| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <mntent.h> |
| #include <sys/mman.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include "sd-device.h" |
| |
| #include "alloc-util.h" |
| #include "ask-password-api.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-fido2.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-util.h" |
| #include "device-util.h" |
| #include "efi-loader.h" |
| #include "escape.h" |
| #include "fileio.h" |
| #include "fs-util.h" |
| #include "fstab-util.h" |
| #include "hexdecoct.h" |
| #include "libfido2-util.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "main-func.h" |
| #include "memory-util.h" |
| #include "mount-util.h" |
| #include "nulstr-util.h" |
| #include "parse-util.h" |
| #include "path-util.h" |
| #include "pkcs11-util.h" |
| #include "pretty-print.h" |
| #include "random-util.h" |
| #include "string-util.h" |
| #include "strv.h" |
| #include "tpm2-util.h" |
| |
| /* internal helper */ |
| #define ANY_LUKS "LUKS" |
| /* as in src/cryptsetup.h */ |
| #define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512 |
| #define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096 |
| |
| static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */ |
| static char *arg_cipher = NULL; |
| static unsigned arg_key_size = 0; |
| static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE; |
| static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT; |
| static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0; |
| static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0; |
| static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false; |
| static bool arg_try_empty_password = false; |
| static char *arg_hash = NULL; |
| static char *arg_header = NULL; |
| static unsigned arg_tries = 3; |
| static bool arg_readonly = false; |
| static bool arg_verify = false; |
| static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = 0; |
| static bool arg_discards = false; |
| static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false; |
| static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false; |
| static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false; |
| static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false; |
| static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL; |
| static uint64_t arg_offset = 0; |
| static uint64_t arg_skip = 0; |
| static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY; |
| static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL; |
| static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL; |
| static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL; |
| static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0; |
| static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL; |
| static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; |
| static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; |
| static bool arg_headless = false; |
| |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep); |
| |
| /* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't: |
| |
| check= |
| checkargs= |
| noearly |
| loud |
| quiet |
| keyscript= |
| initramfs |
| */ |
| |
| static int parse_one_option(const char *option) { |
| const char *val; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(option); |
| |
| /* Handled outside of this tool */ |
| if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout")) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout=")) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_key_size % 8) { |
| log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_key_size /= 8; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_sector_size % 2) { |
| log_error("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { |
| log_error("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) || |
| (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) { |
| |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) { |
| |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| if (path_is_absolute(val)) { |
| if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| } else |
| log_error("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute. Ignoring.", val); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_keyfile_erase = r; |
| |
| } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase")) |
| arg_keyfile_erase = true; |
| |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) { |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(val)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); |
| |
| if (arg_header) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Duplicate header= option, refusing."); |
| |
| arg_header = strdup(val); |
| if (!arg_header) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only")) |
| arg_readonly = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "verify")) |
| arg_verify = true; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) { |
| if (streq(val, "masked")) |
| arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT); |
| else { |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r); |
| SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r); |
| } |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard")) |
| arg_discards = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt")) |
| arg_same_cpu_crypt = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus")) |
| arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue")) |
| arg_no_read_workqueue = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue")) |
| arg_no_write_workqueue = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "luks")) |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| /* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ |
| #ifdef CRYPT_BITLK |
| else if (streq(option, "bitlk")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK; |
| #endif |
| else if (streq(option, "tcrypt")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_hidden = true; |
| } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_system = true; |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true; |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") || |
| startswith(option, "tmp=")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing"); |
| |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) |
| arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL; |
| size_t cid_size; |
| |
| r = unbase64mem(val, SIZE_MAX, &cid, &cid_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m"); |
| |
| free(arg_fido2_cid); |
| arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid); |
| arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */ |
| if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto) |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = true; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) { |
| |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) { |
| |
| if (isempty(val)) |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = 0; |
| else { |
| uint32_t mask; |
| |
| r = tpm2_parse_pcrs(val, &mask); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX) |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = mask; |
| else |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask |= mask; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_try_empty_password = r; |
| |
| } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password")) |
| arg_try_empty_password = true; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_headless = r; |
| } else if (streq(option, "headless")) |
| arg_headless = true; |
| |
| else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach")) |
| log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int parse_options(const char *options) { |
| assert(options); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| break; |
| |
| r = parse_one_option(word); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* sanity-check options */ |
| if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { |
| if (arg_offset != 0) |
| log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type); |
| if (arg_skip != 0) |
| log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static char* disk_description(const char *path) { |
| static const char name_fields[] = |
| "DM_NAME\0" |
| "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0" |
| "ID_MODEL\0"; |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL; |
| const char *i, *name; |
| struct stat st; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(path); |
| |
| if (stat(path, &st) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL; |
| |
| /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's |
| * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or |
| * other weird stuff. */ |
| |
| r = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m"); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL)) |
| return TAKE_PTR(unescaped); |
| } |
| |
| /* These need no unescaping. */ |
| NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) |
| if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 && |
| !isempty(name)) |
| return strdup(name); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; |
| _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL; |
| struct mntent *m; |
| |
| /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */ |
| |
| device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label); |
| if (!device) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re"); |
| if (!f) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| while ((m = getmntent(f))) |
| if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device)) |
| return strdup(m->mnt_dir); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL; |
| char *name_buffer = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(src); |
| assert(vol); |
| |
| description = disk_description(src); |
| mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol); |
| |
| /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */ |
| if (description && streq(vol, description)) |
| description = mfree(description); |
| |
| if (mount_point && description) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point); |
| else if (mount_point) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point); |
| else if (description) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol); |
| else |
| return strdup(vol); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return name_buffer; |
| } |
| |
| static int get_password( |
| const char *vol, |
| const char *src, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool accept_cached, |
| char ***ret) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL; |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; |
| char **p, *id; |
| int r = 0; |
| AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE; |
| |
| assert(vol); |
| assert(src); |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| if (arg_headless) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option."); |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s:", friendly) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| disk_path = cescape(src); |
| if (!disk_path) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path); |
| |
| r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, |
| flags | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED), |
| &passwords); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m"); |
| |
| if (arg_verify) { |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL; |
| |
| assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1); |
| |
| if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter passphrase for disk %s (verification):", friendly) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path); |
| |
| r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, flags, &passwords2); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m"); |
| |
| assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1); |
| |
| if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) |
| return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Passwords did not match, retrying."); |
| } |
| |
| strv_uniq(passwords); |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { |
| char *c; |
| |
| if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* Pad password if necessary */ |
| c = new(char, arg_key_size); |
| if (!c) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size); |
| erase_and_free(*p); |
| *p = TAKE_PTR(c); |
| } |
| |
| *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_tcrypt( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| int r = 0; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL; |
| struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = { |
| .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES, |
| .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, |
| .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles) |
| }; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords)); |
| |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto || arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) |
| /* Ask for a regular password */ |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support."); |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_hidden) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER; |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_system) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER; |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES; |
| |
| if (key_data) { |
| params.passphrase = key_data; |
| params.passphrase_size = key_data_size; |
| } else { |
| if (key_file) { |
| r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| |
| params.passphrase = passphrase; |
| } else |
| params.passphrase = passwords[0]; |
| |
| params.passphrase_size = strlen(params.passphrase); |
| } |
| |
| r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| if (key_data) |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)"); |
| |
| if (key_file) |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file); |
| |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static char *make_bindname(const char *volume) { |
| char *s; |
| |
| if (asprintf(&s, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup/%s", random_u64(), volume) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return s; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_security_device_monitor(sd_event *event, sd_device_monitor **ret) { |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device"); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| *ret = TAKE_PTR(monitor); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_salt = NULL, *discovered_cid = NULL; |
| size_t discovered_salt_size, discovered_cid_size, cid_size, decrypted_key_size; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_rp_id = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| const char *rp_id; |
| const void *cid; |
| Fido2EnrollFlags required; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto); |
| |
| if (arg_fido2_cid) { |
| if (!key_file && !key_data) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing."); |
| |
| rp_id = arg_fido2_rp_id; |
| cid = arg_fido2_cid; |
| cid_size = arg_fido2_cid_size; |
| |
| /* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do |
| * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we |
| * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. Eventually, we should make this |
| * explicitly configurable. */ |
| required = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT; |
| } else { |
| r = find_fido2_auto_data( |
| cd, |
| &discovered_rp_id, |
| &discovered_salt, |
| &discovered_salt_size, |
| &discovered_cid, |
| &discovered_cid_size, |
| &keyslot, |
| &required); |
| |
| if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| if ((required & (FIDO2ENROLL_PIN | FIDO2ENROLL_UP | FIDO2ENROLL_UV)) && arg_headless) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), |
| "Local verification is required to unlock this volume, but the 'headless' parameter was set."); |
| |
| rp_id = discovered_rp_id; |
| key_data = discovered_salt; |
| key_data_size = discovered_salt_size; |
| cid = discovered_cid; |
| cid_size = discovered_cid_size; |
| } |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| bool processed = false; |
| |
| r = acquire_fido2_key( |
| name, |
| friendly, |
| arg_fido2_device, |
| rp_id, |
| cid, cid_size, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| required, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size, |
| arg_ask_password_flags); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ |
| return r; |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's |
| * create an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| r = sd_event_default(&event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); |
| |
| r = make_security_device_monitor(event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no |
| * further ones */ |
| r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| break; |
| |
| processed = true; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2..."); |
| } |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ |
| |
| r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL; |
| size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| const char *uri; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto); |
| |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) { |
| r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot); |
| if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| uri = discovered_uri; |
| key_data = discovered_key; |
| key_data_size = discovered_key_size; |
| } else { |
| uri = arg_pkcs11_uri; |
| |
| if (!key_file && !key_data) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing."); |
| } |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| bool processed = false; |
| |
| r = decrypt_pkcs11_key( |
| name, |
| friendly, |
| uri, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ |
| return r; |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's |
| * create an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| r = sd_event_default(&event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); |
| |
| r = make_security_device_monitor(event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_notice("Security token %s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", |
| uri, friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no |
| * further ones */ |
| r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| break; |
| |
| processed = true; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11..."); |
| } |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility |
| * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through |
| * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do |
| * not not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most |
| * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string |
| * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob |
| * via base64 encoding. */ |
| |
| r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_tpm2_device_monitor(sd_event *event, sd_device_monitor **ret) { |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| *ret = TAKE_PTR(monitor); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| size_t decrypted_key_size; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto); |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| bool processed = false; |
| |
| if (key_file || key_data) { |
| /* If key data is specified, use that */ |
| |
| r = acquire_tpm2_key( |
| name, |
| arg_tpm2_device, |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| NULL, 0, /* we don't know the policy hash */ |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ |
| return r; |
| } else { |
| _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL; |
| size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size; |
| bool found_some = false; |
| int token = 0; /* first token to look at */ |
| |
| /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support |
| * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them |
| * works. */ |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| uint32_t pcr_mask; |
| |
| r = find_tpm2_auto_data( |
| cd, |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */ |
| token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */ |
| &pcr_mask, |
| &blob, &blob_size, |
| &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size, |
| &keyslot, |
| &token); |
| if (r == -ENXIO) |
| /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| found_some |
| ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking." |
| : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| found_some = true; |
| |
| r = acquire_tpm2_key( |
| name, |
| arg_tpm2_device, |
| pcr_mask, |
| NULL, 0, 0, /* no key file */ |
| blob, blob_size, |
| policy_hash, policy_hash_size, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (r != -EPERM) |
| break; |
| |
| token++; /* try a different token next time */ |
| } |
| |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create |
| * an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2()) |
| return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI bios indicates no support for it either, assuming TPM2-less system, falling back to traditional unocking."); |
| |
| r = sd_event_default(&event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); |
| |
| r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no |
| * further ones */ |
| r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| break; |
| |
| processed = true; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2..."); |
| } |
| assert(decrypted_key); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ |
| |
| r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_data); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags); |
| else |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags); |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; |
| size_t kfsize; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_file); |
| |
| /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */ |
| bindname = make_bindname(name); |
| if (!bindname) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = read_full_file_full( |
| AT_FDCWD, key_file, |
| arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset, |
| arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size, |
| READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, |
| bindname, |
| &kfdata, &kfsize); |
| if (r == -E2BIG) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| } |
| if (r == -ENOENT) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, kfdata, kfsize, flags); |
| else |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags); |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| char **p; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| |
| r = -EINVAL; |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags); |
| else |
| r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| usec_t until) { |
| |
| bool pass_volume_key = false; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| |
| if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { |
| struct crypt_params_plain params = { |
| .offset = arg_offset, |
| .skip = arg_skip, |
| .sector_size = arg_sector_size, |
| }; |
| const char *cipher, *cipher_mode; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL; |
| |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain")) |
| /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */ |
| params.hash = NULL; |
| else if (arg_hash) |
| params.hash = arg_hash; |
| else if (!key_file) |
| /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key |
| * file is provided */ |
| params.hash = "ripemd160"; |
| |
| if (arg_cipher) { |
| size_t l; |
| |
| l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-"); |
| truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l); |
| if (!truncated_cipher) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| cipher = truncated_cipher; |
| cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain"; |
| } else { |
| cipher = "aes"; |
| cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256"; |
| } |
| |
| /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */ |
| arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size; |
| |
| /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format |
| * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */ |
| r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m"); |
| |
| /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */ |
| pass_volume_key = !params.hash; |
| } |
| |
| log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.", |
| crypt_get_cipher(cd), |
| crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), |
| crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8, |
| crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (key_data) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (key_file) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| } |
| |
| static int help(void) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup@.service", "8", &link); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS]\n" |
| "%s detach VOLUME\n\n" |
| "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n" |
| "\nSee the %s for details.\n", |
| program_invocation_short_name, |
| program_invocation_short_name, |
| link); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t determine_flags(void) { |
| uint32_t flags = 0; |
| |
| if (arg_readonly) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY; |
| |
| if (arg_discards) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS; |
| |
| if (arg_same_cpu_crypt) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT; |
| |
| if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS; |
| |
| if (arg_no_read_workqueue) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE; |
| |
| if (arg_no_write_workqueue) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE; |
| |
| #ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF |
| /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */ |
| /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */ |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF; |
| #endif |
| |
| return flags; |
| } |
| |
| static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) { |
| int r; |
| |
| if (!*p) |
| return; |
| |
| r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE); |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) |
| log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p); |
| } |
| |
| static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; |
| const char *verb; |
| int r; |
| |
| if (argc <= 1) |
| return help(); |
| |
| if (argc < 3) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "This program requires at least two arguments."); |
| |
| log_setup(); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL); |
| |
| umask(0022); |
| |
| verb = argv[1]; |
| |
| if (streq(verb, "attach")) { |
| _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL; |
| const char *volume, *source, *key_file, *options; |
| crypt_status_info status; |
| size_t key_data_size = 0; |
| uint32_t flags = 0; |
| unsigned tries; |
| usec_t until; |
| |
| /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [PASSWORD] [OPTIONS] */ |
| |
| if (argc < 4) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments."); |
| |
| volume = argv[2]; |
| source = argv[3]; |
| key_file = argc >= 5 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[4], "", "-", "none") ? argv[4] : NULL; |
| options = argc >= 6 && !STR_IN_SET(argv[5], "", "-", "none") ? argv[5] : NULL; |
| |
| if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); |
| |
| if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) { |
| log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file); |
| key_file = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (options) { |
| r = parse_options(options); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__, |
| volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher)); |
| |
| /* A delicious drop of snake oil */ |
| (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE); |
| |
| if (!key_file) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; |
| const char *fn; |
| |
| bindname = make_bindname(volume); |
| if (!bindname) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined |
| * search path, and load it. */ |
| |
| fn = strjoina(volume, ".key"); |
| r = find_key_file( |
| fn, |
| STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), |
| bindname, |
| &key_data, &key_data_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| if (r > 0) |
| log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume); |
| } else if (arg_keyfile_erase) |
| destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */ |
| |
| if (arg_header) { |
| log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header); |
| r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header); |
| } else |
| r = crypt_init(&cd, source); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m"); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); |
| |
| status = crypt_status(cd, volume); |
| if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) { |
| log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| flags = determine_flags(); |
| |
| until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout); |
| if (until == USEC_INFINITY) |
| until = 0; |
| |
| arg_key_size = (arg_key_size > 0 ? arg_key_size : (256 / 8)); |
| |
| if (key_file) { |
| struct stat st; |
| |
| /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a |
| * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */ |
| if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005)) |
| log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file); |
| } |
| |
| if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) { |
| r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| if (arg_header) { |
| r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source); |
| } |
| |
| /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */ |
| if (!key_file && !key_data) { |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token(cd, volume, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, flags); |
| if (r >= 0) { |
| log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", volume, r); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ |
| #ifdef CRYPT_BITLK |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) { |
| r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) { |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; |
| |
| /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order: |
| * |
| * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip |
| * 2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size |
| * 3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size |
| * 4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set |
| * 5. We enquire the user for a password |
| */ |
| |
| if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto && !arg_tpm2_device && !arg_tpm2_device_auto) { |
| |
| if (arg_try_empty_password) { |
| /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */ |
| arg_try_empty_password = false; |
| |
| key_data = strdup(""); |
| if (!key_data) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| key_data_size = 0; |
| } else { |
| /* Ask the user for a passphrase only as last resort, if we have |
| * nothing else to check for */ |
| |
| r = get_password(volume, source, until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, &passwords); |
| if (r == -EAGAIN) |
| continue; |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) |
| r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags); |
| else |
| r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) |
| return r; |
| |
| /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */ |
| |
| key_file = NULL; |
| key_data = erase_and_free(key_data); |
| key_data_size = 0; |
| arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up."); |
| |
| } else if (streq(verb, "detach")) { |
| const char *volume; |
| |
| volume = argv[2]; |
| |
| if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); |
| |
| r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume); |
| if (r == -ENODEV) { |
| log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m"); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); |
| |
| r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate: %m"); |
| |
| } else |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", verb); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run); |
