cipher_name;
}
return pair->lib_name;
}
const char *
translate_cipher_name_to_openvpn(const char *cipher_name)
{
const cipher_name_pair *pair = get_cipher_name_pair(cipher_name);
if (NULL == pair)
{
return cipher_name;
}
return pair->openvpn_name;
}
#endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO */