| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ |
| |
| #include <sys/file.h> |
| |
| #if HAVE_OPENSSL |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "sd-id128.h" |
| |
| #include "blockdev-util.h" |
| #include "capability-util.h" |
| #include "chattr-util.h" |
| #include "constants.h" |
| #include "creds-util.h" |
| #include "efi-api.h" |
| #include "env-util.h" |
| #include "fd-util.h" |
| #include "fileio.h" |
| #include "fs-util.h" |
| #include "io-util.h" |
| #include "memory-util.h" |
| #include "mkdir.h" |
| #include "openssl-util.h" |
| #include "path-util.h" |
| #include "random-util.h" |
| #include "sparse-endian.h" |
| #include "stat-util.h" |
| #include "tpm2-util.h" |
| #include "virt.h" |
| |
| #define PUBLIC_KEY_MAX (UINT32_C(1024) * UINT32_C(1024)) |
| |
| bool credential_name_valid(const char *s) { |
| /* We want that credential names are both valid in filenames (since that's our primary way to pass |
| * them around) and as fdnames (which is how we might want to pass them around eventually) */ |
| return filename_is_valid(s) && fdname_is_valid(s); |
| } |
| |
| static int get_credentials_dir_internal(const char *envvar, const char **ret) { |
| const char *e; |
| |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| e = secure_getenv(envvar); |
| if (!e) |
| return -ENXIO; |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(e) || !path_is_normalized(e)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| *ret = e; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int get_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| return get_credentials_dir_internal("CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| } |
| |
| int get_encrypted_credentials_dir(const char **ret) { |
| return get_credentials_dir_internal("ENCRYPTED_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY", ret); |
| } |
| |
| int read_credential(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *fn = NULL; |
| const char *d; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| if (!credential_name_valid(name)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| r = get_credentials_dir(&d); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| fn = path_join(d, name); |
| if (!fn) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| return read_full_file_full( |
| AT_FDCWD, fn, |
| UINT64_MAX, SIZE_MAX, |
| READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE, |
| NULL, |
| (char**) ret, ret_size); |
| } |
| |
| int read_credential_strings_many_internal( |
| const char *first_name, char **first_value, |
| ...) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ void *b = NULL; |
| int r, ret = 0; |
| |
| /* Reads a bunch of credentials into the specified buffers. If the specified buffers are already |
| * non-NULL frees them if a credential is found. Only supports string-based credentials |
| * (i.e. refuses embedded NUL bytes) */ |
| |
| if (!first_name) |
| return 0; |
| |
| r = read_credential(first_name, &b, NULL); |
| if (r == -ENXIO) /* no creds passed at all? propagate this */ |
| return r; |
| if (r < 0) |
| ret = r; |
| else |
| free_and_replace(*first_value, b); |
| |
| va_list ap; |
| va_start(ap, first_value); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| _cleanup_free_ void *bb = NULL; |
| const char *name; |
| char **value; |
| |
| name = va_arg(ap, const char *); |
| if (!name) |
| break; |
| |
| value = va_arg(ap, char **); |
| if (*value) |
| continue; |
| |
| r = read_credential(name, &bb, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (ret >= 0) |
| ret = r; |
| } else |
| free_and_replace(*value, bb); |
| } |
| |
| va_end(ap); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int get_credential_user_password(const char *username, char **ret_password, bool *ret_is_hashed) { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *creds_password = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *cn = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Try to pick up the password for this account via the credentials logic */ |
| cn = strjoin("passwd.hashed-password.", username); |
| if (!cn) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_password, NULL); |
| if (r == -ENOENT) { |
| free(cn); |
| cn = strjoin("passwd.plaintext-password.", username); |
| if (!cn) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = read_credential(cn, (void**) &creds_password, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn); |
| else |
| *ret_is_hashed = false; |
| } else if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't read credential '%s', ignoring: %m", cn); |
| else |
| *ret_is_hashed = true; |
| |
| *ret_password = TAKE_PTR(creds_password); |
| |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| #if HAVE_OPENSSL |
| |
| #define CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE 4096 |
| |
| static const sd_id128_t credential_app_id = |
| SD_ID128_MAKE(d3,ac,ec,ba,0d,ad,4c,df,b8,c9,38,15,28,93,6c,58); |
| |
| struct credential_host_secret_format { |
| /* The hashed machine ID of the machine this belongs to. Why? We want to ensure that each machine |
| * gets its own secret, even if people forget to flush out this secret file. Hence we bind it to the |
| * machine ID, for which there's hopefully a better chance it will be flushed out. We use a hashed |
| * machine ID instead of the literal one, because it's trivial to, and it might be a good idea not |
| * being able to directly associate a secret key file with a host. */ |
| sd_id128_t machine_id; |
| |
| /* The actual secret key */ |
| uint8_t data[CREDENTIAL_HOST_SECRET_SIZE]; |
| } _packed_; |
| |
| static void warn_not_encrypted(int fd, CredentialSecretFlags flags, const char *dirname, const char *filename) { |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(fd >= 0); |
| assert(dirname); |
| assert(filename); |
| |
| if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED)) |
| return; |
| |
| r = fd_is_encrypted(fd); |
| if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine if credential secret file '%s/%s' is encrypted.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| else if (r == 0) |
| log_warning("Credential secret file '%s/%s' is not located on encrypted media, using anyway.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| } |
| |
| static int make_credential_host_secret( |
| int dfd, |
| const sd_id128_t machine_id, |
| CredentialSecretFlags flags, |
| const char *dirname, |
| const char *fn, |
| void **ret_data, |
| size_t *ret_size) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; |
| _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(dfd >= 0); |
| assert(fn); |
| |
| /* For non-root users creating a temporary file using the openat(2) over "." will fail later, in the |
| * linkat(2) step at the end. The reason is that linkat(2) requires the CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH |
| * capability when it uses the AT_EMPTY_PATH flag. */ |
| if (have_effective_cap(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) > 0) { |
| fd = openat(dfd, ".", O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_TMPFILE, 0400); |
| if (fd < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary credential file with O_TMPFILE, proceeding without: %m"); |
| } |
| if (fd < 0) { |
| if (asprintf(&t, "credential.secret.%016" PRIx64, random_u64()) < 0) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| fd = openat(dfd, t, O_CLOEXEC|O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_NOFOLLOW, 0400); |
| if (fd < 0) |
| return -errno; |
| } |
| |
| r = chattr_secret(fd, 0); |
| if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set file attributes for secrets file, ignoring: %m"); |
| |
| struct credential_host_secret_format buf = { |
| .machine_id = machine_id, |
| }; |
| |
| CLEANUP_ERASE(buf); |
| |
| r = crypto_random_bytes(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data)); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| r = loop_write(fd, &buf, sizeof(buf), false); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| if (fsync(fd) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| warn_not_encrypted(fd, flags, dirname, fn); |
| |
| if (t) { |
| r = rename_noreplace(dfd, t, dfd, fn); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| |
| t = mfree(t); |
| } else if (linkat(fd, "", dfd, fn, AT_EMPTY_PATH) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| if (fsync(dfd) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_data) { |
| void *copy; |
| |
| copy = memdup(buf.data, sizeof(buf.data)); |
| if (!copy) { |
| r = -ENOMEM; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| *ret_data = copy; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_size) |
| *ret_size = sizeof(buf.data); |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| fail: |
| if (t && unlinkat(dfd, t, 0) < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remove temporary credential key: %m"); |
| |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *_dirname = NULL, *_filename = NULL; |
| _cleanup_close_ int dfd = -EBADF; |
| sd_id128_t machine_id; |
| const char *dirname, *filename; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = sd_id128_get_machine_app_specific(credential_app_id, &machine_id); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| const char *e = secure_getenv("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_SECRET"); |
| if (e) { |
| if (!path_is_normalized(e)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| if (!path_is_absolute(e)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| r = path_extract_directory(e, &_dirname); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| r = path_extract_filename(e, &_filename); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| dirname = _dirname; |
| filename = _filename; |
| } else { |
| dirname = "/var/lib/systemd"; |
| filename = "credential.secret"; |
| } |
| |
| mkdir_parents(dirname, 0755); |
| dfd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, dirname, O_CLOEXEC, 0755); |
| if (dfd < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(dfd, "Failed to create or open directory '%s': %m", dirname); |
| |
| if (FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS)) { |
| r = fd_is_temporary_fs(dfd); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to check directory '%s': %m", dirname); |
| if (r > 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEDIUM), |
| "Directory '%s' is on a temporary file system, refusing.", dirname); |
| } |
| |
| for (unsigned attempt = 0;; attempt++) { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) struct credential_host_secret_format *f = NULL; |
| _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; |
| size_t l = 0; |
| ssize_t n = 0; |
| struct stat st; |
| |
| if (attempt >= 3) /* Somebody is playing games with us */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), |
| "All attempts to create secret store in %s failed.", dirname); |
| |
| fd = openat(dfd, filename, O_CLOEXEC|O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW); |
| if (fd < 0) { |
| if (errno != ENOENT || !FLAGS_SET(flags, CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE)) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| "Failed to open %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| |
| |
| r = make_credential_host_secret(dfd, machine_id, flags, dirname, filename, ret, ret_size); |
| if (r == -EEXIST) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Credential secret %s/%s appeared while we were creating it, rereading.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| continue; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create credential secret %s/%s: %m", |
| dirname, filename); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| |
| r = stat_verify_regular(&st); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "%s/%s is not a regular file: %m", dirname, filename); |
| if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Deleted by now, try again */ |
| continue; |
| if (st.st_nlink > 1) |
| /* Our deletion check won't work if hardlinked somewhere else */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| "%s/%s has too many links, refusing.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| if ((st.st_mode & 07777) != 0400) |
| /* Don't use file if not 0400 access mode */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| "%s/%s has permissive access mode, refusing.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| l = st.st_size; |
| if (l < offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data) + 1) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "%s/%s is too small, refusing.", dirname, filename); |
| if (l > 16*1024*1024) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(E2BIG), |
| "%s/%s is too big, refusing.", dirname, filename); |
| |
| f = malloc(l+1); |
| if (!f) |
| return log_oom_debug(); |
| |
| n = read(fd, f, l+1); |
| if (n < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| "Failed to read %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| if ((size_t) n != l) /* What? The size changed? */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), |
| "Failed to read %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| |
| if (sd_id128_equal(machine_id, f->machine_id)) { |
| size_t sz; |
| |
| warn_not_encrypted(fd, flags, dirname, filename); |
| |
| sz = l - offsetof(struct credential_host_secret_format, data); |
| assert(sz > 0); |
| |
| if (ret) { |
| void *copy; |
| |
| assert(sz <= sizeof(f->data)); /* Ensure we don't read past f->data bounds */ |
| |
| copy = memdup(f->data, sz); |
| if (!copy) |
| return log_oom_debug(); |
| |
| *ret = copy; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_size) |
| *ret_size = sz; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Hmm, this secret is from somewhere else. Let's delete the file. Let's first acquire a lock |
| * to ensure we are the only ones accessing the file while we delete it. */ |
| |
| if (flock(fd, LOCK_EX) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, |
| "Failed to flock %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| |
| /* Before we delete it check that the file is still linked into the file system */ |
| if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| if (st.st_nlink == 0) /* Already deleted by now? */ |
| continue; |
| if (st.st_nlink != 1) /* Safety check, someone is playing games with us */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), |
| "%s/%s unexpectedly has too many links.", |
| dirname, filename); |
| if (unlinkat(dfd, filename, 0) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unlink %s/%s: %m", dirname, filename); |
| |
| /* And now try again */ |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Construction is like this: |
| * |
| * A symmetric encryption key is derived from: |
| * |
| * 1. Either the "host" key (a key stored in /var/lib/credential.secret) |
| * |
| * 2. A key generated by letting the TPM2 calculate an HMAC hash of some nonce we pass to it, keyed |
| * by a key derived from its internal seed key. |
| * |
| * 3. The concatenation of the above. |
| * |
| * 4. Or a fixed "empty" key. This will not provide confidentiality or authenticity, of course, but is |
| * useful to encode credentials for the initrd on TPM-less systems, where we simply have no better |
| * concept to bind things to. Note that decryption of a key set up like this will be refused on |
| * systems that have a TPM and have SecureBoot enabled. |
| * |
| * The above is hashed with SHA256 which is then used as encryption key for AES256-GCM. The encrypted |
| * credential is a short (unencrypted) header describing which of the three keys to use, the IV to use for |
| * AES256-GCM and some more meta information (sizes of certain objects) that is strictly speaking redundant, |
| * but kinda nice to have since we can have a more generic parser. If the TPM2 key is used this is followed |
| * by another (unencrypted) header, with information about the TPM2 policy used (specifically: the PCR mask |
| * to bind against, and a hash of the resulting policy — the latter being redundant, but speeding up things a |
| * bit, since we can more quickly refuse PCR state), followed by a sealed/exported TPM2 HMAC key. This is |
| * then followed by the encrypted data, which begins with a metadata header (which contains validity |
| * timestamps as well as the credential name), followed by the actual credential payload. The file ends in |
| * the AES256-GCM tag. To make things simple, the AES256-GCM AAD covers the main and the TPM2 header in |
| * full. This means the whole file is either protected by AAD, or is ciphertext, or is the tag. No |
| * unprotected data is included. |
| */ |
| |
| struct _packed_ encrypted_credential_header { |
| sd_id128_t id; |
| le32_t key_size; |
| le32_t block_size; |
| le32_t iv_size; |
| le32_t tag_size; |
| uint8_t iv[]; |
| /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| }; |
| |
| struct _packed_ tpm2_credential_header { |
| le64_t pcr_mask; /* Note that the spec for PC Clients only mandates 24 PCRs, and that's what systems |
| * generally have. But keep the door open for more. */ |
| le16_t pcr_bank; /* For now, either TPM2_ALG_SHA256 or TPM2_ALG_SHA1 */ |
| le16_t primary_alg; /* Primary key algorithm (either TPM2_ALG_RSA or TPM2_ALG_ECC for now) */ |
| le32_t blob_size; |
| le32_t policy_hash_size; |
| uint8_t policy_hash_and_blob[]; |
| /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| }; |
| |
| struct _packed_ tpm2_public_key_credential_header { |
| le64_t pcr_mask; /* PCRs used for the public key PCR policy (usually just PCR 11, i.e. the unified kernel) */ |
| le32_t size; /* Size of DER public key */ |
| uint8_t data[]; /* DER public key */ |
| /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| }; |
| |
| struct _packed_ metadata_credential_header { |
| le64_t timestamp; |
| le64_t not_after; |
| le32_t name_size; |
| char name[]; |
| /* Followed by NUL bytes until next 8 byte boundary */ |
| }; |
| |
| /* Some generic limit for parts of the encrypted credential for which we don't know the right size ahead of |
| * time, but where we are really sure it won't be larger than this. Should be larger than any possible IV, |
| * padding, tag size and so on. This is purely used for early filtering out of invalid sizes. */ |
| #define CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX (16U*1024U) |
| |
| static int sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key( |
| const void *host_key, |
| size_t host_key_size, |
| const void *tpm2_key, |
| size_t tpm2_key_size, |
| uint8_t ret[static SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(EVP_MD_CTX_freep) EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL; |
| unsigned l; |
| |
| assert(host_key_size == 0 || host_key); |
| assert(tpm2_key_size == 0 || tpm2_key); |
| assert(ret); |
| |
| /* Combines the host key and the TPM2 HMAC hash into a SHA256 hash value we'll use as symmetric encryption key. */ |
| |
| md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); |
| if (!md) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initial SHA256 context."); |
| |
| if (host_key && EVP_DigestUpdate(md, host_key, host_key_size) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash host key."); |
| |
| if (tpm2_key && EVP_DigestUpdate(md, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to hash TPM2 key."); |
| |
| assert(EVP_MD_CTX_size(md) == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| |
| if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, ret, &l) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize SHA256 hash."); |
| |
| assert(l == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int encrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| sd_id128_t with_key, |
| const char *name, |
| usec_t timestamp, |
| usec_t not_after, |
| const char *tpm2_device, |
| uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, |
| const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, |
| uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, |
| const void *input, |
| size_t input_size, |
| void **ret, |
| size_t *ret_size) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL; |
| size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, tpm2_blob_size = 0, tpm2_policy_hash_size = 0, output_size, p, ml; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *tpm2_blob = NULL, *tpm2_policy_hash = NULL, *iv = NULL, *output = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ struct metadata_credential_header *m = NULL; |
| uint16_t tpm2_pcr_bank = 0, tpm2_primary_alg = 0; |
| struct encrypted_credential_header *h; |
| int ksz, bsz, ivsz, tsz, added, r; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *pubkey = NULL; |
| size_t pubkey_size = 0; |
| uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cc; |
| sd_id128_t id; |
| |
| assert(input || input_size == 0); |
| assert(ret); |
| assert(ret_size); |
| |
| if (!sd_id128_in_set(with_key, |
| _CRED_AUTO, |
| _CRED_AUTO_INITRD, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid key type: " SD_ID128_FORMAT_STR, SD_ID128_FORMAT_VAL(with_key)); |
| |
| if (name && !credential_name_valid(name)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid credential name: %s", name); |
| |
| if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY && timestamp != USEC_INFINITY && not_after < timestamp) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Credential is invalidated before it is valid (" USEC_FMT " < " USEC_FMT ").", not_after, timestamp); |
| |
| if (DEBUG_LOGGING) { |
| char buf[FORMAT_TIMESTAMP_MAX]; |
| |
| if (name) |
| log_debug("Including credential name '%s' in encrypted credential.", name); |
| if (timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) |
| log_debug("Including timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), timestamp)); |
| if (not_after != USEC_INFINITY) |
| log_debug("Including not-after timestamp '%s' in encrypted credential.", format_timestamp(buf, sizeof(buf), not_after)); |
| } |
| |
| if (sd_id128_in_set(with_key, |
| _CRED_AUTO, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK)) { |
| |
| r = get_credential_host_secret( |
| CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE| |
| CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED| |
| (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO) ? CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS : 0), |
| &host_key, |
| &host_key_size); |
| if (r == -ENOMEDIUM && sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO)) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Credential host secret location on temporary file system, not using."); |
| else if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential host secret: %m"); |
| } |
| |
| #if HAVE_TPM2 |
| bool try_tpm2; |
| if (sd_id128_in_set(with_key, _CRED_AUTO, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) { |
| /* If automatic mode is selected lets see if a TPM2 it is present. If we are running in a |
| * container tpm2_support will detect this, and will return a different flag combination of |
| * TPM2_SUPPORT_FULL, effectively skipping the use of TPM2 when inside one. */ |
| |
| try_tpm2 = tpm2_support() == TPM2_SUPPORT_FULL; |
| if (!try_tpm2) |
| log_debug("System lacks TPM2 support or running in a container, not attempting to use TPM2."); |
| } else |
| try_tpm2 = sd_id128_in_set(with_key, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK); |
| |
| if (try_tpm2) { |
| if (sd_id128_in_set(with_key, |
| _CRED_AUTO, |
| _CRED_AUTO_INITRD, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, |
| CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK)) { |
| |
| /* Load public key for PCR policies, if one is specified, or explicitly requested */ |
| |
| r = tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(tpm2_pubkey_path, &pubkey, &pubkey_size); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (tpm2_pubkey_path || r != -ENOENT || !sd_id128_in_set(with_key, _CRED_AUTO, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed read TPM PCR public key: %m"); |
| |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to read TPM2 PCR public key, proceeding without: %m"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!pubkey) |
| tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask = 0; |
| |
| r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_device, |
| tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, |
| pubkey, pubkey_size, |
| tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, |
| /* pin= */ NULL, |
| &tpm2_key, &tpm2_key_size, |
| &tpm2_blob, &tpm2_blob_size, |
| &tpm2_policy_hash, &tpm2_policy_hash_size, |
| &tpm2_pcr_bank, |
| &tpm2_primary_alg); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) |
| log_warning("TPM2 present and used, but we didn't manage to talk to it. Credential will be refused if SecureBoot is enabled."); |
| else if (!sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO)) |
| return r; |
| |
| log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 sealing didn't work, continuing without TPM2: %m"); |
| } |
| |
| assert(tpm2_blob_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| assert(tpm2_policy_hash_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (sd_id128_in_set(with_key, _CRED_AUTO, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) { |
| /* Let's settle the key type in auto mode now. */ |
| |
| if (host_key && tpm2_key) |
| id = pubkey ? CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC; |
| else if (tpm2_key) |
| id = pubkey ? CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK : CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC; |
| else if (host_key) |
| id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST; |
| else if (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD)) |
| id = CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT; |
| else |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE), |
| "TPM2 not available and host key located on temporary file system, no encryption key available."); |
| } else |
| id = with_key; |
| |
| if (sd_id128_equal(id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT)) |
| log_warning("Using a null key for encryption and signing. Confidentiality or authenticity will not be provided."); |
| |
| /* Let's now take the host key and the TPM2 key and hash it together, to use as encryption key for the data */ |
| r = sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm()); |
| |
| ksz = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc); |
| assert(ksz == sizeof(md)); |
| |
| bsz = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc); |
| assert(bsz > 0); |
| assert((size_t) bsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| |
| ivsz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cc); |
| if (ivsz > 0) { |
| assert((size_t) ivsz <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX); |
| |
| iv = malloc(ivsz); |
| if (!iv) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| r = crypto_random_bytes(iv, ivsz); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquired randomized IV: %m"); |
| } |
| |
| tsz = 16; /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3 there is EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length(), until then let's hardcode this */ |
| |
| context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
| if (!context) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate encryption object: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, md, iv) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize encryption context: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| /* Just an upper estimate */ |
| output_size = |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz) + |
| ALIGN8(tpm2_key ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size : 0) + |
| ALIGN8(pubkey ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + pubkey_size : 0) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + strlen_ptr(name)) + |
| input_size + 2U * (size_t) bsz + |
| tsz; |
| |
| output = malloc0(output_size); |
| if (!output) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) output; |
| h->id = id; |
| h->block_size = htole32(bsz); |
| h->key_size = htole32(ksz); |
| h->tag_size = htole32(tsz); |
| h->iv_size = htole32(ivsz); |
| memcpy(h->iv, iv, ivsz); |
| |
| p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + ivsz); |
| |
| if (tpm2_key) { |
| struct tpm2_credential_header *t; |
| |
| t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output + p); |
| t->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_hash_pcr_mask); |
| t->pcr_bank = htole16(tpm2_pcr_bank); |
| t->primary_alg = htole16(tpm2_primary_alg); |
| t->blob_size = htole32(tpm2_blob_size); |
| t->policy_hash_size = htole32(tpm2_policy_hash_size); |
| memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob, tpm2_blob, tpm2_blob_size); |
| memcpy(t->policy_hash_and_blob + tpm2_blob_size, tpm2_policy_hash, tpm2_policy_hash_size); |
| |
| p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + tpm2_blob_size + tpm2_policy_hash_size); |
| } |
| |
| if (pubkey) { |
| struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header *z; |
| |
| z = (struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) output + p); |
| z->pcr_mask = htole64(tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask); |
| z->size = htole32(pubkey_size); |
| memcpy(z->data, pubkey, pubkey_size); |
| |
| p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + pubkey_size); |
| } |
| |
| /* Pass the encrypted + TPM2 header as AAD */ |
| if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, output, p) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| /* Now construct the metadata header */ |
| ml = strlen_ptr(name); |
| m = malloc0(ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)); |
| if (!m) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| m->timestamp = htole64(timestamp); |
| m->not_after = htole64(not_after); |
| m->name_size = htole32(ml); |
| memcpy_safe(m->name, name, ml); |
| |
| /* And encrypt the metadata header */ |
| if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, (const unsigned char*) m, ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + ml)) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt metadata header: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| assert(added >= 0); |
| assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); |
| p += added; |
| |
| /* Then encrypt the plaintext */ |
| if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added, input, input_size) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to encrypt data: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| assert(added >= 0); |
| assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); |
| p += added; |
| |
| /* Finalize */ |
| if (EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) output + p, &added) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to finalize data encryption: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| assert(added >= 0); |
| assert((size_t) added <= output_size - p); |
| p += added; |
| |
| assert(p <= output_size - tsz); |
| |
| /* Append tag */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, tsz, (uint8_t*) output + p) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to get tag: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| p += tsz; |
| assert(p <= output_size); |
| |
| if (DEBUG_LOGGING && input_size > 0) { |
| size_t base64_size; |
| |
| base64_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(p * 4, 3); /* Include base64 size increase in debug output */ |
| assert(base64_size >= input_size); |
| log_debug("Input of %zu bytes grew to output of %zu bytes (+%2zu%%).", input_size, base64_size, base64_size * 100 / input_size - 100); |
| } |
| |
| *ret = TAKE_PTR(output); |
| *ret_size = p; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int decrypt_credential_and_warn( |
| const char *validate_name, |
| usec_t validate_timestamp, |
| const char *tpm2_device, |
| const char *tpm2_signature_path, |
| const void *input, |
| size_t input_size, |
| void **ret, |
| size_t *ret_size) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *host_key = NULL, *tpm2_key = NULL, *plaintext = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *signature_json = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_freep) EVP_CIPHER_CTX *context = NULL; |
| size_t host_key_size = 0, tpm2_key_size = 0, plaintext_size, p, hs; |
| struct encrypted_credential_header *h; |
| struct metadata_credential_header *m; |
| uint8_t md[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| bool with_tpm2, with_host_key, is_tpm2_absent, with_tpm2_pk; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cc; |
| int r, added; |
| |
| assert(input || input_size == 0); |
| assert(ret); |
| assert(ret_size); |
| |
| h = (struct encrypted_credential_header*) input; |
| |
| /* The ID must fit in, for the current and all future formats */ |
| if (input_size < sizeof(h->id)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| |
| with_host_key = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK); |
| with_tpm2_pk = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK); |
| with_tpm2 = sd_id128_in_set(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC) || with_tpm2_pk; |
| is_tpm2_absent = sd_id128_equal(h->id, CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT); |
| |
| if (!with_host_key && !with_tpm2 && !is_tpm2_absent) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Unknown encryption format, or corrupted data: %m"); |
| |
| if (with_tpm2_pk) { |
| r = tpm2_load_pcr_signature(tpm2_signature_path, &signature_json); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| if (is_tpm2_absent) { |
| /* So this is a credential encrypted with a zero length key. We support this to cover for the |
| * case where neither a host key not a TPM2 are available (specifically: initrd environments |
| * where the host key is not yet accessible and no TPM2 chip exists at all), to minimize |
| * different codeflow for TPM2 and non-TPM2 codepaths. Of course, credentials encoded this |
| * way offer no confidentiality nor authenticity. Because of that it's important we refuse to |
| * use them on systems that actually *do* have a TPM2 chip – if we are in SecureBoot |
| * mode. Otherwise an attacker could hand us credentials like this and we'd use them thinking |
| * they are trusted, even though they are not. */ |
| |
| if (efi_has_tpm2()) { |
| if (is_efi_secure_boot()) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), |
| "Credential uses fixed key for fallback use when TPM2 is absent — but TPM2 is present, and SecureBoot is enabled, refusing."); |
| |
| log_warning("Credential uses fixed key for use when TPM2 is absent, but TPM2 is present! Accepting anyway, since SecureBoot is disabled."); |
| } else |
| log_debug("Credential uses fixed key for use when TPM2 is absent, and TPM2 indeed is absent. Accepting."); |
| } |
| |
| /* Now we know the minimum header size */ |
| if (input_size < offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| |
| /* Verify some basic header values */ |
| if (le32toh(h->key_size) != sizeof(md)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); |
| if (le32toh(h->block_size) <= 0 || le32toh(h->block_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); |
| if (le32toh(h->iv_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "IV size too large."); |
| if (le32toh(h->tag_size) != 16) /* FIXME: On OpenSSL 3, let's verify via EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_tag_length() */ |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected tag size in header."); |
| |
| /* Ensure we have space for the full header now (we don't know the size of the name hence this is a |
| * lower limit only) */ |
| if (input_size < |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + |
| ALIGN8(with_tpm2 ? offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) : 0) + |
| ALIGN8(with_tpm2_pk ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) : 0) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| |
| p = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)); |
| |
| if (with_tpm2) { |
| #if HAVE_TPM2 |
| struct tpm2_credential_header* t = (struct tpm2_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input + p); |
| struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header *z = NULL; |
| |
| if (!TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(t->pcr_mask)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range."); |
| if (!tpm2_hash_alg_to_string(le16toh(t->pcr_bank))) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR bank invalid or not supported"); |
| if (!tpm2_asym_alg_to_string(le16toh(t->primary_alg))) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 primary key algorithm invalid or not supported."); |
| if (le32toh(t->blob_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 blob size."); |
| if (le32toh(t->policy_hash_size) > CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected TPM2 policy hash size."); |
| |
| /* Ensure we have space for the full TPM2 header now (still don't know the name, and its size |
| * though, hence still just a lower limit test only) */ |
| if (input_size < |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + le32toh(t->blob_size) + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)) + |
| ALIGN8(with_tpm2_pk ? offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) : 0) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| |
| p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + |
| le32toh(t->blob_size) + |
| le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)); |
| |
| if (with_tpm2_pk) { |
| z = (struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header*) ((uint8_t*) input + p); |
| |
| if (!TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(le64toh(z->pcr_mask)) || le64toh(z->pcr_mask) == 0) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "TPM2 PCR mask out of range."); |
| if (le32toh(z->size) > PUBLIC_KEY_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected public key size."); |
| |
| if (input_size < |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct encrypted_credential_header, iv) + le32toh(h->iv_size)) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_credential_header, policy_hash_and_blob) + le32toh(t->blob_size) + le32toh(t->policy_hash_size)) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + le32toh(z->size)) + |
| ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name)) + |
| le32toh(h->tag_size)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Encrypted file too short."); |
| |
| p += ALIGN8(offsetof(struct tpm2_public_key_credential_header, data) + |
| le32toh(z->size)); |
| } |
| |
| r = tpm2_unseal(tpm2_device, |
| le64toh(t->pcr_mask), |
| le16toh(t->pcr_bank), |
| z ? z->data : NULL, |
| z ? le32toh(z->size) : 0, |
| z ? le64toh(z->pcr_mask) : 0, |
| signature_json, |
| /* pin= */ NULL, |
| le16toh(t->primary_alg), |
| t->policy_hash_and_blob, |
| le32toh(t->blob_size), |
| t->policy_hash_and_blob + le32toh(t->blob_size), |
| le32toh(t->policy_hash_size), |
| &tpm2_key, |
| &tpm2_key_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| #else |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Credential requires TPM2 support, but TPM2 support not available."); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (with_host_key) { |
| r = get_credential_host_secret( |
| 0, |
| &host_key, |
| &host_key_size); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine local credential key: %m"); |
| } |
| |
| if (is_tpm2_absent) |
| log_warning("Warning: using a null key for decryption and authentication. Confidentiality or authenticity are not provided."); |
| |
| sha256_hash_host_and_tpm2_key(host_key, host_key_size, tpm2_key, tpm2_key_size, md); |
| |
| assert_se(cc = EVP_aes_256_gcm()); |
| |
| /* Make sure cipher expectations match the header */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->key_size)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected key size in header."); |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cc) != (int) le32toh(h->block_size)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Unexpected block size in header."); |
| |
| context = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); |
| if (!context) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOMEM), "Failed to allocate decryption object: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, cc, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to initialize decryption context: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, le32toh(h->iv_size), NULL) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV size on decryption context: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(context, NULL, NULL, md, h->iv) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set IV and key: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(context, NULL, &added, input, p) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to write AAD data: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| plaintext = malloc(input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); |
| if (!plaintext) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| if (EVP_DecryptUpdate( |
| context, |
| plaintext, |
| &added, |
| (uint8_t*) input + p, |
| input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to decrypt data: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| assert(added >= 0); |
| assert((size_t) added <= input_size - p - le32toh(h->tag_size)); |
| plaintext_size = added; |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(context, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, le32toh(h->tag_size), (uint8_t*) input + input_size - le32toh(h->tag_size)) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to set tag: %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(context, (uint8_t*) plaintext + plaintext_size, &added) != 1) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Decryption failed (incorrect key?): %s", |
| ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); |
| |
| plaintext_size += added; |
| |
| if (plaintext_size < ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name))) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); |
| |
| m = plaintext; |
| |
| if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && |
| le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && |
| le64toh(m->timestamp) >= le64toh(m->not_after)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Timestamps of credential are not in order, refusing."); |
| |
| if (le32toh(m->name_size) > CREDENTIAL_NAME_MAX) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name too long, refusing."); |
| |
| hs = ALIGN8(offsetof(struct metadata_credential_header, name) + le32toh(m->name_size)); |
| if (plaintext_size < hs) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Metadata header incomplete."); |
| |
| if (le32toh(m->name_size) > 0) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *embedded_name = NULL; |
| |
| r = make_cstring(m->name, le32toh(m->name_size), MAKE_CSTRING_REFUSE_TRAILING_NUL, &embedded_name); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Unable to convert embedded credential name to C string: %m"); |
| |
| if (!credential_name_valid(embedded_name)) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Embedded credential name is not valid, refusing."); |
| |
| if (validate_name && !streq(embedded_name, validate_name)) { |
| |
| r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME"); |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NAME: %m"); |
| if (r != 0) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTE), "Embedded credential name '%s' does not match filename '%s', refusing.", embedded_name, validate_name); |
| |
| log_debug("Embedded credential name '%s' does not match expected name '%s', but configured to use credential anyway.", embedded_name, validate_name); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (validate_timestamp != USEC_INFINITY) { |
| if (le64toh(m->timestamp) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->timestamp) > validate_timestamp) |
| log_debug("Credential timestamp is from the future, assuming clock skew."); |
| |
| if (le64toh(m->not_after) != USEC_INFINITY && le64toh(m->not_after) < validate_timestamp) { |
| |
| r = getenv_bool_secure("SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER"); |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CREDENTIAL_VALIDATE_NOT_AFTER: %m"); |
| if (r != 0) |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Credential's time passed, refusing to use."); |
| |
| log_debug("Credential not-after timestamp has passed, but configured to use credential anyway."); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ret) { |
| char *without_metadata; |
| |
| without_metadata = memdup((uint8_t*) plaintext + hs, plaintext_size - hs); |
| if (!without_metadata) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| *ret = without_metadata; |
| } |
| |
| if (ret_size) |
| *ret_size = plaintext_size - hs; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| #else |
| |
| int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| } |
| |
| int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| } |
| |
| int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const char *tpm2_signature_path, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { |
| return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "Support for encrypted credentials not available."); |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
