| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| #pragma once |
| |
| #include <grp.h> |
| #if ENABLE_GSHADOW |
| # include <gshadow.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <pwd.h> |
| #include <shadow.h> |
| #include <stdbool.h> |
| #include <stdint.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| /* Users managed by systemd-homed. See https://systemd.io/UIDS-GIDS for details how this range fits into the rest of the world */ |
| #define HOME_UID_MIN ((uid_t) 60001) |
| #define HOME_UID_MAX ((uid_t) 60513) |
| |
| /* Users mapped from host into a container */ |
| #define MAP_UID_MIN ((uid_t) 60514) |
| #define MAP_UID_MAX ((uid_t) 60577) |
| |
| bool uid_is_valid(uid_t uid); |
| |
| static inline bool gid_is_valid(gid_t gid) { |
| return uid_is_valid((uid_t) gid); |
| } |
| |
| int parse_uid(const char *s, uid_t* ret_uid); |
| int parse_uid_range(const char *s, uid_t *ret_lower, uid_t *ret_upper); |
| |
| static inline int parse_gid(const char *s, gid_t *ret_gid) { |
| return parse_uid(s, (uid_t*) ret_gid); |
| } |
| |
| char* getlogname_malloc(void); |
| char* getusername_malloc(void); |
| |
| typedef enum UserCredsFlags { |
| USER_CREDS_PREFER_NSS = 1 << 0, /* if set, only synthesize user records if database lacks them. Normally we bypass the userdb entirely for the records we can synthesize */ |
| USER_CREDS_ALLOW_MISSING = 1 << 1, /* if a numeric UID string is resolved, be OK if there's no record for it */ |
| USER_CREDS_CLEAN = 1 << 2, /* try to clean up shell and home fields with invalid data */ |
| } UserCredsFlags; |
| |
| int get_user_creds(const char **username, uid_t *uid, gid_t *gid, const char **home, const char **shell, UserCredsFlags flags); |
| int get_group_creds(const char **groupname, gid_t *gid, UserCredsFlags flags); |
| |
| char* uid_to_name(uid_t uid); |
| char* gid_to_name(gid_t gid); |
| |
| int in_gid(gid_t gid); |
| int in_group(const char *name); |
| |
| int merge_gid_lists(const gid_t *list1, size_t size1, const gid_t *list2, size_t size2, gid_t **result); |
| int getgroups_alloc(gid_t** gids); |
| |
| int get_home_dir(char **ret); |
| int get_shell(char **ret); |
| |
| int reset_uid_gid(void); |
| |
| int take_etc_passwd_lock(const char *root); |
| |
| #define UID_INVALID ((uid_t) -1) |
| #define GID_INVALID ((gid_t) -1) |
| |
| #define UID_NOBODY ((uid_t) 65534U) |
| #define GID_NOBODY ((gid_t) 65534U) |
| |
| /* If REMOUNT_IDMAPPING_HOST_ROOT is set for remount_idmap() we'll include a mapping here that maps the host |
| * root user accessing the idmapped mount to the this user ID on the backing fs. This is the last valid UID in |
| * the *signed* 32bit range. You might wonder why precisely use this specific UID for this purpose? Well, we |
| * definitely cannot use the first 0…65536 UIDs for that, since in most cases that's precisely the file range |
| * we intend to map to some high UID range, and since UID mappings have to be bijective we thus cannot use |
| * them at all. Furthermore the UID range beyond INT32_MAX (i.e. the range above the signed 32bit range) is |
| * icky, since many APIs cannot use it (example: setfsuid() returns the old UID as signed integer). Following |
| * our usual logic of assigning a 16bit UID range to each container, so that the upper 16bit of a 32bit UID |
| * value indicate kind of a "container ID" and the lower 16bit map directly to the intended user you can read |
| * this specific UID as the "nobody" user of the container with ID 0x7FFF, which is kinda nice. */ |
| #define UID_MAPPED_ROOT ((uid_t) (INT32_MAX-1)) |
| #define GID_MAPPED_ROOT ((gid_t) (INT32_MAX-1)) |
| |
| #define ETC_PASSWD_LOCK_PATH "/etc/.pwd.lock" |
| |
| /* The following macros add 1 when converting things, since UID 0 is a valid UID, while the pointer |
| * NULL is special */ |
| #define PTR_TO_UID(p) ((uid_t) (((uintptr_t) (p))-1)) |
| #define UID_TO_PTR(u) ((void*) (((uintptr_t) (u))+1)) |
| |
| #define PTR_TO_GID(p) ((gid_t) (((uintptr_t) (p))-1)) |
| #define GID_TO_PTR(u) ((void*) (((uintptr_t) (u))+1)) |
| |
| static inline bool userns_supported(void) { |
| return access("/proc/self/uid_map", F_OK) >= 0; |
| } |
| |
| typedef enum ValidUserFlags { |
| VALID_USER_RELAX = 1 << 0, |
| VALID_USER_WARN = 1 << 1, |
| VALID_USER_ALLOW_NUMERIC = 1 << 2, |
| } ValidUserFlags; |
| |
| bool valid_user_group_name(const char *u, ValidUserFlags flags); |
| bool valid_gecos(const char *d); |
| char *mangle_gecos(const char *d); |
| bool valid_home(const char *p); |
| |
| static inline bool valid_shell(const char *p) { |
| /* We have the same requirements, so just piggy-back on the home check. |
| * |
| * Let's ignore /etc/shells because this is only applicable to real and |
| * not system users. It is also incompatible with the idea of empty /etc. |
| */ |
| return valid_home(p); |
| } |
| |
| int maybe_setgroups(size_t size, const gid_t *list); |
| |
| bool synthesize_nobody(void); |
| |
| int fgetpwent_sane(FILE *stream, struct passwd **pw); |
| int fgetspent_sane(FILE *stream, struct spwd **sp); |
| int fgetgrent_sane(FILE *stream, struct group **gr); |
| int putpwent_sane(const struct passwd *pw, FILE *stream); |
| int putspent_sane(const struct spwd *sp, FILE *stream); |
| int putgrent_sane(const struct group *gr, FILE *stream); |
| #if ENABLE_GSHADOW |
| int fgetsgent_sane(FILE *stream, struct sgrp **sg); |
| int putsgent_sane(const struct sgrp *sg, FILE *stream); |
| #endif |
| |
| bool is_nologin_shell(const char *shell); |
| const char* default_root_shell(const char *root); |
| |
| int is_this_me(const char *username); |
| |
| const char *get_home_root(void); |
| |
| static inline bool hashed_password_is_locked_or_invalid(const char *password) { |
| return password && password[0] != '$'; |
| } |
| |
| /* A locked *and* invalid password for "struct spwd"'s .sp_pwdp and "struct passwd"'s .pw_passwd field */ |
| #define PASSWORD_LOCKED_AND_INVALID "!*" |
| |
| /* A password indicating "look in shadow file, please!" for "struct passwd"'s .pw_passwd */ |
| #define PASSWORD_SEE_SHADOW "x" |
| |
| /* A password indicating "hey, no password required for login" */ |
| #define PASSWORD_NONE "" |