| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <mntent.h> |
| #include <sys/mman.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include "sd-device.h" |
| #include "sd-messages.h" |
| |
| #include "alloc-util.h" |
| #include "ask-password-api.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-fido2.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h" |
| #include "cryptsetup-util.h" |
| #include "device-util.h" |
| #include "efi-api.h" |
| #include "efi-loader.h" |
| #include "env-util.h" |
| #include "escape.h" |
| #include "fileio.h" |
| #include "fs-util.h" |
| #include "fstab-util.h" |
| #include "hexdecoct.h" |
| #include "libfido2-util.h" |
| #include "log.h" |
| #include "main-func.h" |
| #include "memory-util.h" |
| #include "mount-util.h" |
| #include "nulstr-util.h" |
| #include "parse-util.h" |
| #include "path-util.h" |
| #include "pkcs11-util.h" |
| #include "pretty-print.h" |
| #include "process-util.h" |
| #include "random-util.h" |
| #include "string-table.h" |
| #include "strv.h" |
| #include "tpm-pcr.h" |
| #include "tpm2-util.h" |
| |
| /* internal helper */ |
| #define ANY_LUKS "LUKS" |
| /* as in src/cryptsetup.h */ |
| #define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U |
| #define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U |
| |
| typedef enum PassphraseType { |
| PASSPHRASE_NONE, |
| PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0, |
| PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1, |
| PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY, |
| _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX, |
| _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1, |
| } PassphraseType; |
| |
| static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */ |
| static char *arg_cipher = NULL; |
| static unsigned arg_key_size = 0; |
| static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE; |
| static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT; |
| static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0; |
| static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0; |
| static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false; |
| static bool arg_try_empty_password = false; |
| static char *arg_hash = NULL; |
| static char *arg_header = NULL; |
| static unsigned arg_tries = 3; |
| static bool arg_readonly = false; |
| static bool arg_verify = false; |
| static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = 0; |
| static bool arg_discards = false; |
| static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false; |
| static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false; |
| static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false; |
| static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false; |
| static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false; |
| static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL; |
| static uint64_t arg_offset = 0; |
| static uint64_t arg_skip = 0; |
| static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY; |
| static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL; |
| static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL; |
| static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL; |
| static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0; |
| static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL; |
| static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; /* These and the following fields are about locking an encrypted volume to the local TPM */ |
| static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; |
| static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL; |
| static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false; |
| static bool arg_headless = false; |
| static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC; |
| static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */ |
| static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL; |
| |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep); |
| STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep); |
| |
| static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = { |
| [PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase", |
| [PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key", |
| [PASSPHRASE_BOTH] = "passphrase or recovery key", |
| }; |
| |
| const char* passphrase_type_to_string(PassphraseType t); |
| PassphraseType passphrase_type_from_string(const char *s); |
| |
| DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(passphrase_type, PassphraseType); |
| |
| /* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't: |
| |
| check= |
| checkargs= |
| noearly |
| loud |
| quiet |
| keyscript= |
| initramfs |
| */ |
| |
| static int parse_one_option(const char *option) { |
| const char *val; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(option); |
| |
| /* Handled outside of this tool */ |
| if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout")) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout=")) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_key_size % 8) { |
| log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_key_size /= 8; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_sector_size % 2) { |
| log_error("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { |
| log_error("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) || |
| (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) { |
| |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) { |
| |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| if (path_is_absolute(val)) { |
| if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| } else |
| log_error("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute. Ignoring.", val); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_keyfile_erase = r; |
| |
| } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase")) |
| arg_keyfile_erase = true; |
| |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) { |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(val)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); |
| |
| if (arg_header) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Duplicate header= option, refusing."); |
| |
| arg_header = strdup(val); |
| if (!arg_header) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only")) |
| arg_readonly = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "verify")) |
| arg_verify = true; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) { |
| if (streq(val, "masked")) |
| arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT); |
| else { |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r); |
| SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r); |
| } |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard")) |
| arg_discards = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt")) |
| arg_same_cpu_crypt = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus")) |
| arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue")) |
| arg_no_read_workqueue = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue")) |
| arg_no_write_workqueue = true; |
| else if (streq(option, "luks")) |
| arg_type = ANY_LUKS; |
| /* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ |
| #ifdef CRYPT_BITLK |
| else if (streq(option, "bitlk")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK; |
| #endif |
| else if (streq(option, "tcrypt")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_hidden = true; |
| } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_system = true; |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) { |
| arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; |
| arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true; |
| } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") || |
| startswith(option, "tmp=")) |
| arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) { |
| |
| r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing"); |
| |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) |
| arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL; |
| size_t cid_size; |
| |
| r = unbase64mem(val, SIZE_MAX, &cid, &cid_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m"); |
| |
| free(arg_fido2_cid); |
| arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid); |
| arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size; |
| } |
| |
| /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */ |
| if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto) |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = true; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) { |
| |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) { |
| |
| if (streq(val, "auto")) { |
| arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = true; |
| } else { |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) { |
| |
| r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) { |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(val)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); |
| |
| r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_tpm2_pin = r; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-pcr="))) { |
| unsigned pcr; |
| |
| r = safe_atou(val, &pcr); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| pcr = r ? TPM_PCR_INDEX_VOLUME_KEY : UINT_MAX; |
| } else if (pcr >= TPM2_PCRS_MAX) { |
| log_error("Selected TPM index for measurement %u outside of allowed range 0…%u, ignoring.", pcr, TPM2_PCRS_MAX-1); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = pcr; |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) { |
| |
| #if HAVE_OPENSSL |
| _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; |
| |
| l = strv_split(optarg, ":"); |
| if (!l) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(i, l) { |
| const EVP_MD *implementation; |
| |
| implementation = EVP_get_digestbyname(*i); |
| if (!implementation) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val); |
| |
| if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, EVP_MD_name(implementation)) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| } |
| #else |
| log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option); |
| #endif |
| |
| } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_try_empty_password = r; |
| |
| } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password")) |
| arg_try_empty_password = true; |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_boolean(val); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| arg_headless = r; |
| } else if (streq(option, "headless")) |
| arg_headless = true; |
| |
| else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) { |
| |
| r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach")) |
| log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int parse_options(const char *options) { |
| assert(options); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| break; |
| |
| r = parse_one_option(word); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| /* sanity-check options */ |
| if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { |
| if (arg_offset != 0) |
| log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type); |
| if (arg_skip != 0) |
| log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type); |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static char* disk_description(const char *path) { |
| static const char name_fields[] = |
| "DM_NAME\0" |
| "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0" |
| "ID_MODEL\0"; |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL; |
| const char *name; |
| struct stat st; |
| |
| assert(path); |
| |
| if (stat(path, &st) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL; |
| ssize_t l; |
| |
| /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's |
| * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or |
| * other weird stuff. */ |
| |
| l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped); |
| if (l < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m"); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL)) |
| return TAKE_PTR(unescaped); |
| } |
| |
| /* These need no unescaping. */ |
| NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) |
| if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 && |
| !isempty(name)) |
| return strdup(name); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; |
| _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL; |
| struct mntent *m; |
| |
| /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */ |
| |
| device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label); |
| if (!device) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re"); |
| if (!f) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| while ((m = getmntent(f))) |
| if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device)) |
| return strdup(m->mnt_dir); |
| |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL; |
| char *name_buffer = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(src); |
| assert(vol); |
| |
| description = disk_description(src); |
| mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol); |
| |
| /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */ |
| if (description && streq(vol, description)) |
| description = mfree(description); |
| |
| if (mount_point && description) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point); |
| else if (mount_point) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point); |
| else if (description) |
| r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol); |
| else |
| return strdup(vol); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return name_buffer; |
| } |
| |
| static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) { |
| _cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL; |
| int slot_max; |
| PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| |
| if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) { |
| log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; |
| } |
| |
| /* Search all used slots */ |
| assert_se((slot_max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0); |
| slots = new(bool, slot_max); |
| if (!slots) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) |
| slots[slot] = IN_SET(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST); |
| |
| /* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */ |
| for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) { |
| _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL; |
| const char *type; |
| JsonVariant *w, *z; |
| int tk; |
| |
| tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v); |
| if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL)) |
| continue; |
| if (tk < 0) { |
| log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m"); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| w = json_variant_by_key(v, "type"); |
| if (!w || !json_variant_is_string(w)) { |
| log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring."); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| type = json_variant_string(w); |
| if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) { |
| |
| /* At least exists one recovery key */ |
| if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery")) |
| passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY; |
| |
| w = json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots"); |
| if (!w || !json_variant_is_array(w)) { |
| log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring."); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) { |
| unsigned u; |
| int at; |
| |
| if (!json_variant_is_string(z)) { |
| log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring."); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| at = safe_atou(json_variant_string(z), &u); |
| if (at < 0) { |
| log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring."); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) { |
| log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring."); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| slots[u] = false; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */ |
| for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) |
| if (slots[slot]) { |
| passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled, |
| * we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */ |
| return passphrase_type; |
| } |
| |
| static int get_password( |
| const char *vol, |
| const char *src, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool accept_cached, |
| PassphraseType passphrase_type, |
| char ***ret) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL; |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; |
| char *id; |
| int r = 0; |
| AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE; |
| |
| assert(vol); |
| assert(src); |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| if (arg_headless) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option."); |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| disk_path = cescape(src); |
| if (!disk_path) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path); |
| |
| r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, |
| flags | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED), |
| &passwords); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m"); |
| |
| if (arg_verify) { |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL; |
| |
| assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1); |
| |
| if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path); |
| |
| r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, flags, &passwords2); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m"); |
| |
| assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1); |
| |
| if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) |
| return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Passwords did not match, retrying."); |
| } |
| |
| strv_uniq(passwords); |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { |
| char *c; |
| |
| if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* Pad password if necessary */ |
| c = new(char, arg_key_size); |
| if (!c) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size); |
| erase_and_free(*p); |
| *p = TAKE_PTR(c); |
| } |
| |
| *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int measure_volume_key( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const void *volume_key, |
| size_t volume_key_size) { |
| |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(volume_key); |
| assert(volume_key_size > 0); |
| |
| if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { |
| log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| r = efi_stub_measured(LOG_WARNING); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| if (r == 0) { |
| log_debug("Kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace measurement, too."); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #if HAVE_TPM2 |
| r = dlopen_tpm2(); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load TPM2 libraries: %m"); |
| |
| _cleanup_tpm2_context_ Tpm2Context *c = NULL; |
| r = tpm2_context_new(arg_tpm2_device, &c); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; |
| if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) { |
| r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", "); |
| if (!joined) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| /* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an |
| * unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead |
| * send a HMAC signature instead. */ |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; |
| escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */ |
| if (!escaped) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; |
| s = strjoin("cryptsetup:", escaped, ":", strempty(crypt_get_uuid(cd))); |
| if (!s) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = tpm2_extend_bytes(c, l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, SIZE_MAX, volume_key, volume_key_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_struct(LOG_INFO, |
| "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR, |
| LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, s, joined), |
| "MEASURING=%s", s, |
| "PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, |
| "BANKS=%s", joined); |
| |
| return 0; |
| #else |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring."); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const void *volume_key, |
| size_t volume_key_size, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| |
| /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */ |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| if (volume_key_size == 0) { |
| log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none specified."); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| (void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */ |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| int keyslot, |
| const char *passphrase, |
| size_t passphrase_size, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL; |
| size_t vks; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| |
| /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's |
| * requested. Note that we need the volume key for the measurement, and |
| * crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and |
| * retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */ |
| |
| if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { |
| log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); |
| goto shortcut; |
| } |
| |
| r = crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| if (r == 0) { |
| log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none defined."); |
| goto shortcut; |
| } |
| |
| vk = malloc(vks = r); |
| if (!vk) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot, vk, &vks, passphrase, passphrase_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| return measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, vk, vks, flags); |
| |
| shortcut: |
| return crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags); |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_tcrypt( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| int r = 0; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL; |
| struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = { |
| .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES, |
| .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, |
| .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles) |
| }; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords)); |
| |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto || arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) |
| /* Ask for a regular password */ |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support."); |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_hidden) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER; |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_system) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER; |
| |
| if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt) |
| params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES; |
| |
| if (key_data) { |
| params.passphrase = key_data; |
| params.passphrase_size = key_data_size; |
| } else { |
| if (key_file) { |
| r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| |
| params.passphrase = passphrase; |
| } else |
| params.passphrase = passwords[0]; |
| |
| params.passphrase_size = strlen(params.passphrase); |
| } |
| |
| r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| if (key_data) |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)"); |
| |
| if (key_file) |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file); |
| |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static char *make_bindname(const char *volume) { |
| char *s; |
| |
| if (asprintf(&s, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup/%s", random_u64(), volume) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| return s; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_security_device_monitor( |
| sd_event **ret_event, |
| sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret_event); |
| assert(ret_monitor); |
| |
| /* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */ |
| |
| r = sd_event_default(&event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device"); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); |
| *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int run_security_device_monitor( |
| sd_event *event, |
| sd_device_monitor *monitor) { |
| bool processed = false; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(event); |
| assert(monitor); |
| |
| /* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the time-out is |
| * hit. */ |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| int x; |
| |
| r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (r != -ENODATA) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m"); |
| |
| /* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */ |
| } else { |
| assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT); |
| return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt."); |
| } |
| |
| /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */ |
| r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| processed = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static bool libcryptsetup_plugins_support(void) { |
| |
| #if HAVE_TPM2 |
| /* Currently, there's no way for us to query the volume key when plugins are used. Hence don't use |
| * plugins, if measurement has been requested. */ |
| if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX) |
| return false; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */ |
| r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE"); |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m"); |
| if (r == 0) |
| return false; |
| |
| return crypt_token_external_path(); |
| #else |
| return false; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS |
| static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL; |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret_pins); |
| |
| r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m"); |
| if (r > 0) { |
| pins = strv_new(envpin); |
| if (!pins) |
| return log_oom(); |
| } |
| |
| *ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *type, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool headless, |
| void *usrptr, |
| uint32_t activation_flags, |
| const char *message, |
| const char *key_name, |
| const char *credential_name) { |
| |
| #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS |
| AskPasswordFlags flags = ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, usrptr, activation_flags); |
| if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ |
| r = 0; |
| if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ |
| return r; |
| |
| r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), usrptr, activation_flags); |
| if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ |
| r = 0; |
| if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| if (headless) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable."); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| pins = strv_free_erase(pins); |
| r = ask_password_auto(message, "drive-harddisk", NULL, key_name, credential_name, until, flags, &pins); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), usrptr, activation_flags); |
| if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ |
| r = 0; |
| if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; |
| } |
| return r; |
| #else |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool headless, |
| void *usrptr, |
| uint32_t activation_flags) { |
| |
| return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( |
| cd, |
| name, |
| "systemd-fido2", |
| until, |
| headless, |
| usrptr, |
| activation_flags, |
| "Please enter security token PIN:", |
| "fido2-pin", |
| "cryptsetup.fido2-pin"); |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| size_t decrypted_key_size, cid_size = 0; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| const char *rp_id = NULL; |
| const void *cid = NULL; |
| Fido2EnrollFlags required; |
| bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support(); |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto); |
| |
| if (arg_fido2_cid) { |
| if (!key_file && !key_data) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing."); |
| |
| rp_id = arg_fido2_rp_id; |
| cid = arg_fido2_cid; |
| cid_size = arg_fido2_cid_size; |
| |
| /* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do |
| * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we |
| * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. Eventually, we should make this |
| * explicitly configurable. */ |
| required = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT; |
| } |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) { |
| r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, arg_fido2_device, flags); |
| if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| |
| } else { |
| if (cid) |
| r = acquire_fido2_key( |
| name, |
| friendly, |
| arg_fido2_device, |
| rp_id, |
| cid, cid_size, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| required, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size, |
| arg_ask_password_flags); |
| else |
| r = acquire_fido2_key_auto( |
| cd, |
| name, |
| friendly, |
| arg_fido2_device, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size, |
| arg_ask_password_flags); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ |
| return r; |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's |
| * create an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2..."); |
| } |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| ssize_t base64_encoded_size; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ |
| |
| base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (base64_encoded_size < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *friendly_name, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool headless, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS |
| int r; |
| |
| if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device."); |
| |
| systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = { |
| .friendly_name = friendly_name, |
| .until = until, |
| .headless = headless |
| }; |
| |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, ¶ms, flags); |
| if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ |
| r = 0; |
| |
| return r; |
| #else |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL; |
| size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| const char *uri = NULL; |
| bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support(); |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto); |
| |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) { |
| if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) { |
| r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot); |
| if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| uri = discovered_uri; |
| key_data = discovered_key; |
| key_data_size = discovered_key_size; |
| } |
| } else { |
| uri = arg_pkcs11_uri; |
| |
| if (!key_file && !key_data) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing."); |
| } |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) |
| r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(cd, name, friendly, until, arg_headless, flags); |
| else { |
| r = decrypt_pkcs11_key( |
| name, |
| friendly, |
| uri, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ |
| return r; |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's |
| * create an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_notice("Security token %s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", |
| uri, friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11..."); |
| } |
| assert(decrypted_key); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| ssize_t base64_encoded_size; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility |
| * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through |
| * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do |
| * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most |
| * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string |
| * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob |
| * via base64 encoding. */ |
| |
| base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (base64_encoded_size < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_tpm2_device_monitor( |
| sd_event **ret_event, |
| sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret_event); |
| assert(ret_monitor); |
| |
| r = sd_event_default(&event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); |
| |
| *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); |
| *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| usec_t until, |
| bool headless, |
| uint32_t flags) { |
| |
| #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS |
| systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = { |
| .search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, |
| .device = arg_tpm2_device, |
| .signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature, |
| }; |
| |
| if (!libcryptsetup_plugins_support()) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), |
| "Libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled."); |
| |
| return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( |
| cd, |
| name, |
| "systemd-tpm2", |
| until, |
| headless, |
| ¶ms, |
| flags, |
| "Please enter TPM2 PIN:", |
| "tpm2-pin", |
| "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin"); |
| #else |
| return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| usec_t until, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; |
| int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; |
| size_t decrypted_key_size; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto); |
| |
| friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); |
| if (!friendly) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| if (key_file || key_data) { |
| /* If key data is specified, use that */ |
| |
| r = acquire_tpm2_key( |
| name, |
| arg_tpm2_device, |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, |
| UINT16_MAX, |
| /* pubkey= */ NULL, /* pubkey_size= */ 0, |
| /* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0, |
| /* signature_path= */ NULL, |
| /* primary_alg= */ 0, |
| key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, |
| key_data, key_data_size, |
| /* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* policy_hash_size= */ 0, /* we don't know the policy hash */ |
| /* salt= */ NULL, /* salt_size= */ 0, |
| arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| arg_ask_password_flags, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) { |
| log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ |
| } |
| } else { |
| r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, flags); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| return 0; |
| /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found |
| * EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */ |
| if (r == -ENXIO) |
| return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r == -ENOENT) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) { |
| log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */ |
| _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL; |
| size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size; |
| bool found_some = false; |
| int token = 0; /* first token to look at */ |
| |
| /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support |
| * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them |
| * works. */ |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| _cleanup_free_ void *pubkey = NULL, *salt = NULL; |
| size_t pubkey_size = 0, salt_size = 0; |
| uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask; |
| uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg; |
| TPM2Flags tpm2_flags; |
| |
| r = find_tpm2_auto_data( |
| cd, |
| arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */ |
| token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */ |
| &hash_pcr_mask, |
| &pcr_bank, |
| &pubkey, &pubkey_size, |
| &pubkey_pcr_mask, |
| &primary_alg, |
| &blob, &blob_size, |
| &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size, |
| &salt, &salt_size, |
| &tpm2_flags, |
| &keyslot, |
| &token); |
| if (r == -ENXIO) |
| /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */ |
| return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG, |
| SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| found_some |
| ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking." |
| : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| found_some = true; |
| |
| r = acquire_tpm2_key( |
| name, |
| arg_tpm2_device, |
| hash_pcr_mask, |
| pcr_bank, |
| pubkey, pubkey_size, |
| pubkey_pcr_mask, |
| arg_tpm2_signature, |
| primary_alg, |
| /* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */ |
| blob, blob_size, |
| policy_hash, policy_hash_size, |
| salt, salt_size, |
| tpm2_flags, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| arg_ask_password_flags, |
| &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); |
| if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) |
| return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| if (r != -EPERM) |
| break; |
| |
| token++; /* try a different token next time */ |
| } |
| |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) { |
| log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!monitor) { |
| /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create |
| * an event loop and monitor first. */ |
| |
| assert(!event); |
| |
| if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2()) |
| return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), |
| "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking."); |
| |
| r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly); |
| |
| /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed |
| * to create and configure the monitor */ |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2..."); |
| } |
| assert(decrypted_key); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); |
| else { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; |
| ssize_t base64_encoded_size; |
| |
| /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ |
| |
| base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); |
| if (base64_encoded_size < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_data); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags); |
| else |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags); |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; |
| size_t kfsize; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| assert(key_file); |
| |
| /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */ |
| bindname = make_bindname(name); |
| if (!bindname) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = read_full_file_full( |
| AT_FDCWD, key_file, |
| arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset, |
| arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size, |
| READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, |
| bindname, |
| &kfdata, &kfsize); |
| if (r == -E2BIG) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; |
| } |
| if (r == -ENOENT) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, kfdata, kfsize, flags); |
| else |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags); |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| bool pass_volume_key) { |
| |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| |
| r = -EINVAL; |
| STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { |
| if (pass_volume_key) |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags); |
| else |
| r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| if (r == -EPERM) { |
| log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)"); |
| return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m"); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk( |
| struct crypt_device *cd, |
| const char *name, |
| const char *key_file, |
| const void *key_data, |
| size_t key_data_size, |
| char **passwords, |
| uint32_t flags, |
| usec_t until) { |
| |
| bool pass_volume_key = false; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(cd); |
| assert(name); |
| |
| if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { |
| struct crypt_params_plain params = { |
| .offset = arg_offset, |
| .skip = arg_skip, |
| .sector_size = arg_sector_size, |
| }; |
| const char *cipher, *cipher_mode; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL; |
| |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain")) |
| /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */ |
| params.hash = NULL; |
| else if (arg_hash) |
| params.hash = arg_hash; |
| else if (!key_file) |
| /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key |
| * file is provided */ |
| params.hash = "ripemd160"; |
| |
| if (arg_cipher) { |
| size_t l; |
| |
| l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-"); |
| truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l); |
| if (!truncated_cipher) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| cipher = truncated_cipher; |
| cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain"; |
| } else { |
| cipher = "aes"; |
| cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256"; |
| } |
| |
| /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */ |
| arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size; |
| |
| /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format |
| * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */ |
| r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m"); |
| |
| /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */ |
| pass_volume_key = !params.hash; |
| } |
| |
| log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.", |
| crypt_get_cipher(cd), |
| crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), |
| crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8, |
| crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (key_data) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| if (key_file) |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| |
| return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key); |
| } |
| |
| static int help(void) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup@.service", "8", &link); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [KEY-FILE] [OPTIONS]\n" |
| "%s detach VOLUME\n\n" |
| "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n" |
| "\nSee the %s for details.\n", |
| program_invocation_short_name, |
| program_invocation_short_name, |
| link); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static uint32_t determine_flags(void) { |
| uint32_t flags = 0; |
| |
| if (arg_readonly) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY; |
| |
| if (arg_discards) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS; |
| |
| if (arg_same_cpu_crypt) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT; |
| |
| if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS; |
| |
| if (arg_no_read_workqueue) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE; |
| |
| if (arg_no_write_workqueue) |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE; |
| |
| #ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF |
| /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */ |
| /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */ |
| flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF; |
| #endif |
| |
| return flags; |
| } |
| |
| static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) { |
| int r; |
| |
| if (!*p) |
| return; |
| |
| r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE); |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) |
| log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p); |
| } |
| |
| static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; |
| const char *verb; |
| int r; |
| |
| if (argv_looks_like_help(argc, argv)) |
| return help(); |
| |
| if (argc < 3) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "This program requires at least two arguments."); |
| |
| log_setup(); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL); |
| |
| umask(0022); |
| |
| verb = argv[1]; |
| |
| if (streq(verb, "attach")) { |
| _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL; |
| const char *volume, *source, *key_file, *options; |
| crypt_status_info status; |
| size_t key_data_size = 0; |
| uint32_t flags = 0; |
| unsigned tries; |
| usec_t until; |
| PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; |
| |
| /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [OPTIONS] */ |
| |
| if (argc < 4) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments."); |
| |
| volume = argv[2]; |
| source = argv[3]; |
| key_file = mangle_none(argc >= 5 ? argv[4] : NULL); |
| options = mangle_none(argc >= 6 ? argv[5] : NULL); |
| |
| if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); |
| |
| if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) { |
| log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file); |
| key_file = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (options) { |
| r = parse_options(options); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__, |
| volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher)); |
| |
| /* A delicious drop of snake oil */ |
| (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE); |
| |
| if (!key_file) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; |
| const char *fn; |
| |
| bindname = make_bindname(volume); |
| if (!bindname) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined |
| * search path, and load it. */ |
| |
| fn = strjoina(volume, ".key"); |
| r = find_key_file( |
| fn, |
| STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), |
| bindname, |
| &key_data, &key_data_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| if (r > 0) |
| log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume); |
| } else if (arg_keyfile_erase) |
| destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */ |
| |
| if (arg_header) { |
| log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header); |
| r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header); |
| } else |
| r = crypt_init(&cd, source); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m"); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); |
| |
| status = crypt_status(cd, volume); |
| if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) { |
| log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| flags = determine_flags(); |
| |
| until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout); |
| if (until == USEC_INFINITY) |
| until = 0; |
| |
| if (arg_key_size == 0) |
| arg_key_size = 256U / 8U; |
| |
| if (key_file) { |
| struct stat st; |
| |
| /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a |
| * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */ |
| if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005)) |
| log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file); |
| } |
| |
| if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) { |
| r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| |
| if (arg_header) { |
| r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source); |
| } |
| |
| /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */ |
| if (!key_file && !key_data && getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE") != 0) { |
| r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( |
| cd, |
| volume, |
| NULL, |
| until, |
| arg_headless, |
| NULL, |
| flags, |
| "Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:", |
| "luks2-pin", |
| "cryptsetup.luks2-pin"); |
| if (r >= 0) { |
| log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", volume, r); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */ |
| #ifdef CRYPT_BITLK |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) { |
| r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd)); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) { |
| _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; |
| |
| /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order: |
| * |
| * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip |
| * 2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size |
| * 3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size |
| * 4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set |
| * 5. We enquire the user for a password |
| */ |
| |
| if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto && !arg_tpm2_device && !arg_tpm2_device_auto) { |
| |
| if (arg_try_empty_password) { |
| /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */ |
| arg_try_empty_password = false; |
| |
| key_data = strdup(""); |
| if (!key_data) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| key_data_size = 0; |
| } else { |
| /* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we have |
| * nothing else to check for */ |
| if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) { |
| passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd); |
| if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered."); |
| } |
| |
| r = get_password(volume, source, until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, passphrase_type, &passwords); |
| if (r == -EAGAIN) |
| continue; |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) |
| r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags); |
| else |
| r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| break; |
| if (r != -EAGAIN) |
| return r; |
| |
| /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */ |
| |
| key_file = NULL; |
| key_data = erase_and_free(key_data); |
| key_data_size = 0; |
| arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); |
| arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; |
| arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); |
| arg_fido2_device_auto = false; |
| arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); |
| arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; |
| } |
| |
| if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up."); |
| |
| } else if (streq(verb, "detach")) { |
| const char *volume; |
| |
| volume = argv[2]; |
| |
| if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); |
| |
| r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume); |
| if (r == -ENODEV) { |
| log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m"); |
| |
| cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); |
| |
| r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate: %m"); |
| |
| } else |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", verb); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run); |